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The increase in the use of online banking and other alternative banking channels has 
led to improved flexibility for customers but also an increase in the amount of fraud 
across these channels. The industry recommendation for banks and other financial 
institutions is to use multi-factor customer authentication to reduce the risk of 
identity theft and fraud for those choosing to use such banking channels. There are 
few multi-factor authentication solutions available for banks to use that offer a 
convenient security procedure across all banking channels. The CodeSure card 
presented in this research is such a device offering a convenient, multi-channel, two-
factor code-based security solution based on the ubiquitous Chip-and-PIN bank card. 
In order for the CodeSure card to find acceptance as a usable security solution, it 
must be shown to be easy to use and it must also be easy for customers to understand 
what they are being asked to do, and how they can achieve it. This need for a 
usability study forms the basis of the research reported here. 
The CodeSure card is also shown to play a role in combating identity theft. With the 
growing popularity of online channels, this research also looks at the threat of 
phishing and malware, and awareness of users about these threats. Many banks have 
ceased the use of email as a means to communicate with their customers as a result 
of the phishing threat, and an investigation into using the CodeSure card's reverse 
(sender) authentication mode is explored as a potential solution in regaining trust in 
the email channel and reintroducing it as a means for the bank to communicate with 
its customers. 
In the 8 experiments presented in this study the CodeSure card was rated acceptably 
high in terms of mean usability. Overall, the research reported here is offered in 
support of the thesis that a usable security solution predicated on code-based multi-
factor authentication will result in tangible improvements to actual security levels in 
banking and eCommerce services, and that the CodeSure card as described here can 
form the basis of such a usable security solution. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The thesis expounded in this research is that a usable security solution predicated on 
code-based multi-factor authentication will result in tangible improvements to actual 
security levels in banking and eCommerce services, and that the CodeSure card as 
described here can form the basis of such a usable security solution. The research 
reported here is presented as an extensive study into usability engineering aspects of 
such a usable security solution based around the CodeSure card. 
Since the beginning of the 21st Century there has been a major increase in the use of 
online banking, with 6 in 10 of those who are connected to the Internet now checking 
their bank accounts online1. This is coupled with an increase in the number of 
banking ‘channels’ available for customers to use. While this has given more 
flexibility to their customers, it has also led to a corresponding increase in fraud 
across all such channels, leading to a perceived trade-off between convenience and 
security. 
                                                 
1 Source: Ipsos (http://ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5573, 2012). 
1 
Early adopters of these new banking channels were technology enthusiasts, 
computer-savvy individuals who recognised the benefits of the new technologies but 
were also aware of the risks. Nowadays, customers have a broader range of 
competencies and many are not aware of the risks, or at least not completely aware if 
the responsibility for security lies with them or the bank. To reduce the risk of 
identity theft and fraud, it is now recommended that financial institutions use multi-
factor (at least two-factor) authentication, where the factors should be two different 
aspects of what customers have, what customers know and what customers are. 
Although there are many multi-factor authentication solutions currently being 
adopted, few offer a convenient security procedure across all banking channels, most 
being tailored for, or suited to, a limited set of channels. The CodeSure card 
presented in this research is a recent innovation that offers a convenient multi-
channel, two-factor security solution based on the familiar, ubiquitous Chip-and-PIN 
bank card, modified to include extra electronics and functionality for code-based 
multi-factor security. 
Very little research has been reported on the usability of such multi-factor security 
devices and in order for the CodeSure card to find acceptance, it must be shown to be 
easy to use and it must also be easy for customers to understand what they are being 
asked to do, and how they can achieve it. This need for a usability study forms the 
basis of the research reported here. 
With the growing popularity of online channels, this research also looks at the 
growing threat of phishing and malware, and awareness of users about these threats. 
Email communication, for example, from banks has almost disappeared due to the 
prevalence of phishing emails and the resulting mistrust from customers. Indeed, 
many banks are now telling their customers that they will never communicate to 
them by email and if they receive any such emails then they must be fraudulent. 
Having reverse (sender) authentication where the bank authenticates itself with the 
user would perhaps reintroduce a feeling of trust where it no longer exists. The 
CodeSure card with its reverse authentication mode, and its inherent convenience, 
offers a solution for this problem. 
2 
1.1. Contribution 
Although there have previously been attempts to define a methodology for 
assessment of usability of security systems, these have achieved only limited success. 
The work reported here contributes to knowledge with a detailed study and 
investigation into the usability assessment of the CodeSure card as the basis for a 
usable security solution. This research presents a usability assessment methodology 
based on the ISO definition (effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction) along with 
measurements of ease of use, convenience, perceived security and associated 
performance metrics. 
The main contribution to knowledge arising from this research is the empirical 
evaluation of a novel multi-factor and multi-channel authentication device in the 
domain of usable security. This exhaustive study of 8 experiments demonstrates for 
the first time the high usability scores for the CodeSure card and evidence that 
customers appreciate the need for a usable security solution. It also highlights the 
importance of sender authentication technology when using a device as a second 
factor for verification. 
This work also offers new findings concerning the conflict between usability and 
perceived security with respect to multi-factor authentication, showing the 
limitations of social engineering approaches in combating phishing and, unlike other 
studies using students, is based on large scale experiments with banking customers. 
1.2. Outline 
Chapter 2 provides the background to this research. It begins with an introduction to 
banking channels and the problems associated with achieving their security. It 
includes an overview of authentication methods and the need for multi-factor 
authentication, followed by an introduction to the CodeSure card as a unique 
candidate for a two-factor solution across all banking channels. Malware and 
phishing are introduced with an emphasis on identity theft, and some of the various 
techniques used by fraudsters today are detailed. This is concluded with an 
introduction to usability engineering, along with some background on defining and 
measuring usability and the methodology that is used in usability experiments. There 
3 
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is also a description of gaze tracking, an increasingly popular data collection 
technique used in usability experiments. 
In Chapter 3 a set of 3 experiments are described that investigate the usability of the 
CodeSure card. The first experiment investigates the usability of the card in a 
longitudinal study over 10 uses of passcode generation. Based on the findings of that 
experiment, the second experiment uses a simulation of a CodeSure card running on 
a tablet device to investigate some of the usability issues identified in the first 
experiment, comparing the baseline design (used in the first experiment) with an 
enhanced design. The third experiment uses a different simulation of the CodeSure 
card with a gaze tracking camera to investigate gaze behaviour during use of the 
CodeSure card. 
Chapter 4 presents a usability experiment that investigates the use of the CodeSure 
card for multi-channel authentication, comparing use of the CodeSure card with use 
of the existing disparate security processes across three different channels: online 
shopping, Internet banking and automated telephone banking. 
For Chapter 5, the problems of identity theft in online channels and the use of the 
CodeSure card in reverse authentication are investigated with a further 4 
experiments. The first experiment looks at phishing awareness and the propensity for 
participants to click on fraudulent emails. The second experiment then investigates 
the role that education can play in reducing fraud rates. The third experiment 
investigates participant reaction to anti-malware software as a measure of protection 
that banks can offer customers during Internet banking sessions and 3 levels of 
intrusiveness of anti-malware software are investigated to see which participants 
preferred and trusted the most. The fourth experiment investigates the reverse / 
sender authentication capabilities of the CodeSure card for 3 banking channels. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the research findings and 
suggestions for future work. 
Chapter 2. Research Background & Methodology 
Historically, customers have had a limited choice of ‘channels’ with which to make 
contact with their bank or access their money: using the postal service, making a 
telephone call or interacting face-to-face in a branch with bank staff. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the number of banking channels has expanded 
significantly with the proliferation of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) facilities, 
automated telephone banking, text messaging, mobile phone banking (mBanking) 
and Internet banking (eBanking or online banking) (Centeno, 2004). Widespread 
adoption of new consumer channels such as Internet shopping (eCommerce) and 
mobile phone shopping (mCommerce) by consumers has also led to a massive 
increase in the number of (Card Not Present, CNP) Internet transactions. In 2012, 
more than 60%2 of calls to the bank were handled by an automated service and more 
than 90%3 of all consumer purchases on the Internet were CNP transactions. The 
proliferation of these new channels has resulted in a measured increase in fraud and 
                                                 
2 Private communication with Lloyds Banking Group. 
3 Source: Visa Europe. 
5 
there is growing pressure on banks to offer customers improved security when 
accessing modern banking channels to minimise the impact of customer identity 
theft. 
2.1. eBanking and Security 
Offering more channels for customers to do banking and payment transactions 
presents an opportunity for banks to give their customers more flexibility in 
accessing their accounts whilst reducing business costs and in some cases deriving 
competitive advantage. However, use of such ‘remote’ or ‘direct’ channels comes at 
a price in terms of security. The perceived trade-off between customer convenience 
and security is at the heart of the issues facing banks today (Lichtenstein and 
Williamson, 2006; Weir et al., 2009) in their attempts to migrate customers towards 
more widespread use of automated services and their associated fight against the 
criminals who seek to take advantage of this. A study of 23,000 Internet users in 
Europe found that 40% are holding back from using online banking due to security 
worries (Ranger, 2005). An additional problem for banks is that having multiple 
channels means that there are more areas where they are vulnerable to attack and 
criminals will find the weakest link for their attacks (Jowitt, 2011). Criminal gangs 
can fraudulently obtain a targeted customer’s account details and security details via 
email contact (phishing) or via telephone contact (vishing) and then use these details 
to gain access to the targeted customer’s accounts via the bank’s Internet banking site 
or telephone banking service. 
It is not always clear who is responsible for losses occurring with (Internet) banking. 
In the USA a bank refused to accept any responsibility when a user’s computer was 
infected with a key-logger trojan4 and criminals stole $90,000 from the account 
(Henry, 2006). In Canada, where banks have a 100% reimbursement guarantee 
against online fraud, one study (Manna and van Oorschot, 2007) showed that 85% of 
users were unable to state any of the conditions required for the guarantee to be 
                                                 
4 A trojan is a type of malicious software (malware) that masquerades as a legitimate file or helpful 
program with the ultimate purpose of granting a criminal unauthorized access to a computer. 
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upheld. The UK has a similar 100% reimbursement policy. In China, victims must 
prove that the fault lies with the bank before they get any reimbursement (Manna and 
van Oorschot, 2007). 
The early adopters of Internet banking were technology enthusiasts and computer-
savvy individuals. With banks now pushing Internet banking to all of their customers 
to save on costs and provide added convenience, there is a much wider customer 
base, and therefore wider range of customer competencies, that needs to be catered 
for. The greatest business challenge is that of security; banks often have unrealistic 
expectations of the awareness of users when it comes to security (Manna and van 
Oorschot, 2007), specifically in terms of password policies, keeping security 
software up to date and reading banking agreements. 
The role of a security procedure in a banking system is to prevent unauthorised 
individuals from accessing the system whilst allowing access for the genuine 
customer. Customer authentication (O’Gorman, 2003; Renaud, 2005) involves firstly 
identification, where a user will typically claim an identity by name or account 
number, or via a previously registered username or customer code. This is followed 
by a verification process which is the most critical and in which users can 
authenticate themselves by one or more of three factors (Smith, 2001): what they 
have (an object or device owned by or assigned to the user by the bank, such as a 
credit or debit card, a mobile phone or a token generator); what they know (a security 
token which is known only to the user and the bank, such as a password); or what 
they are (a measurable property of a user – a biometric, for example a fingerprint, a 
palmprint or a voiceprint). 
Using only one of these factors to perform customer authentication is no longer 
recommended in online banking due to concerns about fraud, and financial services 
authorities and the security industry are now recommending the use of multi-factor 
authentication (Beaumier, 2006; FFIEC, 2005; Henry, 2006; Viega, 2005). By using 
more than one factor in authentication, the impact of the security limitations in each 
can be minimised (Renaud, 2005). 
Interestingly, use of the ATM has required two-factor authentication since its 
introduction in the early 1960s. Customers are required to know a secret PIN number 
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and have their ATM card in their possession. Since 2004, the introduction of Chip 
and PIN technology in the UK takes this same two-factor authentication approach 
(know a PIN and have a card) at counters in shops and in bank branches (Figure 
2.1a) and has served to reduce fraud in CNP transactions. In the period 2004 to 2010, 
domestic fraud annual losses on UK-issued (Chip and PIN) cards fell by some 34% 
(King, 2012). 
 
(a) Chip and PIN card in a 
terminal (tethered) at a counter. 
(b) Chip and PIN card in a card 
reader device to generate OTP. 
(c) The CodeSure card integrates OTP generation in the card. 
Figure 2.1: The CodeSure Card for Code-based Security 
The security limitations of a fixed PIN for a card have been addressed by a variety of 
solutions. One time passcodes (OTPs) can be used for customer or transaction 
authentication purposes. Several European banks send customers printed lists of 
Transaction Authentication Numbers (TANs) to use for authentication (Hiltgen et al., 
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2006; Reavley, 2005). After logging into their account (with information they know), 
customers must also enter one of their TANs (information they have) as an extra 
level of security against fraud. To provide additional safeguard against phishing 
attacks, banks also ask for a specific TAN in the list rather than just any one since 
once a TAN is used it can no longer be used for future transactions. 
Rather than provide printed TANs to customers, banks are now moving towards the 
use of digital token generators which are able to automatically generate OTPs based 
on encryption algorithms aligned to the customer’s account; or involve the use of a 
portable card reader (Figure 2.1b) requiring the customer to insert their bank card in 
order to generate an OTP. One study investigated the usability of digital OTP 
generators (Weir et al., 2009) and found that users placed higher importance on the 
convenience of such devices when compared to the increased security that they offer. 
The disadvantages with OTP generators are that customers may end up acquiring 
several such devices for their various accounts and that these devices are costly for 
banks to develop and supply to customers (Claessens et al., 2002). An alternative is 
for customers to use a device that they already own, such as a mobile phone or 
mobile tablet for authentication purposes but these have security issues in that the 
banks have no control over any software applications installed on such a device. 
Whilst two-factor (PIN based) OTP generators are recognised to be more secure than 
single-factor authentication alternatives, they can be inconvenient for customers to 
have more than one such device for different purposes. In addition, such devices are 
bulky and users have to plan in advance to take them to where they will be required. 
In contrast, the CodeSure card5 (Figure 2.1c) bases two-factor customer 
authentication on an OTP generator integrated within the customer’s bank card, and 
is activated by the card PIN. 
The CodeSure card is a standard Chip and PIN debit or credit card on the front face 
whilst on the back face it presents a small keypad and an e-Ink display used for two-
factor customer authentication and transaction signing (Figure 2.1c). The advantages 
of the CodeSure card are in customer convenience, requiring the customer to 
                                                 
5 http://www.emue.com 
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remember only their card PIN number for all card transactions both in the physical 
world and in the digital world, and for common access to all bank channels; and in 
improved security, as a two-factor authentication device which is always to hand. 
The high levels of ‘usable security’ achievable with use of the CodeSure card 
promise an improvement in overall security levels since the convenience of having 
the card always to hand will serve to encourage positive customer engagement in 
security procedures. 
The CodeSure card supports three main authentication modes: ‘Identification’, the 
generation of a one-time passcode to authenticate the user of the card; ‘Verification’, 
the input of a bank-supplied number to verify the authenticity of a service; 
‘Challenge Response’, a combination of verification followed by identification. In 
addition, OTP generation can depend on additional variables such as a bank-
generated reference number or transaction amount which can be used in verifying 
(‘Signing’) transactions. 
Existing banking and eCommerce applications can be extended to support the 
CodeSure card by making a secure connection to a CodeSure card server, typically 
hosted by the issuer of the card. This holds a record of each individual card and its 
current PIN and is used to validate generated OTPs, generate challenge codes and 
handle maintenance tasks. 
With the CodeSure card, one-time passcodes are implemented using a ‘moving 
window’ of codes rather than being time-dependent. The card server has a look-
ahead list of expected codes for each CodeSure card which allows for a certain 
number of OTPs to be generated without transmission to the server6. If the number 
of untransmitted generated OTPs exceeds the window size on the server then the 
OTP will be rejected and the card will have to be re-synchronised with the server 
before it can be used further. This involves asking the user of the card to send 3 
generated OTPs to the server so that the server can look ahead and re-compute a new 
window of codes. 
                                                 
6 Typically around 50 to 100. 
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Choosing the most appropriate security procedure for customer authentication to 
achieve high levels of ‘usable security’ for a banking channel represents a challenge. 
There are three strategic options that exist in banking. Banks can use what is relevant 
and available for a channel: for example, fingerprints in a branch, voiceprints over 
the phone and passcodes over the Internet. Or they can rely on user or system 
forensics such as biometrics or IP address. Finally, they can use a code-based 
approach like Chip and PIN which can work across all channels. 
The use of channel-specific security procedures has been tried and failed and the role 
of forensics continues to develop but is unlikely to gain user acceptance in the short 
term (Coventry, 2005). The research reported here addresses code-based approaches 
to customer and transaction authentication, an area where there has been 
considerable development but very few actual scientific usability studies 
(Piazzalunga et al., 2005). 
Two critical areas that need to be addressed by banks are identified in this research. 
The first is the need to create usable security procedures, as discussed in Section 2.2; 
and the second is the need to help customers secure their security information from 
the possibility of identity theft in fraudster attacks by phishing and malware, as 
discussed in Section 2.3. 
2.2. Usable Security 
The idea of ‘usable security’ detailed above in terms of the CodeSure card is the key 
point of departure for the research reported here. 
The premise behind the concept of usable security is that by furnishing customers 
with a familiar device, a familiar form factor, to be used in a familiar, common 
modality for all purchases, financial transactions and account access in the physical 
world as well as in the digital world, this familiarity will demolish the existing 
barriers where channel security procedures are seen by customers as being an 
imposition, thereby achieving improved levels of actual security because security 
procedures with usable security will become a natural part of everyday financial 
activity. 
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In online banking and commerce, as customer authentication moves from using a 
single fixed PIN or password to employing alternative or additional security 
procedures, security vulnerabilities often become evident in the new technologies 
(Braz and Robert, 2006; Du et al., 2011; Furnell, 2007). When new threats appear, 
security procedures need to evolve rapidly to counteract these threats and the need 
for usable security can be forgotten. 
2.2.1. Designing for Usable Security 
Problems with usability have been contributors to many high-profile security failures 
(Johnson and Willey, 2011). However, designing for usability must be balanced with 
achieving desired levels of security. In a recent case, a UK high street bank 
introduced an ‘Instant Access Service’ which was claimed to “make it easier and 
more convenient for customers to log in to their account online”. Using the service, 
customers were no longer required to remember a password and only required one of 
four items (their surname, date of birth, 16-digit card number or 3-digit card security 
code) to authenticate themselves. Since these could be considered public knowledge, 
this left a security vulnerability which fraudsters could easily exploit, resulting in the 
rapid withdrawal of the service (Smyth, 2010). 
A common misconception regarding usable security is that a complicated security 
procedure will be inherently more secure than one that is easier to understand 
because criminals are more likely to target an easy banking channel than one that is 
harder to break into. However, this simplified philosophy fails to take into account 
the value of the data that is being stored, and more crucially does not take into 
consideration the behaviour of customers who would normally be using that channel 
and the human factors that are involved. 
It was generally believed that designing for security was directly at odds with 
designing for usability (Kainda et al., 2010), and whilst it is true that the goals of a 
security procedure are often at odds with the goals of usability, failing to achieve a 
balance in a usable security procedure will either result in a secure banking channel 
that cannot be used or a usable banking channel that is insecure. Usability issues can 
lead to security problems (Piazzalunga and Salvaneschi, 2006) so making the effort 
to achieve the correct design balance is key to the design of a usable security 
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procedure (Tognazzini, 2005). Improving the user experience will often improve the 
effectiveness of security procedures. 
Several reasons have been identified why security procedures are often rendered 
ineffective due to the behaviour of users (Sasse and Flechais, 2005). Firstly, users 
often do not understand the importance of what is being protected or the importance 
of following the required security procedures, especially if they prefer to use an 
alternative procedure that is (in their view) just as secure. Further, they may not 
believe that what is being protected is at risk or they do not understand that their 
behaviour as users puts what is being protected at risk. And finally, they often have 
problems using the security procedures correctly. 
In terms of banking, users will generally understand the need to protect their assets 
(their money) and accept that there will be certain security procedures being 
demanded since users are aware of the presence of criminals and threats. In banking, 
user behaviour in terms of prevention of identity theft can, to a certain extent, be 
overcome through education (addressed in Chapter 5). 
Design of a usable security procedure requires (Sasse and Flechais, 2005) emphasis 
in ensuring that a user is not the weakest link by addressing the human factors issues 
surrounding the security procedure, the security context in which the channel and the 
user operate, and by educating the user to understand the importance of the security 
threat environment. A design balance of usability with security must be part of the 
whole solution, and not regarded as something that can be added on to a finished 
product (Yee, 2005). 
The willingness of users to engage with a usable security procedure and to make the 
extra effort to be security conscious plays a vital part in the effectiveness of a 
channel (Weirich and Sasse, 2001). Users cannot be forced to be security-conscious; 
they have to be persuaded, typically by designing persuasiveness into systems and 
procedures. User resistance can also play a large part in the poor acceptance of 
security procedures (Schultz et al., 2001). 
Usable security mandates that the presence of a security procedure should not make 
it harder to access a resource or perform an action than it would be if the security 
procedure were absent (Bishop, 2005). Although much research is focused on ease of 
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use and clarity, the convenience of a security procedure also has an impact on how 
secure a user perceives it to be (Halderman et al., 2005; Hertzum et al., 2004). This is 
especially true for biometric authentication at an ATM (Coventry et al., 2003). 
If a highly secure procedure is actually difficult to use, users will tend to move their 
account to more usable alternatives which may ultimately be less secure, or take 
security shortcuts to make their life easier, thus rendering the system less secure 
(Besnard and Arief, 2004; Johnston et al., 2003; Witt and Kuljis, 2006). Most users 
are security conscious but only as long as they understand or can see a need for it. 
Even if they accept a security procedure and continue to use it, efficiency will be 
reduced and the likelihood of user errors will increase (Schultz et al., 2001). 
Conversely, if a highly usable channel is not secure, it is unlikely to be very long 
before the security is breached with resulting fraud attack consequences, and it has to 
be rebuilt or replaced. 
However, ensuring a secure banking channel is usable is sometimes difficult to 
accomplish. For example, the action of communicating security needs to the user can 
interrupt the flow of the user experience, providing unwelcome interaction between 
the user and the system. In addition, if users trust the channel they are using, 
highlighting extra security information about risks may actually seem to induce 
mistrust in the channel itself (Patrick et al., 2005). 
Accessibility, especially for those who are visually impaired, is a major factor to take 
into consideration when designing usable security procedures (Jahankhani et al., 
2010). The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has published guidelines for 
accessible web content making it possible for synthesised speech screen readers and 
Braille displays to convey the content of web pages to those who need it. However, 
screen readers have attendant security issues when users are requested to enter 
(masked) passwords into forms. Whilst some will say simply “star” or “asterisk” for 
each digit entered (which provides no feedback for the blind user), there are some 
that will speak each entered digit out loud thereby compromising security if others 
can hear. 
Designers incorporating new security procedures into systems are not only faced 
with the technical challenge of making the changes required, but must also take the 
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responsibility of designing security into the system: keeping information on a 
security procedure completely hidden can frustrate most users who wish security to 
be visible; making the details of a security procedure totally explicit can upset users 
who do not understand enough about the underlying details. One option is to have a 
‘building bricks’ security model that can be easily modified as a system evolves, 
providing common features for users and making it easy for developers to add 
(Smetters and Grinter, 2002). An alternative is to have an event-driven model 
(Dourish and Redmiles, 2002) which presents security events to the user using 
familiar user interface components. 
Since designers often design a security procedure to meet their own models and 
expectations as opposed to those of the users, security procedures can be more 
cumbersome and less effective than they should. Human factors design guidelines 
should be taken into consideration at all stages during the software or hardware life 
cycle (Karat et al., 2005; Zurko and Simon, 1996). For example, research on usable 
security focusing on identity theft (Bardzell et al., 2007) has shown that a security 
procedure will be more usable if the users’ conceptual model of the procedure 
required is aligned with the capabilities and process flow of that procedure. Users 
incorrectly assume that ‘secure’ means ‘trustworthy’ but security implies that there 
will be no unauthorised access to information whereas trust implies that a recipient of 
such information will not share it with others who are not authorised to read it. That 
research also noted that users will not comply with security procedures unless the 
system makes it easy to do so, the user’s perception of the value of complying is 
high, or the transactions they wish to conduct have a high perceived value. Users 
lack an adequate understanding of how criminals might be able to violate security 
and privacy and how quickly new security threats can appear. Most users also do not 
understand how to interact effectively with a security procedure and believe that they 
do not know enough about security to be able to make informed judgements on 
decisions affecting security. 
Privacy should be considered separately from security in a usable security procedure 
and as such should be given separate treatment in the design process (Ackerman and 
Mainwaring, 2005). A highly secure system might be perceived as being intrusive 
and infringing on user privacy – for example a security card system that also tracks 
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the owner’s location. Such privacy leakage, or exoformation (Brunk, 2005), can not 
only infringe upon the personal rights of the user, but may also lead to the leakage of 
personal information that can itself lead to security breaches. 
User trust is also related to security in that a user must believe in the security of a 
system (Johnston et al., 2003). One study looked at the authentication methods used 
in banks in Sweden and the UK, in the context of the issues of security and trust 
(Nilsson et al., 2005). In the UK, where passwords are used to access online banking, 
using passwords was perceived to be significantly less trustworthy than the use of 
OTP generating devices which are used in Sweden. While both types of 
authentication procedures could be argued to be equally secure, the perceived trust in 
them varied significantly. 
2.2.2. Choice of Authentication Method 
Choice of authentication method has a central impact on the usable security of a 
procedure. The simplest and most common method of authentication in a security 
procedure is the password (Augier, 2007) and whilst the security aspects of 
passwords have been studied extensively (Zviran and Haga, 1999), the usability of 
passwords has not been studied in detail (Adams and Sasse, 2005). The most 
common problem with passwords is that they can be easily forgotten, especially if an 
individual has many different passwords to remember and associate with the correct 
system. Strong passwords are hard to remember (Barton and Barton, 1984) and the 
passwords that users find easiest to remember are also the easiest to guess (Yan et al., 
2005). 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are a variation of passwords that have a 
fixed number of digits (typically four) and were originally chosen for use with 
systems that had only a numeric keypad, such as an ATM. Because of their easy 
memorability they are still popular with customers today and are used in a variety of 
authentication systems including Chip and PIN, mobile phone SIMs and most door 
entry systems. However, for online access they are generally used only as a second 
factor in two-factor authentication because of their low complexity and customers’ 
failure to follow good security practices when choosing and using their PINs 
(Bonneau et al., 2012). 
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Security procedures that impose tight restrictions on users regarding password 
strength and have strict policies on the lifetime of passwords may well have less 
chance of being broken into but in practice most users will undermine the security of 
the system by writing down their password in an easy to find location. In many cases 
there are no justifications for having such stringent policies. In one study (Florêncio 
and Herley, 2010), the password policies of 75 different web sites were analysed: the 
sites with the most restrictive password policies did not necessarily have greater 
security concerns than those that had less stringent policies. 
Having a less stringent password policy might result in improved popularity with 
users but using mnemonic phrase-based passwords results in them being easy to 
guess or crack, given enough time (Kuo et al., 2006). Many users will re-use the 
same passwords across different accounts (Gaw and Felten, 2006; Ives et al., 2004) 
leading to potential security breaches in those accounts if the password is obtained 
for only one of them. One suggestion to improve memorability but also security of 
passwords is to allow users to propose a password and then shuffle other characters 
into it (Forget et al., 2008). Many web sites have now taken a slightly different 
approach to password authentication by asking only for certain characters or digits at 
varying positions in the password. While this reduces the chance of an eavesdropper 
obtaining a complete, reusable password, it is more difficult for users to mentally 
work out which characters or digits to use, and many will resort to writing the full 
password on a piece of paper, thus compromising security. 
One alternative to passwords is the use of challenge questions. These ask the user for 
a piece of (private) information that is well known to them (and only them) in order 
to authenticate them. Several such questions can be used in place of passwords if 
they are deemed to be secure enough, or just one can be used to augment a password 
or provide one part (knowledge) of a two-factor authentication procedure that sends 
the forgotten password to their email address (ownership). The difficulty of guessing 
the answer to the challenge question has to be matched also by the ease of an attacker 
being able to retrieve or observe (Just, 2005) and the challenge questions themselves 
also have to be usable (Just and Aspinall, 2009). Another issue that is likely to 
become more relevant over time is that more and more personal information is 
becoming available to view online, and so it will be easier for the answers to 
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challenge questions to be determined by fraudsters via phishing attacks (Rabkin, 
2008). 
An alternative to alphanumeric passwords is using graphical passwords (Bicakci and 
van Oorschot, 2011; Monrose and Reiter, 2005). These make use of the fact that 
humans are better at remembering pictures than they can text; and are useful for 
systems that do not have keyboards. However, if these become too prevalent then 
users are at risk of confusion, where the graphical password for one account gets 
confused for one to access another account. Another graphical password system uses 
distorted images based on an image that the user is familiar with. It is very difficult 
for an automated attack to bypass this system, and it is also difficult for a human who 
has not seen the original image to work it out (Hayashi et al., 2008). Rather than 
using images, CAPTCHAs7 are distorted words used to authenticate a human but 
deny access to an automated attack. Despite their popularity with online registrations, 
they are often hard to read and their usability is poor (Yan and El Ahmad, 2008). 
CAPTCHAs can also be video based (Kluever and Zanibbi, 2009). 
The use of biometrics as a means of authentication has been focused very much on 
getting the technology to work reliably rather than on the user experience (Coventry, 
2005; Toledano et al., 2006). One study looked at using iris verification to 
authenticate a customer at an ATM (Coventry et al., 2003) and found that 90% of 
those who used it would prefer iris verification over PIN or signature, perceiving it as 
being more secure, more reliable and faster. However, this study did not look into 
using other biometrics technologies at an ATM, such as fingerprint verification. 
While biometrics are in use today across a wide range of fields, they have yet to be 
adopted in online applications. This is mainly due to the need to have a trusted 
biometrics sensor for each user, something that is costly to do and difficult to 
maintain trust in over long periods of time. The move towards multi-factor 
authentication by banks may mean that biometrics will be adopted as part of a larger 
solution, but even then it is more likely to only be used where the customer is 
present, in a branch or at an ATM. 
                                                 
7 Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart. 
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It is also acknowledged (Moody, 2004) that public perceptions of biometrics as 
having police or criminal connotations can hinder their acceptance, so usability 
research is very important before biometrics are introduced. Previous studies 
(Coventry et al., 2003; Furnell and Clarke, 2005; Moody, 2004) have shown that 
only a small percentage of a bank’s customer base will have had any experience of 
biometrics, and their understanding of how a biometric procedure works will be 
limited. One study (Coventry et al., 2003) found that customers have difficulty 
believing the technology can work, and fear that it will fail to recognise them, that 
some biometrics like voiceprints will be easy to defraud, and that some have 
perceived health risks. 
2.3. Identity Theft: Malware and Phishing 
Banks continually seek to enhance security for their (Internet) banking channels. The 
presence of malicious software (or malware) such as trojans and key-loggers on a 
customer’s computer or mobile phone/tablet can compromise the security of the 
customer’s online banking account (by logging account details and passwords) with 
the intent of enabling the perpetrators of the malware infection to conduct theft from 
the customer’s accounts. Some malware is self-propagating (viruses, worms) while 
other types are spread by unsuspecting users. 
Another threat lies in the prevalence of phishing, an attempt to fraudulently capture a 
targeted customer’s security details by pretending to be a trustworthy sender of an 
electronic communication, typically an email message (Myers, 2007a) or phone call 
(vishing). 
2.3.1. Phishing 
A customer who is deceived in a phishing attack would be directed to a fraudulent 
web site which would attempt to collect the information the attacker wishes to 
obtain. Such attacks, with their potential for unseen contamination of the computers 
that customers use for connection to the Internet banking sites could introduce 
malware applications which can compromise the security of the customer’s computer 
and can compromise the security of the customer’s online bank account (by logging 
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account numbers and passwords) with the intent of conducting fraud (James, 2005; 
Lininger and Vines, 2005; Myers, 2007a). 
Phishing first appeared in the early 1990s when hackers were able to use America 
Online (AOL) services for free, and registered with AOL using automatically-
generated fake credit card numbers (Myers, 2007a). Although this in itself was not 
considered phishing, when AOL cracked down on the practice by contacting users to 
verify the credit card numbers already used in registrations, hackers posing as AOL 
employees attempted to steal real AOL accounts by emailing AOL users. In these 
phishing emails users were being asked to verify their password, not realising that 
this was for fraudulent purposes as it came from a legitimate source at AOL. 
Phishers have now expanded into mimicking emails purporting to come from large 
financial institutions with the aim of obtaining credit card numbers and bank account 
details. Phishers are no longer simply competent hackers – organised crime and 
terrorism are now listed among those that are organising phishing attacks. Attack 
campaigns also span multiple countries (Emigh, 2007) and in many cases phishers do 
not use the stolen details directly but instead sell these on to other criminals. 
In 2007, phishing was estimated to be costing US financial institutions in excess of 
$1 billion a year in direct losses (Emigh, 2007). However, this is not the full extent of 
the losses as there are other types of costs to consider when looking at the cost of 
phishing (Myers, 2007a): whilst direct costs represent the actual money that was 
stolen, indirect costs represent the costs involved in dealing with the attack, both by 
the victim and the bank / enterprise. In addition there is also the money lost in 
revenue due to users being unwilling to continue to use an online service due to 
mistrust and fear of further phishing attacks. 
There are typically three key components of a phishing attack (Myers, 2007a). The 
first component is the ‘lure’, normally a fake / spoofed email that gets sent to a large 
number of users. Next there is the ‘hook’, which is typically a fake web site that 
mimics a legitimate web site and is the destination to where the victims are sent by 
the spoofed email of the lure. Finally there is the ‘catch’, where the attacker uses the 
fraudulently obtained information in criminal activities. 
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To make the lure convincing there are two main categories of tricks that phishers 
employ. Social engineering tricks involve the attacker offering a plausible reason for 
victims to click on the link in the email and give out their personal information on 
the website. Examples of social engineering include requiring security upgrades (or 
enrolment in an anti-fraud program), incomplete account information, financial 
incentives (Christin et al., 2011) or enticing offers where customers get things for 
free, problems with accounts (false account updates) or fictitious orders with a link to 
cancel. 
Alternatively, the phishers will use technical tricks such as using copies of logos and 
images and a corporate font, using email spoofing to pretend the email comes from 
an authentic address; or will use URL hiding, encoding and matching or using bot 
nets. They may also use ‘cousin domain attacks’ where a similar sounding / looking 
name with a minor spelling change is used (Emigh, 2007), such as 
‘www.goggle.com’ instead of ‘www.google.com’. 
To make the hook convincing the attacker must first mimic the legitimate web pages 
as faithfully as possible using the legitimate design schema (Myers, 2007a). Two 
things that cannot be changed however are the legitimate URL and lack of secure 
HTTP connection, which have to be worked around. This can be done using URL 
homograph attacks (URL hiding) to mimic the intended URL, such as 
‘www.paypa1.com’ where the digit ‘1’ has been used to replace the letter ‘l’. This is 
a specialised case of a cousin domain attack and is intended to fool the user into 
thinking that the URL of a spoofed web site is in fact the URL of the legitimate web 
site (Fu et al., 2007). It is done by replacing some of the letters or numbers in the 
legitimate URL with ones that look identical (which is possible when using Unicode) 
or similar (such as digit ‘1’ and letter ‘l’, or digit ‘0’ and letter ‘O’) in the URL of the 
fraudulent web site. 
The appearance of the user’s web browser can also be modified (Raskin, 2007) using 
JavaScript or other web technologies to make it look as though there is a valid 
security certificate icon, change the URL which is displayed, or modify the rendered 
page. This is increasingly more difficult to do as web browsers become more 
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security-aware with measures in place to prevent most of this behaviour, but there 
will no doubt be more loopholes uncovered. 
Another way to make the hook convincing is for the attacker to make a new self-
signed certificate that is not issued by a Certificate Authority. Browsers will warn 
that this is the case, but most of the time users ignore such warnings and just click 
through (Miller and Wu, 2005). However, rather than use elaborate technical tricks, 
some phishing attacks actually do not attempt to cover up their fraudulence, relying 
on the user failing to notice or ignoring the security warnings from the browser. 
A phisher will not want to use their own computer to send out phishing emails or 
host the web site that victims will be directed to. For the emails, a bot net8 will 
typically be used or a server with a compromised email server. For the web site, a 
computer must be hacked into and a new web server installed containing a copy of 
the spoof web site. The stolen credentials obtained from the web site will typically be 
posted onto Usenet newsgroups or web news and encrypted or obfuscated to prevent 
authorities tracing the attacker and anyone else from using the collected information. 
There are actually various tools available to a hacker to do all of this: a ‘rootkit’ is 
primarily used to obtain and maintain administrative privileges on a machine, 
employing various techniques to prevent discovery; a ‘phishing kit’ is used to set up 
the web server and web site on a compromised machine. 
Another technique related to phishing, which eliminates the lure component is called 
pharming (Gupta, 2007a). It uses DNS9 manipulation to map web site names to IP 
addresses of fraudulent servers. That way, users will still see the legitimate URL in 
their email client or web browser, but the server that they get connected to will be a 
fraudulent one. This can be done by hacking into servers or home routers (Tsow, 
2007) and changing the default DNS server to a compromised one. The term 
                                                 
8 A group of compromised computers connected to the Internet that can be made to do certain 
automated tasks without the knowledge of their owners. 
9 Domain Name Service – an Internet service used for mapping host names (such as 
‘www.google.com’) to IP addresses. 
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pharming also includes hosts file poisoning, which involves adding fraudulent entries 
to the local DNS ‘hosts’ file on a computer. 
There are typically three different areas of spoofing that phishers are able to employ 
(Gupta, 2007b): IP spoofing, email spoofing and web spoofing. The first involves 
modifying the low-level packets that are sent over IP networks by changing the 
sender address. This can be used in Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against 
commercial websites or in attempts to bypass authentication in a corporate network. 
Email spoofing involves sending out emails that appear to be from one sender but are 
in reality sent from another. It is a technique used in spam emails and is possible due 
to a lack of security in the SMTP protocol (James, 2005). The IP address from which 
the email originated cannot be faked however, which is why spammers and phishers 
never send emails from servers they own. However, only the ‘From’ address is ever 
visible when reading an email which is why so many people fall for this type of 
spoofing. 
Web spoofing involves setting up a fraudulent web site that appears to the user to be 
the legitimate web site. As with email spoofing, there are various techniques 
currently being used, as described earlier. An additional technique is possible with 
the injection of malware into a system in terms of the ‘man in the middle’ proxy. 
This sets up a hidden intermediary to pass network traffic between a fraudulent 
service and the legitimate service, thus ensuring that the legitimate service works as 
expected and the user is never aware of what is going on (Emigh, 2007). By 
forwarding all data to the legitimate web site the user remains unaware that there is 
anything wrong since the legitimate web site behaves as expected and they could go 
on and give out further personal information. 
The increased number of phishing attacks in the last few years has led to it being 
taken more seriously, with various attempts at countermeasures being put in place. 
Studies in the US (Graeber, 2004) and the UK (Ensor, 2005) highlight a growing 
concern for online security amongst Internet users, yet a large number of people have 
still never heard of the term phishing. While many Internet users have installed 
antivirus software and firewalls, lack of interest (and desire) in learning more about 
threats associated with identity fraud has led to customer complacency. Teenagers 
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have been found to be less victimised by phishing attacks (15%) than have adults 
(22%), but they are willing to change their behaviour to protect against online fraud 
(Lopez, 2006), suggesting that education and awareness are as important as the 
security measures themselves. Banks may also need to make it clearer to customers 
where the liability resides for losses incurred due to phishing attacks. 
Research that investigated the strategies used by phishing web sites (Dhamija et al., 
2006) showed that one in four of the respondents did not look at security indicators 
(such as padlock icons) in the web browser, features designed to aid users in 
identifying suspect web sites. In addition, even experienced computer users were 
fooled by some of the fraudulent web sites that they were exposed to in the research. 
A study using gaze tracking (Whalen and Inkpen, 2005) showed that whilst the 
padlock icon in a web browser is commonly viewed, the site certificate information 
is rarely checked and most users actually stop thinking about security after having 
successfully logged in to a web site. Even browser toolbars specifically developed to 
convey security information to the user are actually ineffective at preventing 
phishing attacks (Wu et al., 2006) and many Internet users are unable to tell from 
web browser cues when an Internet connection is secure or not (Friedman et al., 
2002). 
Human-centred strategies to combat phishing attacks have included educating users 
about computer security and phishing (Bardzell et al., 2007; Robila and Ragucci, 
2006); using training systems and games to teach users how to avoid phishing attacks 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2007); training users in how to use online 
applications in a secure manner; encouraging good security practices in the 
workplace; and fostering cultures that encourage compliance. Explicitly warning 
users about risks during critical points in a security procedure can also help to 
heighten awareness, but unless users are stimulated by such warnings they are likely 
to have only a limited effect (Karlof, 2009). However, badly designed web sites can 
undermine the effectiveness of education in computer security and phishing. One 
study (Falk et al., 2008) analysed 214 web sites of financial institutions in the U.S. 
and found that 76% of these web sites had at least one security design flaw. Such 
flaws included presenting secure login options on insecure pages and offering to send 
users their statements and passwords through email. 
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Other, more design-centred strategies to improve security include having different 
security procedures for system administrators, developers and users in software; 
hiding security features in applications from the user if the application can 
automatically manage them; performing usability testing and experiments to learn 
more about what security policies an enterprise requires or expects, and what security 
policies a user is capable of properly complying with. 
There are three main types of technology solutions that are available for enterprises 
like banks to use to combat phishing (Penn, 2004). Firstly, alerting services are 
available that continually search the Internet for fraudulent / spoof sites and will 
notify companies if their (legitimate) site has become the target of a phishing attack. 
This can be achieved by setting up ‘honeypots’ on the Internet (Viecco, 2007), 
systems that are deliberately left open to attack but are closely monitored so as to 
determine the behaviour and intent of any intruders on the system. Secondly, email 
validation procedures can check the validity of the content of an email through 
message signing, or can check the identity of the server that sent the email via 
domain validation (Myers, 2007b). Thirdly, web site validation can be achieved 
either through the web site itself (via two-step login procedures) or through the 
browser (using a phishing filter that compares the true IP address with those of 
known fraudulent sites). If a legitimate web site is discovered to also be being used 
as a phishing site, the owners of the web site will have to be convinced that their site 
has been compromised and should be taken down, and there may also be legal issues 
too. This ‘takedown’ can sometimes take too long, and some Internet service 
providers are reported to have launched denial of service (DoS) attacks on the 
phishing sites to prevent further users reaching them. 
Users can also take an active role in the detection of spoofed emails by setting up 
spam filters in their email client to check the contents of each email for known 
keywords or content. Many email clients and spam filters also come with IP address 
blacklisting and whitelisting for additional control and whilst users are generally 
willing to accept a small amount of spam getting through to their email in-box, they 
are likely to be less forgiving about a small amount of valid emails being blocked as 
wrongly marked as spam. Because of the proliferation of spoofed emails an 
increasing number of online companies and banks have made a business decision to 
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avoid use of email as a communication channel with customers. They instead offer 
local messaging systems on their web sites through which customers can be 
contacted. Google has recently added an authentication feature to their Gmail email 
client which displays a ‘key’ icon next to authenticated email addresses, but this icon 
will currently only be displayed for emails sent by eBay and PayPal and it is unclear 
how banks and other companies could register for this in the future. 
When the World Wide Web first started, all communications between a web browser 
and the web site were unencrypted. With the advent of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications between web 
client and server had the option to be encrypted, in theory preventing the possibility 
of man-in-the-middle attacks. Both SSL and TLS involve the exchange of keys (in 
common with public key encryption and digital signatures) to set up a secure 
communications channel (Myers, 2007b), and avoid the issue of reliably distributing 
keys by requiring Certificate Authorities to issue them. However, man-in-the-middle 
attacks can still be achieved, either by installing a new fraudulent Certificate 
Authority via malware or by polluting the DNS cache which maps the correct URL 
to the wrong IP address. 
There have been several attempts to define a more secure solution than SSL/TLS. 
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) was a technology developed in 1996 that had 
the backing of many large companies, including MasterCard and Visa (Garfinkel and 
Spafford, 2002). This failed to gain popularity due to its level of complication, its 
reliance on requiring all parties to have digital signatures and because the cost per 
transaction was too high for small payments. Another alternative, Disposable Credit 
Card Numbers (DCCNs) are similar to one-time passcodes and remove the need for 
customers to divulge their credit card number to online merchants during an online 
transaction (Kadirire, 2010). A temporary, one-use credit card number is generated at 
checkout when the customer enters a password that was set up during registration. 
The merchant will be unaware that the credit card number is only temporary and the 
issuing bank can then associate that credit card number with the originating customer 
and that single transaction. 
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If a web site is displayed over a secure connection, the web browser should 
communicate the results of setting up the secure connection to the user. This is 
displayed in most browsers by having a clickable padlock button, and by having a 
URL that begins with ‘https’. Not many users are aware that they can click on the 
padlock icon for more information about the security certificate used to set up the 
connection. 
Not all certificates are issued by Certificate Authorities. Many are self-signed which 
the browser will warn about, but the user will still have to accept if they want to use 
the legitimate site (Myers, 2007b). This has the effect of deconditioning the user to 
such warnings and accepting any certificates without much thought. Users are 
expected to be trained in knowing what a Certificate Authority is and this is clearly 
not true for most. 
Attempts to use paper-based approaches involving lists of one-time passcodes for 
two-factor authorisation have been shown to be susceptible to phishing (Bennett, 
2004) and a move to alternative passcode systems, such as using picture passwords 
(Fraser, 2007) or passfaces (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000), might prove more successful 
against password interception tools such as keyloggers. Other approaches aim to 
target web page spoofing that is used in most phishing attacks by making use of 
memorable images and employing visual matching (Dhamija et al., 2006) or 
comparing the content of a suspect URL with pre-registered content (Liu et al., 
2006). Some two-factor authorisation mechanisms that use security fobs or other 
electronic devices offer some degree of enhanced protection from phishing 
(Ollmann, 2004). 
The nature of the threat from phishing attacks has evolved as countermeasures 
struggle to keep up and consumers become (slowly) more aware of the threat and the 
issues surrounding it (Lopez, 2005). Phishing attacks are now targeting smaller 
financial institutions and have started to target individual account holders at specific 
banks using ‘spear phishing’ (Jakobsson, 2007). By better targeting victims, phishers 
can afford to make more effort in making the lure more realistic, can expect a higher 
success rate, and are less likely to get caught in a honeypot. However, technology is 
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also moving to keep up, with spam filters and phishing filters reducing exposure to 
fraudulent sites, and with new standards emerging for authenticating email. 
With more and more Internet users being online every day, it is relatively easy for 
fraudsters to obtain information on targeted individuals using publicly available data. 
Security challenges based on, for example, mother’s maiden name are made 
ineffective as such knowledge becomes available on publicly accessible databases 
(Griffith, 2007). Other phishing / pharming attacks use social networking (Jagatic 
and Johnson, 2007), use of web browser history (Stamm and Jagatic, 2007), use of 
the autofill feature in forms (Menczer, 2007), retrieving data from deleted files on 
disks (Garfinkel, 2005), and even acoustic keyboard emanations (Zhuang et al., 
2007) that can betray what is being typed by a potential victim. 
2.3.2. Malware 
Malware is also being used by fraudsters to enhance the effectiveness of phishing 
attacks. By using key logging software or trojans, phishers can now obtain anything 
that is typed in or displayed on the screen, not just in a web browser. 
Malware is generally spread using either social engineering techniques (convincing 
someone to open an attachment in an email, for example) or through security 
vulnerabilities via use of a worm10 or virus or a security loophole in a browser. Some 
examples of malware used in phishing include (Emigh, 2007) keyloggers (or 
keystroke sniffers) which are either installed as browser helper objects (BHOs) 
which record keystrokes when the user is at the target (legitimate) web site, or as 
device drivers which monitor all keyboard and mouse events; session hackers which 
wait until the user has logged into their account and then use the active session to 
perform background activities; web trojans which pop up over login screens to look 
exactly like the legitimate web site but collect credentials for the malware instead. 
There are also lower-level system-wide malware techniques such as adding a proxy 
server through which all data gets rerouted; modification of DNS servers or hosts file 
                                                 
10 A self-replicating form of malware designed to propagate across, and typically adversely affect, 
computer networks. 
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poisoning for use in pharming; scanning a user’s files on the computer looking for 
specific types of confidential information (data theft). 
To combat malware on the customer’s computer, anti-viral, anti-malware 
(disinfection) solutions perform time-consuming (typically some 10 minutes) scans 
of a computer’s hard disk; and / or search for currently running broad coverage 
threats in the computer’s memory. These solutions are inherently time consuming 
since they search for all known viral threats, resulting in a huge database of malware 
signatures. They also require on-going updates to remain effective against recently 
discovered threats. One suggestion for reducing the overhead of such security 
solutions is to have sessions with higher security requirements running in a virtual 
machine which could then be closely monitored by the host computer (Sinclair and 
Smith, 2005), although the initial setup and maintenance of this solution would 
currently be beyond the skills of most users. 
A relatively new approach for security software involves server-side detection, 
scanning for viruses which might be directed at specific enterprise sites rather than 
all-encompassing disinfection solutions. These server-side detection approaches are 
leaner in software terms and faster to download and run at log on. They allow the 
bank / enterprise to remotely initiate a scan of the customer’s PCs for malware when 
the customer is logging on to the (bank’s) Internet banking site, without demanding 
installation of a complete anti-malware solution on each customer’s computer. A 
similar proposal involves client-side logging with server-side auditing in order to 
detect the presence of malware on a customer’s machine (Jakobsson and Juels, 
2009). 
Having discussed the background research in the field of usable security, the rest of 
this chapter introduces the details of the methodology used in this research. 
2.4. Usability Engineering of Security Procedures 
Like other traditional engineering disciplines, usability engineering for security 
procedures involves procedures being designed, built and tested to achieve a high 
level of usability by focusing the process on the user and their tasks; providing 
techniques to support the management of resources in process design and 
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development (Whiteside et al., 1998) and using principles of quality measurement 
(Faulkner, 2000), and relies on being able to define and measure usability in a 
quantifiable way. 
2.4.1. Usability 
There are many definitions of usability, but the key elements that they all share are 
summarised in this statement: 
“The concept of usability means making artefacts easy, efficient and 
comfortable to use.” (Stanton and Young, 1999) 
The typical benefits of having a highly usable system are increased productivity, 
decreased training costs and increased customer satisfaction. While some of these 
might not apply or be important for a specific system, usability is now beginning to 
be recognised as being as important as the performance of a system (efficiency of 
usage) and its robustness (effectiveness of coping with errors) in terms of system 
quality attributes. 
The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) Committee for the 
Ergonomics of Human-system Interaction gives usability a more formal definition as 
being: 
“The extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve 
specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified 
context of use.” (International Organisation for Standardization, 1998) 
Here, effectiveness governs whether a typical user would be able to carry out their 
intended task and whether the system supports a range of user skills and needs. 
Efficiency describes the need for users to complete tasks quickly and with minimal 
effort, and satisfaction is measured by the attitudes of a person using the system and 
if it is comfortable for them to use. Successfully measuring all of these is key to 
measuring the overall usability of a system. 
Such definitions of usability, admittedly generalised, have been criticised for placing 
too much emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency whereas some systems might not 
require these in favour of more specific usability goals (Quesenbery, 2003). 
30 
Taking a more detailed view, usability has been traditionally associated with five key 
dimensions, or attributes (Nielsen, 1993): ‘learnability’, ‘efficiency’, ‘memorability’, 
‘low error rate’ and ‘satisfaction’. These five usability attributes are generalisations 
which should apply to most, but not all, systems. There are many dimensions to 
usability and variants of the five attributes listed above typically form the basis for a 
template upon which further attributes can be defined, either by broadening the scope 
of usability to other areas, or by splitting the main attributes into more specific detail. 
The key to a usable system is not only identifying these attributes but also their 
relative importance to one another. A well-defined set of usability attributes allows 
for their systematic measurement which can then be statistically analysed. 
Additional usability concepts include ‘utility’ (Hartson, 1998) since it is just as 
important for a system to be useful as it is for it to be easy to use, how much 
knowledge people will be able to take from using a similar system to work out how 
to use a new or modified one, and ease of recovery when errors occur. The latter is of 
vital importance to the banking industry since usability engineering methods can be 
used to ensure that unrecoverable or unnoticed errors do not occur and minimise calls 
to the Helpdesk or via other, costly channels. 
In addition to these, consideration must also be given to looking at the needs of the 
users when using the system: how much training is required, where will users be 
operating the system, when will they be operating the system, and what background 
knowledge users are expected to have. Once a working prototype is available further 
research can be carried out into what the most common errors users make are, how 
they recover from such errors and if they learn from their mistakes. 
The importance of the usability of systems was recognised as far back as 1979 after 
the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Inexperienced operators during the accident 
mistook a light on a control panel to represent the operation of a valve in the cooling 
system. However, the light only indicated if the solenoid in the valve was working 
correctly and this misunderstanding led to the operators wrongly assuming the valve 
was open. Such a mistake could have been prevented with proper training (the better 
trained operators in the next shift correctly diagnosed the real problem) but if the 
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control panel had been easier to understand to someone with little or no training then 
perhaps the accident could have been avoided. 
Research has shown (Karat et al., 2005) that enterprises that actively employ 
usability engineering techniques to design their products can not only improve the 
user experience of the product but can also bring about a significant return on 
investment. 
There are two main ways to evaluate usability: expert-based inspection (Nielsen and 
Molich, 1990; Polson et al., 1992) and user experiments. Expert-based inspection can 
offer insights from usability experts and be used as part of the evaluation of a design 
before a working prototype is available. User experiments have the advantage of 
directly observing real users and can offer more insights, especially where the initial 
assumptions about users may prove unrealistic (Karat, 1998; Lewis, 2001), but have 
the disadvantage of usually being more costly than expert-based inspection. 
With user experiments, a large proportion of any usability engineering work involves 
observing user behaviour and how the relevant usability attributes affect the user in 
performing the required task. Usability engineering also involves research in human 
performance and capabilities, anthropometrics11 and design (Norman, 1988). 
Data collected during user experiments can be quantitative, such as the time taken to 
complete a task, task completion rates or error rates. Qualitative data can also be 
collected, such as having the user observed by a usability expert, having them think 
aloud during the session, or by taking part in a structured interview session or focus 
group. Think aloud sessions tend to cause certain groups of users to behave 
differently in that they concentrate more on the process (rather than the task) than 
they would normally, so non-intrusive observations are generally preferred. 
Administering questionnaires (Hornbaek, 2006) can be a good alternative to 
structured interviews and can provide quantitative data on attitudes and feelings that 
can be analysed using statistical techniques. 
                                                 
11 Anthropometrics – measurement of the human individual. 
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The research reported here is based on such user experiment approaches permitting 
statistical analysis of (quantitative) attitudinal data on usability attributes derived 
from questionnaires. 
2.4.2. Gaze Tracking Cameras in Usability Research 
The research presented here employs gaze tracking cameras as one of the key tools 
used to capture usability and usage data during usability experiments. 
It is assumed with gaze tracking that visual attention gives a direct insight into 
attention in general, i.e. what a user is focused on and currently thinking about. There 
has been a lot of research in this area (Duchowski, 2007) and it is generally accepted 
that this is the case, although users can relatively easily covertly direct their gaze 
away from their focus of attention, or even daydream. 
Foveal vision describes what is being looked at (the focus of attention) and is the 
scene being projected onto the fovea, the high-resolution part of the retina. 
Parafoveal (or peripheral) vision highlights where is being looked at and indicates 
the periphery of the scene being projected onto the low-resolution movement-
sensitive part of the retina; this is where the next focus of attention is likely to come 
from. 
The retina is not like a digital camera with a grid array of pixels. It has various 
physiological limitations that have to be corrected by the visual processing centres in 
the brain, which often account for various optical illusions, resulting in unexpected 
visual perception. The chemical processes used to convert photons to electrical 
impulses in the photoreceptors also mean that they are motion sensitive and have to 
have a continually moving scene (however small) in order to be stimulated. Even if 
the eye is fixated on a particular object, ‘microsaccades’ occur in order to provide 
enough tiny movements to keep an image being generated. If these microsaccades 
did not occur and the image on the retina was motion-compensated then the viewed 
scene would become blank within about a second if no other eye movement 
occurred. 
This behaviour is related to ‘persistence of vision’, a phenomenon where the eye is 
unable to sample rapidly changing intensities above approximately 50Hz. This is 
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how television and cinema are able to achieve the illusion of a lifelike scene as 
opposed to the constant flickering frames that are really being shown. They also 
make use of the ‘phi phenomenon’, or stroboscopic motion, where light flashes give 
the illusion of motion above 60Hz. 
Motion detection is the main task for peripheral vision processes and provides an 
early warning system for moving targets about to enter the visual field. As such, 
peripheral vision is most likely to be processed in parallel fashion within the brain in 
order to achieve a high response rate, whereas foveal vision is more likely to be 
processed in serial fashion. However, peripheral vision perceives the velocity of a 
moving target to be slower than would the fovea, and is twice as sensitive to 
horizontal axis movement than vertical axis movement, something that should be 
taken into consideration when gaze tracking with moving targets. 
Fixations are eye movements lasting between 150 to 600ms that stabilise the fovea 
over a stationary object of interest. During this time, the oculomotor system is 
generating microsaccades (the tiny movements that ensure that the image does not 
disappear on the retina) and is getting ready to reposition the fovea to another 
fixation through a rapid eye movement called a saccade. Saccades may be voluntary 
or involuntary, last from 10 to 100ms and appear to be preprogrammed in that once 
they are executed, they cannot be altered. Programming saccades is performed by 
visual processes in the brain and can take up to 200ms to prepare. During a saccade, 
a person is effectively blind due to the rapid eye movement; however, 90% of 
viewing time in humans is devoted to fixations. 
Saccades are used to move from fixation to fixation and, when voluntary, are an 
indication of the desire to change the focus of attention, but there are other 
movements generated by the oculomotor system as well. Smooth pursuits are eye 
movements that follow a moving target and match its velocity and direction. A 
feedback mechanism is used that ensures the target is always centred, otherwise a 
saccade occurs that attempts to correct the motion and continue the smooth pursuit. 
Nystagmus movements compensate for the movement of the eyeball or head during 
fixations or smooth pursuits and vergence movements focus the eyes on a target in 
the distance for depth perception. However, only fixations, saccades and smooth 
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pursuits need be modelled or detected during eye movement analysis and all three 
can be characterised by linear filters. 
The gaze tracking cameras (Tobii T/X12) used in this research are video-based, 
utilising both pupil and infrared corneal reflection to provide point of regard 
binocular tracking with free-head movement, designed to be non-intrusive and easy 
to use, ideal for use in usability experiments. 
The cameras use infrared-transmitting LEDs to generate reflection patterns on the 
corneas and lenses of the user’s eyes (Purkinje images). A built-in video camera 
collects these infrared reflection patterns and also measures the position and distance 
of the eyes relative to the camera, thus allowing for free head movement and non-
intrusive measurement, ideal for a usability experiment. Real-time image processing 
is then used to calculate the gaze point of each eye on the screen. Because the eye 
tracker operates in the infrared spectrum, it can be sensitive to near-infrared 
interference such as direct sunlight, which must be controlled during an experiment. 
Because eyeballs and corneas can vary in shape between individuals it is essential 
that each user calibrates the camera settings to their eyes before use. This involves 
asking the user to gaze at a set of points (usually between 5 and 9 points are used, 
spaced across the area of the screen), which appear sequentially on the screen for 
about 2 to 3 seconds each. This enables the gaze tracker camera to correct for any 
aberrations in subsequent gaze tracking with that individual. 
The Tobii gaze tracker provides a stream of gaze tracking data packets (typically 
every 10 milliseconds). Data contained within each packet include: time stamp (in 
microseconds); gaze target (for current calibration) on screen for each eye ranging 
between (0, 0) and (1, 1); validity (or confidence) score that the gaze target is correct 
for each eye; pupil size for each eye, in millimetres. Using the validity scores for 
each eye it is possible to determine whether the average gaze target of both eyes, the 
gaze target for just one eye or no gaze target can be used for each eye tracking event. 
Knowing the resolution of the screen, the gaze target can be converted to screen 
pixels. Such logs can then be processed at the end of the experiment, filtering the 
                                                 
12 http://www.tobii.com 
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gaze events through a saccade-fixation filter and converting screen co-ordinates to 
points of interest. 
The client application used in the research reported here communicates with the gaze 
tracking server via a TCP/IP connection, which allows such applications to run on 
different operating systems. This is all achieved by building applications with a 
special set of libraries that are provided in the Tobii Software Development Kit 
(SDK). These software libraries expose a set of functions that can be used to perform 
various gaze tracking tasks, and perform all underlying TCP/IP communication with 
the server in the background. 
The development libraries supplied with the SDK include a low-level API for 
performing basic gaze tracking functions, and also a component API built on top of 
that which provides a COM interface with some ready made GUI components. 
2.4.3. Usability Research Methodology 
In scientific and engineering research, controlled experiment-based evaluation of 
user interfaces can provide robust data suited to hypothesis testing. This form of 
research involving the direct manipulation of variables results in more pertinent data 
than purely correlational (observational) research techniques which involve 
observing natural events and do not allow manipulation of variables (Field, 2009). 
Critics of this approach argue that it is too artificial and that any findings may not 
generalise beyond the sample population. However, the biggest benefit of a 
laboratory setting is that more confounding variables can be controlled, allowing any 
effects on dependent variables to be identified and measured. 
Experiment-based research methods involve the direct manipulation of an 
independent variable (such as the version of a prototype) and measure the effect on 
one or more dependent variables (such as usability attribute scores or error frequency 
whilst performing a task). Such experiments can be used to test theories, and the 
results of such experiments can be used to support or reject hypotheses (predictions 
about a theory). Null hypotheses assume independent variables have no effect on 
dependent variables, whereas alternative hypotheses oppose this view and state that 
there will be an effect. Statistical tests are used to determine whether such effects are 
of statistical significance. 
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In the usability experiments carried out in this research, participants were given tasks 
and asked to interact with a functional prototype system. After each experiment 
session, questions were posed about a wide range of relevant usability attributes, 
with regard to cognitive, fluency, quality and engagement characteristics. These 
measures allow the resulting analysis to isolate areas where improvements are 
needed before the development of a final design. The evaluation process 
characterises user attitudes and behaviours (Howell, 1985). 
Each of the experiments reported here were repeated-measures (Landauer, 1998) 
(within subjects) experiments, in which all participants experienced all versions of 
the designs being tested, the benefit being to allow comparisons to be made for each 
participant, reducing the effect of individual differences. When participants 
experience more than one version of a design there can be an order effect, either 
through habituation through learning, or fatigue causing bias. As such, the order of 
experience was carefully balanced across the sample in controlled experiments 
(Preece et al., 2002; Robson, 1983). 
Experiment procedures were standardised: each participant received minimal 
instruction (priming) and followed the same session blueprint. In this way, the data 
collected can be used for statistical comparisons (Coolican, 1990; Whiteside et al., 
1998). 
The participants in usability experiments were recruited so as to be representative of 
the intended users of a system. Age and gender, background and experience were all 
taken into account during the recruitment process and the spread of version and order 
of design experienced were carefully balanced. Participants were invited to attend the 
experiment session for a set period and were given an honorarium payment in return 
for their participation. 
A variety of data were collected in the usability experiments presented in this 
research, pertinent to the requirements for each experiment. Quantitative data on 
participants’ attitudes to usability attributes were captured by computer-based, self-
completion questionnaires. Usability questions were randomised to avoid contextual 
effects (Oppenheim, 1992) and were carefully worded to avoid bias or careless 
prompting. Quantitative data were also obtained from the tasks as they were being 
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performed, such as timing data or success rates. Qualitative data were also obtained 
from individual interviews at the end the hands-on session for each participant. 
Immediately after experiencing each design variant, each participant was asked to 
complete a usability questionnaire, designed to objectively measure their attitudes 
across a range of usability attributes. The use of such questionnaires to evaluate 
services and user interfaces has a long history (LaLomia and Sidowski, 1990; Root 
and Draper, 1983) and the questionnaires used here have been developed and refined 
over many years (Dutton et al., 1993; Jack et al., 1993; Love et al., 1992). They have 
been adapted and used in a wide range of experiments (Davidson et al., 2004; Foster 
et al., 1998; Gunson et al., 2011; Larsen, 1999, 2003; Morton et al., 2004; Sturm and 
Boves, 2005; Weir et al., 2009; Weir et al., 2010), giving weight to the reliability of 
the questionnaires and also to their validity (they measure what they purport to 
measure). 
The questionnaires are comprised of a set of statements representing an attitude, each 
with a set of tick-boxes on a seven-point Likert format scale (Likert, 1932; Rossi et 
al., 1983) ranging from ‘strongly agree’ through ‘neutral’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The 
statements cover a range of usability-related attributes such as ease of use and 
complexity, level of frustration or stress experienced, efficiency of the design, and 
other issues specific to an experiment. Participants find such questionnaires natural 
to respond to, and they have been shown to have high reliability (Oppenheim, 1992). 
However, they are best used for relative comparisons between designs rather than as 
a tool to provide absolute measures. 
To counteract the problem of acquiescence response bias, which is the general 
tendency for respondents to agree with the statement offered (Gross, 2001), 
statements in the questionnaire are equally balanced, positive and negative, and are 
presented in a randomised order. During analysis, participant responses are converted 
into numerical values from 1 (most unfavourable) to 7 (most favourable) allowing 
for the polarity of the statements: for example, a ‘strongly agree’ response to a 
negative statement is converted to a value of 1. A resulting score higher than 4 
therefore represents a positive attitude and scores below 4 represent a negative 
attitude, with 4 being the neutral point. Taking the mean of these normalised 
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numbers across all of the questions gives a measure of each participant’s overall 
attitude to the usability of a design and a measure of the overall attitude to the design 
can then be obtained by taking the mean of all the questionnaire results for 
participants who experienced that design, giving the overall usability metric 
(Coolican, 1990), an objective measure of system appeal (Nielsen, 1993). 
The mean scores for individual usability statements in the questionnaire can also be 
examined to highlight any aspects of the design which were particularly successful or 
which require improvement. Results can also be analysed according to demographic 
groupings of participants (such as gender or age) and any significant differences 
between groups can then be identified. 
In each of the usability experiments reported here, all participants completed the 
questionnaires following exposure to each of the experiment conditions. An overall 
attitude score was determined by calculating the overall mean for all of the attributes 
by all participants. Individual attributes were also analysed separately to identify any 
specific issues that arose. These data were analysed using parametric tests involving 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Although it was originally considered (Likert, 1932) that data from such Likert scales 
are ordinal data as opposed to being interval data, and so should be analysed by non-
parametric techniques, there is considerable evidence (Kim, 1975; O’Brien, 1979) to 
suggest that parametric tests are in practice sufficiently robust against violations of 
their underlying data assumptions, providing these are not too extreme, and can 
therefore be used with Likert scale data. 
Statistical methods are used to analyse the quantitative results collected during the 
experiments reported here. The output from such analyses can be used to draw 
conclusions about whether the hypotheses used in the experiment are likely or 
unlikely. There are two ways to test a hypothesis – observe what naturally happens 
(correlational research) or manipulate one variable to see its effects on another 
(experiment-based research). Using correlational research does not guarantee that 
cause comes before effect and the impact of external influences (confounding 
variables) can never be fully ruled out (Field, 2009). The research reported here uses 
only experiment-based techniques, where an experiment collects data from a cohort 
39 
40 
of the population (a sample) and uses these data to infer things about the population 
as a whole (Field, 2009). 
The choice of statistical tests used to analyse the data depend on the type of the 
dependent variables that are measured during the experiment. Categorical data can be 
binomial (2 categories), nominal (more than 2 categories) or ordinal (ordered 
categories) whereas interval data are measured on a continuous scale between a 
maximum and minimum value. The usability questionnaires used in this research use 
a seven-point Likert scale (Likert, 1932), which measures participant attitude with an 
ordinal variable. There has been some debate about whether data from such a 
questionnaire can also be considered to be on an interval scale (Martilla and Garvey, 
1975; Munshi, 1990). While there is no resolution on this issue, it is generally 
accepted that if the differences between the responses are perceived to be equal then 
the advantage of the more powerful statistical tests with known sampling errors 
offsets the small amount of error that may be accompanied with the treatment of 
ordinal variables as interval data. (Labovitz, 1970). 
Background on the statistical tests used in this research, and on working definitions 
of levels of statistical significance for the work, can be found in Appendix A. 
The next chapter exploits the usability research methodology introduced here in a 
series of three usability experiments with different cohorts of users, to report on 
usability performance of the CodeSure card as a proposed universal usable security 
procedure to combat phishing and malware attacks. 
Chapter 3. CodeSure Card Usability 
Results from three experiments to provide a detailed characterisation of the usability 
of the CodeSure card are reported in this chapter. 
The first experiment (The CodeSure Card Baseline Usability Experiment) involves 
112 participants in a longitudinal study of usability metrics for the (baseline design) 
CodeSure card used in two-factor customer authentication. 
Identifying areas for improvements from that experiment, the second experiment 
(The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment) with 70 participants used a 
simulation of the CodeSure card running on a handheld touch screen tablet device to 
investigate the usability and performance of a proposed enhanced user interface 
design. The tasks for the experiment included using the CodeSure card to generate 
one-time passcodes and to sign financial transactions. 
The third experiment (The CodeSure Card Keypad and Display Synchrony 
Experiment) involved 40 participants to investigate issues with the display and the 
buttons of the CodeSure card by using a different simulation of the CodeSure card, 
this time running on a desktop computer with touch screen, operating in conjunction 
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with gaze tracker cameras to investigate gaze behaviour during use of the CodeSure 
card. 
Taken together, the findings from these three experiments offer a detailed 
characterisation of the usability attributes of the CodeSure card as the foundation of a 
solution for usable security procedures. 
3.1. The CodeSure Card Baseline Usability Experiment 
This experiment collected usability and performance data from participants using the 
CodeSure card (Figure 3.1) in the context of a two-factor customer authentication 
procedure with an Internet banking site. Participants were all using the CodeSure 
card for the first time, and for five uses in a session: and also in a repeated session 
after seven days had elapsed. The aim of the experiment was to produce data on user 
attitudes to usability and on user learning behaviour. 
 
(a) The Front of a CodeSure Card.








Figure 3.1: The CodeSure Card 
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The CodeSure card is constructed in the form of a standard ISO/IEC 7813 bank card 
with a two-track magnetic stripe and a standard EMV1 chip. For security, the EMV 
chip has no connections to the CodeSure card components. The CodeSure card 
contains a 6502 8-bit embedded microprocessor running at 5MHz, surface mounted 
on a flexible printed circuit board, a 12-button keypad (each button uses copper 
electrodes separated by an air gap) and an 8-digit alphanumeric E Ink 
(Electrophoretic Ink) display, which has the advantages of low power consumption 
(power is only required to change the display rather than refresh it), and a wide 
viewing angle. Power for the CodeSure microprocessor and the E Ink display is 
supplied by a thin-film Li-ion battery that has been proven to be resistant to the types 
of flexing experienced by the card with general usage. The battery has a projected 
operating life of around three years which is the typical replacement frequency for 
card issuers in issuing replacement cards to customers. 
The CodeSure card can operate in several authentication modes depending on the 
application required. In Identify mode, the primary mode for card use in two-factor 
authentication procedures, entering a 4-digit card PIN generates an 8-digit OTP for 
use in two-factor authentication. In Exchange mode, a challenge-response exchange 
between bank and customer provides enhanced validation (for transactions), entering 
a 4-digit PIN and an 8-digit reference challenge number (which may be a coded form 
of the account numbers involved in a transaction) generates an 8-digit OTP for the 
challenge-response exchange. In Verify mode, customers can reassure themselves 
that a phone call, text message or email purporting to be from the bank is legitimate 
by checking that the bank provide a (reverse authentication) reference number that is 
valid only for that customer’s CodeSure card. Entering this (8-digit) reverse 
authentication reference number generates a PASS/FAIL display for that reference 
number. In Sign mode, transaction signing is possible by entering the target account 
number for a transaction and then the amount to be transferred, followed by the 4-
digit PIN to generate an 8-digit OTP. The numeric keypad serves a dual role, 
allowing mode selection involving pressing a control button followed by a mode 
(digit) button, as well as digit data entry. 
                                                 
1 Europay, MasterCard and Visa, whose collaboration resulted in a global standard for Chip and PIN. 
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3.1.1. Experiment Design 
A sample of 112 banking customers was recruited in Edinburgh to take part in the 
experiment sessions. Participants attended for their individual experiment session 
and were introduced to the CodeSure card and given a (paper) User Guide for the 
device (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). They then used the CodeSure card to 
generate a one-time passcode in order to login to a typical Internet banking page – a 
total of five uses in succession during their 60-minute experiment session. 
After each use of the card, participants completed a usability questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was designed to explore attitudes to device usability and security and 
was presented as 25 randomised attitudinal statements allowing users to respond on a 
7-point Likert format that ranged from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’. The 
usability questionnaire statements are listed in Table 3.1, which also shows the 
statement polarities (needed in the data analysis) and abbreviated forms used in the 
discussion here. 
The 18 core usability statements used (Love et al., 1992) were: 
Cognitive attributes – concentration, feeling flustered, stress, frustration. 
Fluency attributes – complication, knew what to do next, feeling in control, quick. 
Quality attributes – use again, reliable, needs improvement, matched expectations. 
User engagement attributes – user-friendly, appearance, liked using, enjoyed using, 
trustworthy, secure. 
To these were added 7 device-specific usability statements (Table 3.1): 
Device attributes – button layout, ease of use of buttons, screen response, display 
size, ease of reading, ease of retrieving information, need for user instructions. 
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Questionnaire Statement (polarity) Abbreviated Form 
I had to concentrate hard to use this device (-) Concentration 
I felt flustered when using this device (-) Flustered 
I felt under stress when using this device (-) Stressed 
Using this device was very frustrating (-) Frustration 
Using this device was too complicated (-) Complication 
When using this device I didn’t always know what to do next (-) Knew what to do next 
I felt in control when using this device (+) In control 
Using this device was quick (+) Quick 
I would be happy to use this device again (+) Use again 
I felt this device was reliable (+) Reliable 
I felt this device needs a lot of improvement (-) Needs improvement 
The operation of this device didn’t match my expectations (-) Matched expectations
I found this device user-friendly (+) User friendly 
I liked the appearance of this device (+) Appearance 
I liked using this device (+) Liked 
I did not enjoy using this device (-) Enjoyment 
Using this device felt trustworthy (+) Trustworthy 
Using this device felt secure (+) Security 
The layout of the buttons on this device was clear (+) Button layout 
I found the buttons on this device easy to use (+) Easy to use buttons 
The screen on this device was slow to respond to button presses (-) Screen response 
The display on this device was too small (-) Display size 
The display on this device was difficult to read (-) Easy to read 
Retrieving the details I needed from this device was straightforward (+) Information retrieval 
I would have liked more instructions on the use of this device (-) Instructions 
Table 3.1: Usability Questionnaire Statements 
Participants were asked to access ‘their’ bank account, and in order to do so they 
would need to use the CodeSure card to generate, and then enter a passcode into the 
screen. To generate the passcode they needed to enter their (supplied) PIN number 
into the CodeSure card. If the PIN was entered incorrectly on the CodeSure card, this 
was not reported to the participant until checked by the banking site. 
In common with all other Chip and PIN cards, but unlike other OTP generators, the 
CodeSure card has no record of the PIN actually stored on the card itself. If the PIN 
is entered incorrectly by the user then an OTP will still be displayed and the user will 
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not be notified that the OTP is actually invalid. All of the checking is done via the 
bank’s CodeSure card server, which maintains a record of the PIN for each card and 
is able to verify that the OTP was generated using the correct PIN for that card. The 
CodeSure chip on the card is unable to communicate with the EMV chip on the card. 
The programming interface for the CodeSure card server was accessed using SOAP 
(Simple Object Access Protocol), an XML-based messaging system transferred over 
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). After registering each of the CodeSure cards 
with the CodeSure card server it was possible to check the OTPs generated in the 
experiment. 
A Perl program was written to interface with the card server using the SOAP::Lite 
module. Three software functions were written: isalive, which was used to check if 
the card server was available, and webservicewithserial and webservicewithid, 
both of which were able to run an individual CodeSure card server function by its 
specified name (along with any supplied parameters) and then wait for the response 
from the card server itself. Identification of a CodeSure card to the card server could 
either be done with a 16-digit hexadecimal serial number (using 
webservicewithserial) unique to each card, or could be achieved by using a 6-
digit ID (using webservicewithid) tied to the account used to initially login to the 
card server which uniquely identified cards within the domain of the account used to 
login to the service. 
For this experiment, a web page to simulate user login to an Internet (banking) site 
was written in Perl using the CGI module, and ran on a Microsoft IIS (Internet 
Information Services) web server. The web page consisted of an HTML form 
containing only two fields: ‘userid’ and ‘passcode’. A prompt was displayed just 
above these fields: “To log on, please enter your User ID and generate a passcode 
using your card.” After entering the requested details and pressing the submit button, 
the passcode was checked with the card server. 
If the card server reported an error with the entered passcode, an error message was 
displayed requesting the fields be completed again: “I’m sorry, that passcode does 
not match your details. To log on, please enter your User ID and generate a 
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passcode using your card.” All data entered in the forms were sent to a log file for 
later analysis along with the number of attempts each participant took in each task. 
The cohort of participants was recruited by quota, balanced by gender and age, 
recruited in equal numbers in three age groups: 
Ages 18 to 35 ‘Generation Y’, the ‘Net generation’ who have grown up in an online 
world, a world with small form factor consumer devices, often as early 
adopters. 
Ages 36 to 55 ‘Generation X’, parents of the techno-savvy Net generation, who are 
more usually ‘followers’ rather than early adopters of new technologies. 
Ages 56 and older The ‘Baby Boomers’ who are generally (hesitant) traditionalists 
when it comes to new technologies, but with more wealth to be secured. 
These three consumer segments were balanced in the experiment design so that 
robust statistical analysis could be performed on the data collected to identify 
differences in attitudes and reactions between various groups. 
Experiment sessions took approximately 60 minutes and were conducted in a 
research suite at the University. The details of the experiment are summarised in 
Table 3.2. 
In order to determine if usability attitudes change with time, participants carried out 
two sessions, one week apart (to the day) to repeat the experiment treatment. In the 
second visit, they were not given the User Guide to the CodeSure card that they had 
been given in the first week. 
To encourage participants back for the second week, they were rewarded with a £20 
cheque for taking part during the first week and a £40 cheque for participation during 
the second week. 
Data collected included: demographic and technographic characteristics of 
participants (e.g. age, gender, mobile phone and text message usage); attitudes to 
device usability per-use; quality rating; task completion rates and timing data; 
debriefing interview responses with qualitative comments on specific issues. 
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The CodeSure Card Baseline Usability Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of user attitudes to the usability of a CodeSure card 
one-time passcode in two-factor authentication. 
Null hypothesis (H0) There will be no differences in metrics of participant attitude to 
usability, or performance (usage times, success rates) over time. 
Experiment design Participants use the CodeSure card 5 times, entering a PIN to 
generate a one-time passcode for two-factor authentication each 
time. Session repeated after 7 days. 
Repeated measures, longitudinal study. 
Dependent variables Usability questionnaire (7-point Likert scale). 
Quality rating data (linear scale). 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Performance data: times, error rates. 
Exit interview data. 
Independent variables Participant: gender (2 genders, balanced), age group (3 groups, 
balanced, split 18 to 35 / 36 to 55 / 56 and over). 
Cohort 96 (3 age groups × 2 genders × over-sampling ratio 16:1) = 96. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £20 for the first session and a cheque for £40 
for the second session. 
Session time 60 minutes. 
Table 3.2: Experiment Design Details 
After each session, a one-on-one interview sought to gather further opinions and 
suggestions about aspects of the usability of the CodeSure card, security and 
behavioural intention to use, after the repeated measures experiment; and usefulness 
and convenience of the device for authentication. 
3.1.2. Results 
3.1.2.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
A good balance for gender (50.5% male and 49.5% female) and for age groups 
(32.3% aged 18 to 35, 38.4% aged 36 to 55 and 29.3% aged 56 and over), was 
achieved in the final sample of 112 participants. 
Participants can be judged as a valid cross-section of the customer base for the 
experiment, with 92.9% having visited a branch in the four weeks prior to the start of 
the experiment; 68.7% having phoned their bank; 62.6% having used Internet 
banking; and 93% having used an ATM. Their preferred method of banking was 
Internet banking (46.9%), visits to the branch (24.0%), ATM (13.5%) and automated 
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telephone banking (12.5%). The mean duration of their banking relationship was 22 
years. 
Almost all the cohort (94%) owned a mobile phone. Of these, 99% receive text 
messages on their phone whilst 98% had sent a text message. The average number of 
texts sent in a week was 34, an important skill for an experiment involving usage of 
devices with small buttons and screens. 
Some 61% of participants regularly shop online. The majority (68%) of the cohort 
claimed to do their own research before purchasing technology products rather than 
relying on recommendations from others – representing a good mix of ‘leaders’ and 
‘followers’ for adoption of new products. 
Finally, 8% of the cohort reported to being left-handed which is within the expected 
range (10%) for the general population. 
These data confirm that the cohort was a suitable sample for the purposes of this 
experiment. 
3.1.2.2. Usability Results 
Analysis of the questionnaire responses for the 95 experiment participants who 
completed all 10 uses show that the CodeSure card achieves a mean usability score 
(grand mean over all 25 statements) of 4.49 on first use, increasing to a score of 4.66 
after the tenth use, Table 3.3. Whilst the means and standard deviations are presented 
in tables, the discussion focuses on the (more powerful) results from the analysis of 
variance reported for the ANOVA tests. These results indicate an acceptable 
usability score, (being greater than 4.0 on this scale2) for the baseline CodeSure card 
design. 
                                                 
2 The median on the scale of 1 to 7 and the minimum acceptance criteria for the work presented here. 
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Use Mean Score Std. Dev. N ANOVA Results 
1 4.4888 1.18510 95  
2 4.6463 1.19305 95 Use 2 > Use 1 (df=1; F=9.089; p=0.003) 
3 4.7785 1.23404 95 Use 3 > Use 2 (df=1; F=12.309; p=0.001)
4 4.7718 1.24574 95  
5 4.7655 1.31335 95  
6 4.4358 1.30145 95 Use 6 < Use 5 (df=1; F=11.843; p=0.001)
7 4.5183 1.32344 95 Use 7 > Use 6 (df=1; F=5.294; p=0.024) 
8 4.6021 1.30171 95 Use 8 > Use 7 (df=1; F=6.001; p=0.016) 
9 4.6581 1.29847 95 Use 9 > Use 8 (df=1; F=4.889; p=0.030) 
10 4.6623 1.30710 95  
Table 3.3: Mean Usability Scores for the CodeSure Card after Each Use 
Table 3.3 reflects a strong learning behaviour with an improvement in overall mean 
usability scores between successive uses. This improvement was especially marked 
between first and second use and between second and third use in each week. 
Statistical tests of usability scores from successive pairs of uses (repeated measures 
ANOVA with age group and gender as between-subjects independent variables) 
show (Table 3.3) that the increase in usability scores between first use and second 
use was statistically significant, F(1,89)=9.089, p=0.003: the increase between 
second use and third use was statistically significant, F(1,89)=12.309, p=0.001: as 
was the decrease between fifth use and sixth use, F(1,89)=11.843, p=0.001: the 
increase between sixth use and seventh use, F(1,89)=5.294, p=0.024: the increase 
between seventh use and eighth use, F(1,89)=6.001, p=0.016: and the increase 
between eighth use and ninth use, F(1,89)=4.889, p=0.030. Similar ANOVA tests 
confirm that the increase in usability scores between the first use and fifth use was 
statistically significant, F(1,89)=14.851, p<0.001, as was the increase between sixth 
use and tenth use, F(1,89)=14.847, p<0.001. 
The difference (fall) in usability scores between fifth use (4.77) and sixth use (4.44) 
after a gap of seven days, was statistically significant, F(1,89)=11.843, p=0.001, 
reflecting a regression after the gap of seven days. There were no statistically 
significant effects by age group on overall mean usability scores but males tended to 
score the card usability higher than did females after the gap of seven days, for the 
sixth use, F(1,89)=4.736, p=0.032, and seventh use, F(1,89)=4.976, p=0.028. 
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The mean scores for the individual usability attributes by successive uses are shown 
in Table 3.4. Scores for ‘security’, ‘reliable’ and ‘appearance’ were high (greater 
than 4.90) at the outset and remained high throughout. For the first use four usability 
attributes failed to achieve scores higher than 4.0: ‘concentration’, ‘screen response’, 
‘easy to use buttons’ and ‘needs improvement’. The usability scores for 
‘concentration’ showed a significant difference (increase) between first use and 
second use, F(1,89)=35.356, p<0.001, and again between second use and third use, 
F(1,89)=4.980, p=0.028: and scores for ‘easy to use buttons’ showed a significant 
difference (increase) between first use and second use, F(1,89)=5.001, p=0.028 – as 
might be expected as users become familiar with operating the card. 
Usability scores for attributes associated with ‘easy to use buttons’ on the card and 
the associated ‘screen response’ remain low throughout, especially in the second 
week and are identified as core usability issues. Scores for ‘needs improvement’ 
remained low throughout at less than 4.0. Interestingly, ‘button layout’ scored 
consistently high for the first week but much lower for the second week compared to 
the first week, although uses in both weeks consistently score above 4.0 for this 
attribute. This might be due to the fact that participants did not have access to the 
User Guide for their second session. In general, males consistently scored each of the 
usability attributes higher than did females. 
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 Week 1 Uses Week 2 Uses 
Usability Statement3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Concentration 3.35 4.22 4.47 4.46 4.54 3.94 4.35 4.54 4.57 4.75
Flustered 4.38 4.64 4.84 5.01 5.00 4.55 4.78 4.92 4.94 4.99
Stress 4.62 4.85 4.98 4.91 4.94 4.73 4.82 5.01 5.07 5.05
Frustration 4.34 4.58 4.71 4.69 4.67 4.53 4.49 4.53 4.63 4.73
Complication 4.75 4.99 5.03 5.08 5.12 4.86 4.74 4.96 5.03 5.03
Knew what to do next 4.55 4.95 5.15 5.11 5.18 4.09 4.76 4.94 5.12 5.00
In control 4.56 4.99 5.03 5.04 4.87 4.66 4.83 4.87 4.89 5.05
Quick 4.66 4.74 4.81 4.81 4.92 4.52 4.66 4.69 4.75 4.75
Use again 4.68 4.63 4.77 4.77 4.74 4.61 4.51 4.58 4.64 4.65
Reliable 4.93 5.01 4.99 5.05 4.96 4.93 4.95 4.97 4.99 4.96
Needs improvement 3.67 3.82 3.95 3.87 3.96 3.61 3.67 3.78 3.76 3.72
Matched expectations 4.32 4.42 4.61 4.59 4.55 4.53 4.39 4.65 4.60 4.54
User-friendly 4.37 4.36 4.54 4.51 4.46 4.21 4.28 4.29 4.38 4.37
Appearance 4.93 4.89 5.04 5.06 4.98 4.81 4.92 4.96 4.97 4.99
Liked 4.43 4.36 4.62 4.53 4.45 4.25 4.24 4.32 4.45 4.35
Enjoyment 4.29 4.31 4.66 4.48 4.61 4.02 4.23 4.27 4.40 4.42
Trustworthy 4.80 5.08 5.12 5.06 5.04 4.94 5.04 5.08 5.05 4.99
Security 5.06 5.16 5.14 5.03 5.05 5.03 5.01 5.02 5.13 5.04
Button layout 5.08 5.17 5.13 5.15 5.17 4.77 4.62 4.74 4.78 4.83
Easy to use buttons 3.56 3.89 3.93 3.94 3.91 3.48 3.62 3.61 3.60 3.63
Screen response 3.77 3.88 4.04 4.01 4.01 3.68 3.60 3.52 3.60 3.56
Display size 4.56 4.57 4.64 4.73 4.73 4.41 4.54 4.56 4.56 4.61
Easy to read 4.96 4.82 5.06 4.96 4.93 4.75 4.66 4.73 4.78 4.73
Information retrieval 4.89 4.98 5.19 5.31 5.20 4.75 4.85 4.89 5.02 5.07
Instructions 4.72 4.84 5.02 5.14 5.17 4.24 4.39 4.63 4.75 4.76
Table 3.4: Mean Usability Scores for Individual Usability Statements – by Use 
Using the data from all of the ten usability questionnaires involved in the experiment, 
reliability analysis for each (calculation of Cronbach’s α) shows a minimum of 
α=0.960 (this was for the first questionnaire in week 1), indicating that the reliability 
of all ten questionnaires was exceptionally high. 
                                                 
3 Underscore bold entries represent a statistically significant difference (p<0.05) from the previous 
use. 
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3.1.2.3. Quality Rating Results 
Participants were asked to rate the CodeSure card on a scale of 0 to 30, in terms of 
overall quality and for three attributes, ‘convenience’, ‘security’ and ‘ease of use’, 
Table 3.5. This was done after all tasks had been completed in each of the weeks. 
Attribute Week 1 Week 2
Overall quality 16.01 17.33
Convenience  21.54 22.43
Security 19.54 21.04
Ease of use 16.42 16.25
Table 3.5: Mean Quality Rating Results 
The CodeSure card was rated highest for ‘convenience’ in both weeks but lower for 
‘overall quality’ and ‘ease of use’. 
Participants who gave a high overall quality rating for the CodeSure card were 
generally impressed by the design and portability: “Like it, high tech, exciting”, “I 
liked the availability and mobility of the card”. Reasons for giving a low overall 
rating ranged from comments on the responsiveness of the device “The CodeSure 
card screen response was a bit slow” to the difficulty of using the buttons “The 
buttons were so difficult to use”. 
For ‘convenience’, positive comments for the CodeSure card focused on its 
portability when compared to other security devices “The card is so easy to carry 
and light”. Those that gave negative comments tended to focus on reliability: “The 
CodeSure card looks like it would be easy to damage”. 
A few participants thought that the buttons on the CodeSure card would wear with 
use and that would aid thieves when attempting to guess the owner’s PIN: “The 
CodeSure card isn’t trustworthy because it seems like it could wear and you can see 
where people have been pressing the keys and have left an indent corresponding to 
the PIN number”. 
Most negative comments about the ‘ease of use’ for the CodeSure card related to the 
buttons: “The buttons on the card are difficult to press and the screen is slow to 
respond”, “The buttons on the card need improved”. 
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In general these comments underscore the usability attribute trends shown in Table 
3.4. 
3.1.2.4. Task (Login) Times and Success Rates 
Tasks were timed from the point at which the login page was displayed until the 
timer was stopped when the participant pressed the submit button on the login page. 
No attempt was made to validate the fields before submitting the form, although all 
entered data were logged for later analysis. The submitted User ID was not checked 
as the experiment’s primary focus was on the generated passcodes. 
All login details were checked using the card server since the card itself generated a 
passcode regardless of whether the PIN was entered correctly or not. The timing data 
reported here do not include the time spent contacting the card server (typically 3 
seconds). If a participant failed validation at their first login attempt when using the 
CodeSure card, the time to login for their second attempt was added to the overall 
time for that task. 
The mean login times for the login task are shown in Table 3.6 across both weeks. 
Statistical analysis of this data (repeated measures ANOVA with age group and 
gender as between-subjects independent variables) confirms (Table 3.6) that there 
was a significant learning behaviour up to the third use in each week. 
Use Mean Login Time (s) Std. Dev. ANOVA Results 
1 133.88 111.914  
2 71.62 42.674 Use 2 < Use 1 (df=1; F=30.917; p<0.001)
3 57.31 29.254 Use 3 < Use 2 (df=1; F=11.503; p=0.001)
4 53.85 25.911  
5 49.22 22.299 Use 5 < Use 4 (df=1; F=8.558; p=0.004) 
6 85.47 43.474 Use 6 > Use 5 (df=1; F=74.988; p<0.001)
7 63.06 46.261 Use 7 < Use 6 (df=1; F=17.661; p<0.001)
8 52.38 29.343 Use 8 < Use 7 (df=1; F=8.795; p=0.004) 
9 53.37 38.571  
10 49.57 30.981  
Table 3.6: Mean Task (Login) Times with the CodeSure Card – by Use 
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The gap of 7 days between fifth use and sixth use produced a large increase in login 
times which was statistically significant, F(1,89)=74.988, p<0.001, but the sixth use 
still took much less time than for the first use. There were no significant differences 
in login times associated with gender but there was a statistically significant effect of 
age group on login times, with the difference in times for the youngest age group and 
the oldest age group being statistically significant (p<0.05) across all uses, and 
especially evident between the fifth use and sixth use, F(2,89)=12.609, p<0.001. The 
youngest age group participants were fastest overall with a mean login time on first 
use of 95 seconds whereas the oldest age group participants were slowest overall 
with a mean login time on first use which was twice as long at 185 seconds. The gap 
between the age groups narrowed after the first use in both weeks, Table 3.7. 
 Age 18 to 35 Age 36 to 55 Age 56 and over 
Use Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
1 95.37 67.875 125.11 101.769 184.62 141.333 
2 60.00 26.024 70.53 43.562 85.00 52.044 
3 48.47 25.205 55.39 28.559 68.83 31.137 
4 45.67 22.690 48.67 20.007 68.76 29.731 
5 41.97 22.101 48.86 21.981 57.17 20.915 
6 64.63 25.281 80.53 38.810 113.17 50.088 
7 49.50 31.053 58.31 40.495 83.00 59.146 
8 46.60 27.932 50.78 28.352 60.34 31.192 
9 42.90 26.987 56.47 51.243 60.34 27.888 
10 40.37 24.656 45.86 22.206 63.69 40.761 
Table 3.7: Mean Task (Login) Times – by Age Group 
The number of successful first-attempt and second-attempt logins using the 
CodeSure card was measured and the results are shown in Table 3.8. As with login 
times, there was a noticeable learning effect up to the third use of the CodeSure card 
in each session with a major regression in first-attempt success rate between the last 
use of the first week (use 5) and the first use of the second week (use 6) after a gap of 
7 days. 
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Table 3.8: CodeSure Card Login Overall Success – by Use 
Although only 77% of participants successfully managed to login on their first 
attempt with their first use of the CodeSure card, Table 3.8, all subsequent uses 
(allowing for two attempts) had success rates better than 96%. 
The login data (6-digit User ID and 8-digit passcode) entered by each participant was 
recorded during the experiment for subsequent analysis to permit characterisation of 
login errors. These data show that (data for first use, first attempts only) the reasons 
for entering the wrong User ID were using the PAN4 of the card (3% of attempts) or 
a simple typing error (1% of attempts), although there were no User ID errors after 
the seventh use. 
Errors with passcode entries were due to users entering the card PIN instead of the 
passcode (7% of attempts on the first use, first attempt), however, this improved 
markedly after the first use in both weeks, falling to around 1% of attempts. On first 
use, first attempt, some 8% of attempts were failures due to passcodes entered with 
an incorrect length and many of these were 7 or 9 digits in length, possibly 
highlighting a problem transcribing the string of 8 passcode digits from the CodeSure 
card display to the computer keyboard. 
                                                 
4 Primary Account Number, the (typically) 16-digit number that is printed on the front of credit and 
debit cards. 
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3.1.2.5. Interview Responses 
The individual interviews with participants sought to gather comments and 
preferences on a wide range of issues related to the CodeSure card experienced by 
the participants. The responses gathered are presented here with illustrative 
comments. 
Some 45% of respondents appreciated the fact the CodeSure card could fit in their 
wallet and afford them the convenience of not having to carry a separate reader or 
similar device: “I quite like having it on your card because I hate having to carry a 
card reader around”, “It’s one piece of equipment, its innovative having everything 
on the same card”, “I liked the concept, it would fit into my wallet”. 
Almost all participants mentioned that the responsiveness of the CodeSure card was 
poor: “The buttons were a bit slow”, “The buttons are not very responsive. You have 
to push hard to work them”, “Sometimes I was typing and the screen didn’t seem to 
respond”. 
When asked for suggestions for improvements, performance of the buttons was 
consistently mentioned: “The buttons could be made to respond a bit faster”, “The 
numbers should stay on screen for longer before they get masked”, “The screen 
should be quicker to respond and something should tell me when it’s activated so I 
know what mode I’m in”. 
Generally, participants were happy with the display on the CodeSure card although 
some mentioned it was too small or not bright enough: “It was fine, it was clear 
enough and the font size was good”, “It was a wee bit small, but other than that I 
liked it”, “I’d like to see the PIN digit I’d typed on the screen rather than just a star”. 
The CodeSure card was appreciated by participants as a security solution that could 
be applied across a range of channels. Of the participants who use Internet banking, 
82% expected to be able to use the CodeSure card to access their bank’s Internet 
banking service. For those who use Telephone banking, 73% expected to be able to 
use the CodeSure card to access their bank’s Telephone banking service. Of the 
participants who do online shopping, 88% expected to be able to use the CodeSure 
card for online shopping. Some 67% of participants said they would use the 
CodeSure card as their main card. 
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3.1.3. Discussion on Experiment Findings 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“There will be no differences in metrics of participant attitude to 
usability, or performance (usage times, success rates) over time.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since usability 
scores, success rates and usage times for the CodeSure card exhibited significant 
improvements between successive uses. 
Usability scores for the CodeSure card at 4.49 (on a 7-point scale) for first use rising 
to 4.66 on tenth use confirm the device usability as suited for use in a usable security 
procedure. Participants recognised that the CodeSure card was convenient to use as 
reflected in the quality ratings and comments; and appreciated the role of the card as 
a multiple channel, usable security solution where 82% expected to be able to use it 
to access their Bank’s Internet banking service, 73% to use it for Telephone banking 
and 88% to use it for online shopping. 
The results obtained from this usability experiment highlight a range of usability 
issues with the CodeSure card, where improvement might further boost card usability 
and which are addressed in the next two experiments. 
Dual mode operation. Although only one CodeSure card mode (Identify) was used 
in the experiment, users still had problems coping with the button sequence required 
for mode selection to set the device into Identify mode: “Something should tell me 
when it’s activated so I know what mode I’m in”. Modifying the control button 
sequences and better use of the display in prompting and separating mode selection 
from data entry might be an improvement here, although this would increase power 
consumption for the card. 
Navigation cues. Users were often unclear about how the control buttons were 
meant to be used at various points in the sequence and when to enter PIN digits and 
other data. Better use of the display to show more navigation cues (mode entry 
instructions, when to press OK, which data to enter) might be an improvement here. 
PIN masking. The digit masking used on the display (straight to star) also caused 
some problems: “I’d like to see the PIN digit I’d typed on the screen rather than just 
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a star”. In contrast to the digit masking for this baseline design of CodeSure card, 
which displayed each PIN entry masked as a star, a scheme where the keyed digit is 
displayed briefly before being masked to a star might be an improvement here. 
Key-ahead. Users also had problems with the response time of the keypad, not so 
much with the delay between button press and screen display, but more when they 
tried to type ahead of the display: “Sometimes I was typing and the screen didn’t 
seem to respond”. A keypad buffer allowing type-ahead may be an improvement 
here, although it would again increase power consumption for the card. 
Display format. The format of the (passcode) display as a single string of 1x8 digits 
may have produced read-remember-type errors for passcodes during tasks. 
Displaying the passcode in a 4-space-4 digit format may be an improvement here. 
This would require a longer display on the CodeSure card, at increased cost for the 
card. 
Button sensitivity. The small size of the buttons and their closeness on the card were 
identified as being less of a usability problem than the contact pressure required in 
getting the buttons to ‘press’: “The buttons are not very responsive. You have to push 
hard to work them”. Other button technologies (for example piezoelectric or 
capacitive button technology instead of the air gap / resistive button technology used 
in the baseline CodeSure card design) might be an improvement here in making 
buttons easier to press. 
These usability issues are addressed in the next experiments which compare the 
usability of the baseline design of CodeSure card with an enhanced user interface 
design. 
3.2. The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment 
In the previous usability experiment with the (baseline design) CodeSure card, issues 
which were impacting usability were identified and enhancements to address these 
issues were proposed. This experiment investigates the effectiveness of some of 
these enhancements in improving the usability of the CodeSure card. 
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Dual mode operation. An alternative method for mode selection was used for the 
enhanced design to give the user more feedback when selecting the card mode. In the 
enhanced design, pressing the OK button when the card is inactive displays a prompt 
message ‘MODE _’ and when the mode number button is pressed, the number for the 
selected mode is displayed on the screen for one second or until OK is pressed. 
Navigation cues. PIN entry was also changed in the enhanced design with use of a 
display prompt ‘PIN ____’ to prompt the user to enter their PIN after mode 
selection. 
PIN masking. Two different masking styles for the PIN digit display were also 
investigated, comparing the existing straight-to-star PIN masking design with an 
alternative digit-to-star PIN masking design. 
Key-ahead. A keypad buffer is used with the enhanced design to store any key 
presses made before the display was updated, to alleviate the issue where users felt 
the keypad was not responsive enough when trying to key ahead. 
Display format. Two different passcode display styles were also investigated, 
comparing a 4-space-4 digit passcode display design with the existing passcode 
display design of a single string of 1x8 digits. 
The enhanced CodeSure card design featured the alternative method for mode 
selection and improved navigation cues to provide visible feedback to the user during 
mode selection, and incorporated a keypad buffer to allow type-ahead. The different 
PIN masking styles and passcode display formats were not tied to a specific card 
design and were investigated separately. 
3.2.1. Experiment Design 
For this experiment a 1:1 size simulation of the CodeSure card was created on a 
small touch screen tablet device to investigate some of these usability issues in more 
depth. There was no requirement to use the CodeSure card server for this experiment 
as there were no physical CodeSure cards being used. 
The experiment involved two tasks (two CodeSure card modes) – login using 
Identify mode, and transaction signing using Sign mode. A web page very similar to 
that used in the previous experiment was used to simulate participant login and 
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transaction signing. This was written in Perl using the CGI module and ran on 
Microsoft IIS. For participant login, the form contained two fields, ‘User ID’ and 
‘Passcode’ and the prompt was changed to “To log on, please enter your User ID 
and generate a Passcode using IDENTIFY mode on your card.” For transaction 
signing, the form had an additional two fields labelled ‘Account No’ and ‘Amount’ 
and the prompt was changed to “To proceed with the transfer of £AMOUNT to account 
number ACCOUNT, please enter your User ID and generate a Passcode using SIGN 
mode on your card.”, where AMOUNT and ACCOUNT were dynamically filled depending 
on the payment details in the task. 
After entering the requested details and pressing the submit button, the details were 
logged for later analysis. No live checking on the content of the fields was done other 
than ensuring that the ‘User ID’ or ‘Passcode’ fields were not empty. If that was the 
case then a JavaScript alert box prompted them to “Please enter values for both 
User ID and Passcode.” 
To characterise card usability and learning effects, participants were asked to attend 
the usability labs at the University. In their individual session they were asked to use 
the CodeSure card a total of 16 times (4 times with each of Identify and Sign modes 
with baseline and enhanced designs), generating a new and unique OTP to either 
login to a typical Internet page or sign a typical transaction. Participants were given 
paper User Guides on how to use each design (Figure B.2 through Figure B.4 in 
Appendix B). Task time [time to derive OTP + login] and success rates were 
measured for each use. After the first and fourth repeat of each task with each user 
interface design participants completed a usability questionnaire. 
A cohort of representative banking customers (Edinburgh) took part in the 
experiment, using a CodeSure card simulator to login and sign transactions. None of 
the participants had taken part in the previous CodeSure experiment and they were 
recruited on a balanced quota basis with equal numbers of men and women: and 
equal numbers in two age groups – under 45’s and those 45 and over5. 
                                                 
5 Results of the previous experiment showed no significant effect involving the intermediate age group 
so the 3 age groups of that experiment were simplified to 2 age groups for this second experiment. 
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The same usability statements used in the previous experiment were completed by 
each participant after their first and fourth uses of each design for each of the two 
tasks / modes. The attributes being measured did not change but the statement 
wording changed from ‘this device’ to ‘this process’ to focus interest on the usability 
of the overall task. As before, the questionnaire was presented as 25 randomised 
statements in a 7-point Likert format that ranged from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly 
Disagree’, Table 3.1. 
The experiment aimed to address three aspects: the relative usability of the two card 
designs; the error rates for the two alternative passcode display modes (1x8 versus 4-
space-4); and preferences for digit PIN masking approaches. 
For each use, keystrokes were logged, time was measured, and the frequency of 
occurrence of key-ahead attempts was monitored. The order of experience for design 
and for mode was balanced across the cohort. Participants also experienced the two 
passcode displays (4-space-4 or 1x8 digits) alternating between uses to investigate if 
the enhanced display format improves transcription of the passcode from the card to 
the computer. 
Individual sessions lasted 60 minutes. Participants were thanked with honorarium 
cheques of £30. The details of the experiment are summarised in Table 3.9. 
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The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of usability issues with enhanced CodeSure card 
design. 
Null hypothesis (H0) There will be no differences in metrics of participant attitude to 
usability, task timings or error rates between different designs for 
the CodeSure card user interface. 
Experiment design Participants experience baseline design of CodeSure card and 
enhanced design which seeks to better partition mode selection 
from card usage; participants also experience two different display 
formats to assess error rates; participants give preference for PIN 
masking techniques. 
Repeated measures (balanced order), within subjects. 
Dependent variables Usability questionnaire (7-point Likert scale). 
Error rates with the different display formats. 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Independent variables Experiment: treatment order (2 design orders × 2 mode orders, 
balanced). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, balanced), age group (2 groups, 
balanced). 
Cohort 64 (2 age groups × 2 genders × 4 treatment orders × over-
sampling ratio 4:1) = 64. 
Not the same participants as the previous experiment. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £30. 
Session time 60 minutes. 
Table 3.9: Experiment Design Details 
3.2.2. CodeSure Card Simulator 
The CodeSure card simulator screen was exactly the same size as a real card. Button 
presses were simulated with circular regions matching the exact dimensions of the 
buttons on the real card, Figure 3.2. The touch-screen device used in the CodeSure 
card simulator was an ARCHOS 7 media tablet. The simulator was written in a 
combination of ASP code running on a remote Windows Server and JavaScript 
rendering in the Opera web browser running on the tablet. 
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Figure 3.2: The CodeSure Card Simulator 
3.2.3. Results 
3.2.3.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
A good balance for gender (50% male and 50% female) and for age groups (49% 
aged 18 to 45 and 51% aged 46 and over) was achieved in the final sample of 70 
participants. 
Nearly all of the participants (99%) owned a mobile phone and of these, some 90% 
sent and received text messages, sending an average of 45 text messages a week, an 
important skill for an experiment involving usage of devices with small buttons and 
screens. 
Finally, 16% of participants were noted as using their left hand to press the touch 
screen during the experiment. 
During the experiment, data logs from the simulator were found to be incomplete for 
eleven participants. The cause of this was not known but the simulator did continue 
to function correctly. Therefore, task completion and timing data are only available 
for 59 participants, but usability and preference data are available for all 70 
participants. Of the 11 participants with missing or incomplete task data, 10 of them 
experienced the enhanced design first, perhaps indicating that the cause of logging 
failure was related to a software problem with running the enhanced design first. 
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Even with this small imbalance of design order allocations there were enough 
samples in each of the subgroups to perform split analyses with the data. 
3.2.3.2. Usability Results 
The enhanced design scored higher for usability with an overall mean score of 5.01 
than did the baseline design with a mean score of 4.83, Table 3.10. Usability scores 
in Sign mode were lower than in Identify mode, Table 3.10. 
 Enhanced Design Baseline Design 
Overall Mean=5.0073, SD=0.95983 Mean=4.8339, SD=1.08171 
Identify mode Mean=5.1563, SD=0.99044 Mean=4.9957, SD=1.07509 
Sign mode Mean=4.8593, SD=1.00752 Mean=4.6720, SD=1.16992 
Table 3.10: Mean Usability Scores for the Two Designs (N=70) 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out for the overall 
mean usability scores (Table 3.11) taking design (baseline vs. enhanced) as the 
within-subjects factor and gender, age group and order of design experienced as 
between-subjects factors. An exploratory analysis beforehand was able to discount 
task (mode) order as not being a significant between-subjects factor so this was 
removed from any subsequent analysis. For this analysis the mean of the 
participant’s usability scores of first and fourth use of each design/mode were used 
and only main effects and two-way interactions were explored. 
The overall difference in mean usability scores between the enhanced design 
(mean=5.01) and the baseline design (mean=4.83) was approaching significance, 
F(1,62)=3.806, p=0.056, Table 3.11. There were no significant main effects on the 
mean attitude scores due to gender or age group, and also no significant between-
subjects interactions, Table 3.11. There was a significant effect due to design order, 
F(1,62)=25.141, p<0.001, Table 3.11, but the order of experience was equally 
balanced across the cohort. 
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Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Design 0.745 1 0.745 3.806 0.056 
Design × Gender 0.390 1 0.390 1.993 0.163 
Design × Age 0.151 1 0.151 0.774 0.382 
Design × Order 4.920 1 4.920 25.141 0.000 
Error (Design) 12.132 62 0.196   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 1.734 1 1.734 0.897 0.347 
Age 1.275 1 1.275 0.660 0.420 
Order 0.029 1 0.029 0.015 0.902 
Gender × Age 1.317 1 1.317 0.682 0.412 
Gender × Order 0.004 1 0.004 0.002 0.965 
Age × Order 2.298 1 2.298 1.189 0.280 
Error 119.795 62 1.932   
Table 3.11: ANOVA Results for Overall Mean Usability 
Similar ANOVA tests on each of the individual usability attributes show that there 
were significant main effects due to design, gender or age group in 7 of the 25 
attributes, Table 3.12. 
Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Flustered Age (df=1; F=7.250; p=0.009) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Stressed Age (df=1; F=4.592; p=0.036) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Frustration Gender (df=1; F=4.212; p=0.044) Females > Males 
Design (df=1; F=6.199; p=0.016) Enhanced > Baseline design Screen response 
Gender (df=1; F=5.402; p=0.023) Females > Males 
Easy to use buttons Design (df=1; F=7.518; p=0.008) Enhanced > Baseline design 
Use again Design (df=1; F=4.385; p=0.040) Enhanced > Baseline design 
User friendly Design (df=1; F=4.451; p=0.039) Enhanced > Baseline design 
Table 3.12: Summary of Significant Differences in Usability Attributes 
ANOVA tests for the individual attributes show that the enhanced design scored 
significantly higher for overall usability than the baseline design for ‘screen 
response’, ‘easy to use buttons’, ‘use again’ and ‘user friendly’. In Table 3.12, high 
scores for ‘flustered’, ‘stressed’ and ‘frustration’ imply that participants were 
actually less flustered, less stressed and less frustrated as these were presented as 
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negative polarity statements. Females found both designs less frustrating than did 
males and also scored both designs higher for ‘screen response’. Younger 
participants found that both designs left them less flustered and less stressed than did 
older participants, Table 3.12. 
For the eight sets of usability questionnaire data, reliability analysis on the scale of 
each (based on Cronbach’s α) reported a minimum value of α=0.959 (for the first 
questionnaire for the enhanced design in Sign mode), indicating that the 
questionnaire reliability was high. 
3.2.3.3. Timings 
Card usage times, taken as being the time from the first button press to the passcode 
being displayed, were measured with the CodeSure card simulator for each task, 
Table 3.13. For Identify mode, mean card usage times for the enhanced design and 
baseline design were similar, Figure 3.3, but mean card usage times in Sign mode 
appear faster by 9 seconds with the enhanced design, Figure 3.4. 
 Enhanced Design (s) Baseline Design (s) 
Identify mode Mean=25.3153, SD=25.64611 Mean=24.9932, SD=14.60913
Sign mode Mean=63.2481, SD=25.12291 Mean=72.4793, SD=46.75887
Table 3.13: Mean Device Timing Results for the Two Designs (N=59) 
Statistical tests (ANOVA) on these data indicate that the difference in card usage 
times between the enhanced design and the baseline was not statistically significant 
for either mode. Removing the 3 outliers reduces the mean card usage time for 
Identify mode in the enhanced design to 21.41s (24.56s in the baseline design) and 
reduces the mean card usage time for Sign mode in the baseline design to 67.84s 
(62.13s in the enhanced design), and although this resulted in reduced card usage 

























































Figure 3.4: Card Usage Times – Sign Mode 
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The overall task times, taken as being the time from the task web page being 
displayed until the time of hitting submit were measured, Table 3.14. On average 
overall task times for the enhanced design were faster than with the baseline design 
by 7 seconds in Identify mode, Figure 3.5, and by 13 seconds in Sign mode, Figure 
3.6. 
 Enhanced Design (s) Baseline Design (s) 
Identify mode Mean=63.1907, SD=40.21658 Mean=70.2119, SD=31.77859
Sign mode Mean=103.6890, SD=39.73001 Mean=116.9534, SD=60.19948






























Figure 3.5: Overall Task Times – Identify Mode 
Again, statistical tests (ANOVA) on these data show that the difference in task times 
between the enhanced design and the baseline was not statistically significant for 
either mode. Removing the 4 outliers reduces the mean for Identify mode in the 
enhanced design to 55.55s (68.83s in the baseline design) and reduces the mean for 
Sign mode in the baseline design to 110.65s (99.27s in the enhanced design), 
resulting in a statistically significant difference for task times in Identify mode, 
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Figure 3.6: Overall Task Times – Sign Mode 
3.2.3.4. Success Rates 
In both modes of operation the PIN that was entered into the CodeSure simulator was 
recorded for later analysis, Table 3.15. Success rates with the enhanced design were 
slightly higher than with the baseline design. During mode selection, only two 
participants selected the wrong mode for some of their tasks, and although this was 
recorded the CodeSure card simulator still generated a Passcode so that they could 
continue their task. 
Mode Baseline Design (%) Enhanced Design (%) 
Identify 97% 99% 
Sign 97% 98% 
Table 3.15: PIN Entry Success Rates – both Modes 
With Sign mode, both the account number and amount (in pence) entered were 
recorded by the CodeSure card simulator, with results summarised in Table 3.16. A 
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passcode was generated regardless of whether or not the account number and amount 
were correct for the task. 
 Baseline Design (%) Enhanced Design (%)
Correct account number 89% 94%
Correct amount (but specified in pounds) 35% 34%
Correct amount 56% 59%
Table 3.16: Data Entry Success Rates – Sign Mode 
Again, success rates for entry of account number and amount in Sign mode were 
higher for the enhanced design than for the baseline design: evidence of the success 
of the key-ahead functionality of the enhanced design. Although participants were 
asked to enter the amount in pence, just over one third of amounts were entered in 
pounds. 
3.2.3.5. Impact of Display Format 
Changing the format of the 8 digit passcode display into two blocks of 4 digits 
resulted in a slightly higher success rate when transcribing the passcode from the 
CodeSure card display to a web page, Table 3.17. Errors reading and then entering 
the 8-digit passcode were reduced from 3.4% to 1.9% by use of two blocks of 4 
digits in the passcode display. 
Result Block of 8 Digits (%) Two Blocks of 4 Digits (%)
Passcode entry success 95.5% 97.3%
Wrong (PIN entered) 1.1% 0.6%
Wrong (User ID entered) 0.0% 0.2%
Wrong (other) 3.4% 1.9%
Table 3.17: Error Rates for Passcode Entry – by Display Format 
3.2.3.6. Key-ahead Frequency 
In the baseline design, the number of key-ahead attempts that were made was 
recorded for each use, Table 3.18. 
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 Identify Sign Overall 
% of participants 83% 78% 81% 
Mean attempts per task 0.55 0.68 0.61 
Table 3.18: Key-ahead Attempts with the Baseline Design 
Overall, 81% of participants attempted to key-ahead at least once during their eight 
uses of the baseline design, with an average of 0.61 attempts per use. 
More participants pressed keys ahead of time in a task using Identify mode compared 
to Sign mode, although there were more attempts per use when using Sign mode, 
which is understandable given the increased number of button presses required. 
Interestingly, participants using Identify mode for the first time in the baseline design 
made an average of 0.81 key-ahead attempts which decreased to less than 0.6 
attempts for the fourth use, whereas the average number of key-ahead attempts for 
the first use of Sign mode was 0.64 which did not decrease on subsequent uses. This 
is further evidence of the value of the keypad buffer in the enhanced design. 
3.2.3.7. PIN Masking Preferences 
After performing the two tasks for both designs, participants were asked to comment 
on an alternative PIN masking design on the CodeSure card simulator where the 
digits were immediately masked with a star rather than initially showing the PIN 
digit and then masking it. They were then asked which design they preferred and 
why. 
The majority of those that preferred the digit-to-star design, Table 3.19, indicated 
that it was because they could “Check they had entered the correct number”, whilst 
those that preferred the straight-to-star design said that it “Would prevent others 
seeing the PIN”. 
Preference % 
Digit to star 61%
Straight to star 33%
No preference 6%
Table 3.19: PIN Masking Preferences 
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3.2.4. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“There will be no differences in metrics of participant attitude to 
usability, task timings or error rates between different designs for the 
CodeSure card user interface.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since usability 
scores with the enhanced design of the card were superior to those with the baseline 
card design. There is also evidence to suggest that task timings and success rates 
were also improved. Statistical tests show the difference in usability scores between 
the enhanced card design and the baseline card design was statistically significant. 
The significant differences (improvements) reported in scores for ‘screen response’ 
and ‘easy to use buttons’ can be attributed to inclusion of a keypad buffer in the 
enhanced design and the significant differences (improvements) reported for ‘use 
again’ and user friendly’ can be attributed to the improvement in navigation cues for 
mode selection and data entry in the enhanced card design. 
Usage times and task times decreased with the enhanced design but the differences 
were not statistically significant. However, removing the 4 outliers from the task 
timing results resulted in a significant reduction in task times in the enhanced design 
when using Identify mode. 
Success rates for data entry were slightly higher with the improved navigation cues 
and keypad buffer in the enhanced design. Errors in reading and then entering the 8-
digit passcode were reduced with the 2 blocks of 4 digits format for passcode 
display, and users expressed a preference for the digit-to-star mode of PIN masking.  
The fact that 82% of participants attempted key-ahead button presses with the 
baseline design is evidence of the need for a keypad buffer as used in the enhanced 
design. 
73 
3.3. The CodeSure Keypad and Display Synchrony 
Experiment 
The previous experiment identified that the usability attributes ‘easy to use buttons’ 
and ‘screen response’ were higher for the enhanced user design for the CodeSure 
card in comparison to the baseline design and the difference was statistically 
significant. However, neither the buttons themselves, nor the screen response times, 
were actually different between the two designs, implying that the keypad buffer in 
the enhanced design was the key contributor to this improvement. 
To further investigate this design aspect, a touch screen simulation of the CodeSure 
card (enhanced user interface design as discussed above) was prepared on a desktop 
PC (touch) screen connected to a gaze tracking camera making it possible to 
determine if participants gazed at the display of the CodeSure card after each button 
press6. If they did not gaze at the display after button presses then they would be 
relying on the button presses to be registered on the display, a false assumption if 
they typed too quickly (key-ahead) without a keypad buffer and this would 
contribute to their perceptions of slower screen response and buttons being harder to 
use buttons. 
3.3.1. Experiment Design 
The experiment used a touch screen display simulation of the CodeSure card, Figure 
3.7. The ELO Intellitouch touch screen technology used was built in to a 17 inch 
Iiyama LCD monitor with Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) technology. 
                                                 
6 The gaze tracking camera available for this research is not able to track gaze for a physical CodeSure 
card because the target points for the gaze tracker need to be fixed relative to the camera position. 
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Figure 3.7: Experiment Setup 
The dimensions of the simulated card on the screen (exactly 2.5 times the original 
size) was designed to be of a similar perspective size, for a participant sitting 
approximately 75cm from the touch screen, as a physical CodeSure card when held 
at some 30cm from the eyes. 
The simulator was written in a combination of ASP code running on a remote 
Windows Server and JavaScript rendering in the Internet Explorer web browser 
running on the desktop PC. 
The gaze tracking camera used was the Tobii X120 which uses infrared beams to 
detect reflections (Purkinje images) from the corneas of participants’ eyes that can be 
used in conjunction with the pupil position to calculate gaze direction (the human 
cornea is non-spherical). A calibration stage is necessary for each participant before 
using the eye tracker so that gaze direction can be mapped directly on to screen co-
ordinates. This is especially important with the X120 as it is not fixed rigidly to the 
display. 
The human eye is capable of focusing on stationary objects for small periods of time 
(fixations) separated by periods of jitter (saccades). By applying a fixation filter to 
filter out saccades from an eye tracking log, the fixations of interest can be identified. 
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The fixation filter used in this experiment was a dispersion-threshold identification 
(I-DT) algorithm, Figure 3.8 (based on Salvucci and Goldberg, 2000). For this 
experiment the minimum duration of a fixation was set to 50ms and the maximum 
radius of a fixation was 50 pixels. 
 
d ← minimum duration of a fixation (ms) 
r ← maximum radius of a fixation (pixels) 
while p ← next gaze point do 
    F = {p} // start a new fixation 
    c ← p // initialise the fixation centroid 
    while p ← next gaze point and p ≤ r pixels away from c do 
        F = F U {p} 
        c ← centroid of all points in F 
    end while 
    if overall duration of F ≥ d then 
        replace all points in F with fixation, c 
    else 
        mark all points in F as saccades 
    end if 
end while 
Figure 3.8: Dispersion Threshold Identification Fixation Filter Code 
It is important to note that not all of the gazes to the screen could be captured in the 
simulator, particularly during button presses where an arm might have obscured the 
gaze tracking camera. However, even having only one detected fixation to the 
appropriate area of the screen was judged enough to be included in the analysis. 
At the start of their session, the gaze tracking camera was calibrated to suit the 
participant’s eyes / gaze by asking the participant to follow and focus on a set of 5 
target points which appeared in sequence at a set of fixed positions over the screen 
area. 
Participants were asked to generate one-time passcodes using the Identify mode of 
the CodeSure card simulator and also using a real CodeSure card. As with the 
previous experiments participants were provided with a paper User Guide for the 
CodeSure card (covering both the simulated and real form), as shown in Figure B.5 
in Appendix B. None of the participants had taken part in either of the two 
experiments reported earlier in this chapter. 
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The initial batch of five passcode generation tasks used the CodeSure simulator on 
the touch screen display with the gaze tracking camera. This first batch of five uses 
with the simulator / gaze tracking camera was then followed by a batch of five 
passcode generation tasks with a physical CodeSure card. A further batch of five 
passcode generation tasks used the CodeSure simulator and gaze tracking camera, to 
investigate if gaze behaviour differed after use of the physical CodeSure card. 
For each task, participants generated the one-time passcode and were asked to write 
down the passcode for subsequent checking. 
Participants were thanked with an honorarium cheque for £30. The details of the 
experiment are summarised in Table 3.20. 
The CodeSure Keypad and Display Synchrony Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of gaze behaviour when using a CodeSure card. 
Null hypothesis (H0) There will be no difference in participant gaze behaviour between 
the first five uses of the CodeSure card simulator and the second 
five uses. 
Experiment design Participants use the CodeSure card simulator / gaze tracking 
camera 5 times to generate one-time passcodes, followed by 5 
similar uses of a physical CodeSure card, followed by another 5 
uses of the CodeSure card simulator / gaze tracking camera. 
Repeated measures (balanced order), within subjects. 
Dependent variables Gaze tracking data. 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Performance data: simulator error rates. 
Independent variables Participant: gender (2 genders, balanced), age group (2 groups, 
balanced, split ages 18 to 44 / 45 and over). 
Cohort 40 (2 age groups × 2 genders × over-sampling ratio 10:1) = 40. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £30. 
Session time 60 minutes. 
Table 3.20: Experiment Design Details 
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
A cohort of 40 participants took part in the experiment. Data from 2 participants 
were removed from the analysis because they were unable to complete the practice 
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gaze tracking calibration due to eye problems (one who reported suffering from a 
‘lazy eye’ and one who was about to have an operation to remove cataracts). 
Of the remaining 38 participants, 19 were male and 19 were female: 20 were aged 18 
to 44 and 18 were aged 45 and over. There were 14 participants who wore glasses 
during the experiment and 5 participants wore contact lenses although none of these 
cases caused any problems for the gaze tracking camera. 
Only 4 participants were left-handed and the remainder were right-handed. The 
simulated card was positioned on the touch screen display according to the 
participant’s handedness during the experiment in order to minimise the likelihood of 
an arm blocking the line of sight for the gaze tracker when pressing the buttons on 
the screen. 
3.3.2.2. Task Results 
For the simulator tasks only 2 tasks had the PIN submitted wrongly (the participants 
were not notified in these cases since a passcode was generated regardless). There 
were many more tasks where the PIN was initially entered wrongly but corrected by 
the participant before submission. There were 18 tasks where the OK button was 
pressed to confirm the mode selection rather than just waiting for the mode selection 
to automatically proceed. This issue only occurred for 4 participants and did not 
affect their ability to generate a passcode. 
Participants were also asked to write down each passcode as it was generated in the 
simulator tasks and by the real CodeSure card. For the simulator tasks, 100% of 
passcodes were recorded correctly. The passcodes generated by the physical 
CodeSure card were not checked during the experiment. 
3.3.2.3. Gaze Tracking Results 
Each participant provided gaze tracking data from the first batch of 5 simulator tasks 
before using the physical CodeSure card and from the second batch of 5 simulator 
tasks. There were data for 379 simulator tasks in total. There was a technical issue 
with the eye tracking hardware with one participant where the first simulator task 
was not run. 
78 
Boolean values recording if a participant gazed at least once at the simulator display 
after each button press for each task were calculated from the fixation-filtered gaze 
tracking data and the results summed for each participant, per button, per task and 
per batch of 5 tasks. 
Table 3.21 shows the percentage of participants who gazed at the display after each 
button press in the sequence <button OK then button 6> for mode selection (Identify 
mode), followed by the four buttons for PIN digit entry. These results, Table 3.21, 
show that on some 40% of occasions participants did not look at the display after 
entering a PIN digit. Interestingly, Table 3.21, on some 20% of cases they did not 
even look at the display after mode selection. Only 13% of participants looked at the 
display after every single PIN digit entry. 
 % of Participants who Gazed at Display 
State in Sequence First Batch Second Batch Overall 
After OK button 73.54% 59.47% 66.49% 
After mode select digit button 85.19% 75.26% 80.21% 
After first PIN digit  56.61% 61.05% 58.84% 
After second PIN digit 62.96% 65.26% 64.12% 
After third PIN digit 66.14% 61.05% 63.59% 
After fourth PIN digit 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Overall (all 6 buttons) 74.07% 70.35% 72.21% 
Table 3.21: Display Gazes After Button Presses for <OK [Mode 6] DDDD> 
Between the first batch and second batch of simulator tasks there was a 14% 
decrease in gazes to the display after pressing the OK button, and a 10% decrease 
after mode selection. This shows an increased familiarity with the process of mode 
selection, resulting in less need to check that the mode was correctly selected on the 
display. There were only slight differences in gaze behaviour after entering the first, 
second and third PIN digits between the first and second batch of simulator tasks. 
The data, Table 3.21, confirm however that for 100% of uses participants gazed at 
the display after the fourth PIN digit – since of course they had then to read the 
passcode from the display. 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to investigate 
overall gaze behaviour, Table 3.22, taking use (first batch of 5 tasks with the 
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simulator vs. second batch of 5 tasks with the simulator) as the within-subjects factor 
and gender and age group as the between-subjects factors. The within-subjects factor 
(use) was measured on an integer scale of 0 to 5 representing the number of tasks in 
which the participant gazed at least once at the display. Only main effects and two-
way interactions were explored. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Use 19.799 1 19.799 2.202 0.147 
Use × Gender 2.471 1 2.471 0.275 0.604 
Use × Age 3.378 1 3.378 0.376 0.544 
Error (Use) 305.678 34 8.991   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 216.178 1 216.178 2.490 0.124 
Age 732.258 1 732.258 8.435 0.006 
Gender × Age 150.915 1 150.915 1.738 0.196 
Error 2951.722 34 86.815   
Table 3.22: ANOVA Results for Gaze Behaviour between First and Second 
Batches of Simulator Tasks 
There was no significant effect on overall gaze behaviour between the first and 
second batches of simulator tasks, although there was a significant effect of age 
group on gaze behaviour with younger participants gazing at the display significantly 
more, F(1,34)=8.435, p=0.006, than did older participants, Table 3.22. 
Further ANOVAs were run to investigate gazes to the display after each button press, 
Table 3.23, between the first batch and second batch of simulator tasks. The analyses 
confirm that the decrease in rate of gazes to the display when selecting the operating 
mode between the first and second batch of simulator tasks was statistically 
significant, F(1,34)=11.791, p=0.002. Similarly for the decrease in rate of gazes to 
the display for the mode select digit, F(1,34)=5.003, p=0.032. There were no effects 
due to use for the PIN digits, although there was between-subject effect of age group 
with younger participants looking at the display more than did older participants – 
significant differences for first PIN digit, F(1,34)=8.276, p=0.007; for second PIN 
digit, F(1,34)=11.105, p=0.002; and for third PIN digit, F(1,34)=6.670, p=0.014. The 
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analyses did not include gaze behaviour after the fourth PIN digit since all 
participants gazed at the display after that event. 
After Button Press Significant Effects Details 
Use (df=1, F=11.791, p=0.002) First 5 uses > Second 5 uses OK 
Age (df=1, F=5.031, p=0.032) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Mode select digit Use (df=1, F=5.003, p=0.032) First 5 uses > Second 5 uses 
First PIN digit Age (df=1, F=8.276, p=0.007) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Second PIN digit Age (df=1, F=11.105, p=0.002) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Third PIN digit Age (df=1, F=6.670, p=0.014) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Table 3.23: Significant Effects in Gaze Behaviour between First and Second 
Batches of Simulator Tasks 
Men tended to look at the display more frequently than did women, Figure 3.9, 
which shows that 14 men gazed at the display more than 50% of the time after 





































Figure 3.9: Display Gazes after Button Press – By Gender for PIN Entry 
Younger participants tended to look at the display more than did older participants, 
Figure 3.10, which shows that 16 younger participants gazed at the display more than 
50% of the time after entering a PIN digit, compared to 8 older participants. 
Further repeated-measures ANOVAs were run to investigate gaze behaviour between 






































Figure 3.10: Display Gazes after Button Press – By Age for PIN Entry 
The only significant effect of use on gaze behaviour was between the second and 
third uses, F(1,34)=4.744, p=0.036, Table 3.24, where there were more gazes to the 
display in the third use compared to the second use. There were some between-
subjects effects of age group on gaze behaviour, confirming the previous findings in 
Table 3.22. 
Use Significant Effects Details 
Use 1 vs. Use 2 Age (df=1, F=5.791, p=0.022) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Use (df=1, F=4.744, p=0.036) Use 3 > Use 2 Use 2 vs. Use 3 
Age (df=1, F=6.338, p=0.017) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Use 3 vs. Use 4 Age (df=1, F=5.163, p=0.030) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Use 4 vs. Use 5 Age (df=1, F=5.665, p=0.023) Age 18 to 44 > Age 45 and over
Table 3.24: Significant Effects in Gaze Behaviour between Successive First 5 
Uses of Simulator 
3.3.3. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“There will be no difference in participant gaze behaviour between the 
first five uses of the CodeSure card simulator and the second five uses.” 
The evidence presented here supports this null hypothesis, as far as behaviour with 
PIN digits goes where gaze behaviour only differed slightly overall with repeated use 
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after entering each PIN digit. However, there was a statistically significant decrease 
in gazes to the display after pressing the OK button and the mode selection button, 
between the first batch of five uses and the second batch of five uses. 
Only 13% of participants looked at the display after every single PIN digit entry. 
Overall some 40% of button presses were not associated with gazes at the display by 
participants, confirming the importance of key-ahead functionality with a keypad 
buffer in the design of the CodeSure card. 
Interestingly, younger participants tended to look at the card display more than did 
older participants after each button press during PIN entry. Similarly men tended to 
look at the display more than did women. 
Taken together these data confirm the important role being played by the keypad 
buffer in the enhanced CodeSure card design. 
3.4. Summary 
Usability scores for the CodeSure card at 4.49 (on a 7-point scale) for first use rising 
to 4.66 on tenth use confirm the device usability as suited for use in a usable security 
procedure. 
The enhanced card design, featuring improved mode selection and navigation cues 
and importantly, a keypad buffer to allow key-ahead served to further boost usability 
scores for the CodeSure card to 5.01 with improved usage times and improved task 
times and success rates. 
Participants recognised that the CodeSure card was convenient to use as reflected in 
the quality ratings and comments; and appreciated the role of the card as a multi- 
channel, usable security solution where 82% expected to be able to use it to access 
their Bank’s Internet banking service, 73% to use if for Telephone banking and 88% 
to use it for online shopping. Some participants would even expect to use direct 
channels more often when using the CodeSure card. 
This use of the CodeSure card as a common solution for usable security in multi-
channel two-factor authentication procedures is investigated in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 4. Common Multi-Channel Authentication 
Based on the CodeSure Card 
One of the advantages of the CodeSure card expounded in the previous chapter is 
that it offers acceptable levels of usability, rendering it suitable for consideration as a 
common form factor component in usable security procedures applicable over all 
banking and eCommerce channels in the physical world and in the digital world. 
This chapter reports results from an experiment to investigate such a usable security 
role in multi-channel security (specifically Internet shopping, Internet banking and 
Telephone banking). Results are presented for a comparison of user attitudes to 
usability and perceived security from their experience with a unified security 
procedure based on the CodeSure card with their experience with disparate, channel-
specific security procedures. 
4.1. The CodeSure Multi-Channel Usability Experiment 
The experiment sought to engage participants in scenarios simulating a series of 
typical financial transactions – making an Internet purchase, then logging in to 
Internet banking to check their purchase and then phoning Telephone banking to 
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check their balance. Participants experienced all three transactions using disparate 
channel-specific procedures in the one case: and experienced all three transactions 
using a common security procedure based on the CodeSure card in the other case. 
4.1.1. Experiment Design 
For this experiment, participants were purposely recruited on the basis that they were 
familiar with the use of their bank’s Internet banking and Telephone banking 
services (‘power users’), and that they were comfortable and familiar with Internet / 
online shopping. Volunteer participants were provided with a fictitious persona and 
fictitious account numbers and passwords. The procedure of using a persona allows 
participants to feel secure that their personal details remain confidential, and it allows 
control of what each participant encounters in the experiment, ensuring a 
standardised experience that can be compared across participants and groups. 
The experiment scenarios were based around participants using their (fictitious) 
customer details, account numbers and security details to experience three disparate 
channel-specific security procedures to “make an online purchase of a DVD”, 
experiencing a typical one-factor security procedure based on a password in Visa’s 
3-D Secure1 Verified by Visa challenge: to then log in to their bank’s Internet 
banking service to “check on their purchase”, experiencing a second, different one-
factor security procedure for Internet banking involving (different) password and 
memorable information (password) challenges: and to then “imagine a few days had 
passed” and phone their bank’s Telephone banking service to “check their balance”, 
experiencing a third, different, one-factor security procedure involving yet another 
(different) Telephone banking security number (password) challenge. In this 
scenario, participants were thus being asked to perform tasks involving a total of four 
different security passwords. 
Participants also completed a similar scenario and set of financial transactions (in the 
same sequence: Internet purchase, Internet banking, Telephone banking) using a 
common security procedure based on OTP generation using the Identify mode of the 
                                                 
1 3-D Secure is an industry standard, extra security layer for online (card not present) transactions, 
branded as Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode. 
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CodeSure card. In the experiment, the order of presentation of the two scenarios was 
controlled and balanced across the cohort of volunteer participants. 
For the experiment, a music store web site modelled on a popular commercial web 
site for which the participant’s persona “had an existing account” was created. This 
allowed the convenience of pre-populating fields for the customer account 
information in the experiment, thereby minimising any unnecessary typing required 
by the participant to enter only the 3-digit security code (shown on the reverse of 
their credit card) in the CVV2 field, followed by three random digits from their 
Verified by Visa password, Figure 4.1, to complete the transaction. For the security 
procedure based on the CodeSure card, the Verified by Visa password screen was 
replaced by a screen asking the participant to generate an OTP with their CodeSure 
card (Identify mode), Figure 4.2. 
The Verified by Visa challenge, although adopting an industry standard procedure, 
has encountered consumer resistance because the password challenge only ever 
appears after a purchase has been made on a web site and users tend to assume the 
password being asked for is their account password on the site, causing input errors, 
user frustration and abandoned sales. Also, if the customer fails the password 
challenge they are presented with a ‘password reset’ screen which asks them to enter 
their card CVV, expiry date, the name on the card, their date of birth and email 
address; and then create a new password, none of which seems relevant to the 
transaction itself and none of which suggests to the customer that they should 
memorise this Verified by Visa password as being associated with their card for use 
with future purchases. Use of the (common) CodeSure OTP challenge removes the 
problems associated with generating and remembering the Verified by Visa 
password. Finally, the Verified by Visa password is by design complex. It has to be 
generated by the customer; it has to be between 8 and 15 characters; it has to include 
at least two letters and two numbers; and at least one of the letters has to be lower 
                                                 
2 Card Verification Value (also known as Card Security Code – CSC) consists of 3 digits printed on 
the signature strip of a debit or credit card. 
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case and at least one has to be upper case. The security procedure with the CodeSure 
card only requires the user to remember the existing everyday PIN for their card. 
 
Figure 4.1: Internet Shopping: Verified by Visa Password Challenge 
 
Figure 4.2: Internet Shopping: CodeSure OTP Challenge 
The Internet banking site used in the experiment was a replica of the customer’s 
bank’s web site written in ASP running on a Microsoft IIS web server. To log in to 
the service the participant completed an authentication stage where they were asked 
to enter their customer User ID and password, Figure 4.3, followed by 3 random 
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characters from previously registered memorable information (basically another type 
of password) using a pull-down list to avoid keyboard logging threats, Figure 4.4. 
For Internet banking both password and memorable information tokens have to be 
generated by the customer; between 6 and 15 characters including both letters and 
characters. With the security procedure based on the CodeSure card, the memorable 
information entry screen was replaced with a CodeSure OTP generation screen, 
Figure 4.5, asking the participant to use Identify mode on the card to generate an 
OTP. 
 
Figure 4.3: Internet Banking Login: User ID and Password Challenge 
 
Figure 4.4: Internet Banking Login: Memorable Information Challenge 
88 
 
Figure 4.5: Internet Banking Login: CodeSure OTP Challenge 
In addition to the cognitive effort for the user to remember and input two unique 
passwords / memorable information secrets, the use of memorable information has a 
security weakness because most common choices of memorable information are 
easily obtainable by friends or family, or in identity theft. The increased use of 
memorable information across different online services also means that users are less 
likely to remember which memorable information is used by which service, causing 
errors, user frustration and limiting the usability and effectiveness of security 
procedures. The security procedure with the CodeSure card only requires the user to 
remember the existing everyday PIN for their card. 
The IVR3 telephone banking service used in the experiment was a replica of the 
customer’s bank’s automated interactive voice response (IVR) telephone banking 
service (Wilkie et al., 2005). This was written in C using Nuance speech recognition 
technology and the Nuance Dialog Builder API. To access the service the 
participants completed an authentication stage where they were asked to say or key 
in their account details (account number and sort code). This was followed by a 
                                                 
3 Interactive Voice Response – utilises speech recognition technology to provide an automated 
telephone service. 
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security procedure based on saying or keying two random digits from a ‘security 
number’ (a type of password), Figure 4.6. The telephone banking security number 
has to be a fixed length of 6 digits. The security procedure based on the CodeSure 
card replaces the security number stage with a request for an 8 digit OTP generated 
with the Identify mode on the CodeSure card, Figure 4.7. 
 
and the nth digit.” 
Now give the mth digit of your security number … 
Thanks …  
and your sort code … 
“Please say or key in your eight digit account number … 
Figure 4.6: Telephone Banking Login: Security Number (Password) Challenge 
 
“Please say or key in your eight digit account number … 
and your sort code … 
Thanks … 
Now I need information from your debit card. Do you have it with you? … 
Thank you … 
Now please use the identify mode on the reverse of your debit card and 
using your telephone keypad please key in the eight digit code displayed. 
For help on how to get your code, press hash.” 
Figure 4.7: Telephone Banking Login: CodeSure OTP Challenge 
The 6 digit security number used in telephone banking is initially assigned to users 
by the bank, sent through the post to their home address for security, and users are 
required to change that number to one of their choosing during their first use of the 
service. This introduces a certain amount of confusion in that it is an additional 
security number / password that users must remember; adding further to the 
confusion, the sort code for their account is also a 6 digit number; and the initial 
assignment of security number is reliant on being delivered through the post, which 
could be intercepted, representing a security weakness. The security procedure with 
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the CodeSure card only requires the user to remember the existing everyday PIN for 
their card. 
Participants were all already familiar with the set of channel-specific security 
procedures involved for each task. In the scenario with the common security 
procedure based on the CodeSure card, participants were presented with a User 
Guide for the CodeSure card, Figure B.6 in Appendix B. 
After each of their six tasks, participants completed a usability questionnaire. 
Participants were balanced by gender and age group: ‘Generation Y’ (ages 18 to 35), 
‘Generation X’ (ages 36 to 55) and the ‘Baby Boomers’ (56 and over). These groups 
were balanced in the experiment design so that robust statistical analysis could be 
performed on the data collected to explore differences in attitudes and reactions 
between various groups. 
Experiment sessions took approximately 90 minutes and were conducted in the 
experiment research suite in Edinburgh. Participation was rewarded with a £50 
cheque. The details of the experiment are summarised in Table 4.1. 
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The CodeSure Multi-Channel Usability Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of customer attitude to the usability of a common 
security procedure based on the CodeSure card in multi-channel 
banking. 
Null hypothesis (H0) There will be no differences in metrics of attitude to usability and 
preference between the two scenarios. 
Experiment design Participants experience a scenario with multiple disparate security 
procedures for different banking channels, and a scenario with 
common authentication based on the CodeSure card. 
Repeated measures (balanced order), within subjects. 
Dependent variables Usability questionnaire (7-point Likert scale). 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Exit interview data. 
Independent variables Experiment: treatment order (2 orders, disparate security 
procedures or CodeSure, balanced). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, balanced), age group (3 groups, 
balanced, ages 18 to 35, 36 to 55, 56 and over). 
Cohort 144 (3 age groups × 2 genders × 2 treatment orders × over-
sampling ratio 12:1) = 144. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £50. 
Session time 90 minutes. 
Table 4.1: Experiment Design Details 
4.1.2. Summary of Experiment Metrics 
Measurements collected included demographic and technographic characteristics of 
participants (e.g. age, gender); attitude toward usability, per-channel, per scenario; 
task completion data, error rates; interview comments on specific issues. 
The design of the usability questionnaire for this experiment closely followed that of 
the previous CodeSure experiments, modified to reflect the focus on the overall 
process rather than just being about the device itself. Statements about the card 
display and buttons were replaced with statements covering confusion and the need 
for more instructions, the ease of use of the process and its perceived efficiency, and 
the volume of (security) details involved, Table 4.2. 
As previously, the questionnaire was administered on a laptop with all statements 
presented in randomised order. 
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Questionnaire Statement (polarity) Abbreviated Form 
I had to concentrate hard to use this process (-) Concentration 
I felt flustered when using this process (-) Flustered 
I felt under stress when using this process (-) Stressed 
Using this process was very frustrating (-) Frustration 
Using this process was too complicated (-) Complication 
When using this process I didn’t always know what to do next (-) Knew what to do next 
I felt in control when using this process (+) In control 
Using this process was quick (+) Quick 
I would be happy to use this process again (+) Use again 
I felt this process was reliable (+) Reliable 
I felt this process needs a lot of improvement (-) Needs improvement 
The operation of this process didn’t match my expectations (-) Matched expectations 
I liked using this process (+) Liked 
I enjoyed using this process (+) Enjoyment 
Using this process felt trustworthy (+) Trustworthy 
Using this process felt secure (+) Security 
I found this process confusing to use (-) Confusion 
I would have liked more instructions on how to use this process (-) Instructions 
I felt this process was easy to use (+) Ease of use 
I thought this process was efficient (+) Efficiency 
I had to enter too many details during this process (-) Too many details 
Table 4.2: Usability Questionnaire Statements 
4.1.3. Results 
4.1.3.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
The final customer sample consisted of 165 Internet banking and Telephone banking 
customers in Edinburgh. A good balance for gender (47% male and 53% female) and 
for age groups (30% aged 18 to 35, 35% aged 36 to 55 and 35% aged 56 and over) 
was achieved in the final sample. 
Some 66% of participants reported that they buy something online at least once a 
month; 60% reported that they log in to their bank’s Internet banking site at least 
once a month; 36% reported that they phone their bank’s automated telephone 
banking service at least once a month. 
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The socio-economic profile (based on occupation) of the sample was A(6%), 
B(41%), C1(35%), C2(15%), D(3%), E(0%), which can be judged as representing a 
reasonable cross-section of economic activity for the general population. 
4.1.3.2. Usability Results 
Online Shopping Task 
The online shopping experience incorporating the CodeSure security challenge (on 
first time use) scored an acceptable 5.11 for overall usability. The more familiar 
procedure, based on a Verified by Visa password scored higher for usability at 5.61, 
Table 4.3. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out for 
the online shopping task, Table 4.4, with design (Verified by Visa vs. CodeSure 
card) as the within-subjects factor: and gender (78 male; 87 female), age group (50 
aged 18 to 35; 57 aged 36 to 55; 58 aged 56 and over) and order of experience (83 
Verified by Visa first; 82 CodeSure card first) as the between-subjects factors. Only 
main effects were explored. 
Design Mean Score Std. Dev. N 
CodeSure Card 5.1100 1.12097 165 
Verified by Visa 5.6072 0.80720 165 
Table 4.3: Usability Questionnaire Means: Online Shopping 
There was a very highly significant main effect for the design used, 
F(1,153)=30.247, p<0.001, confirming that the difference in usability scores between 
the online shopping experience based on the CodeSure card and the online shopping 
experience based on the Verified by Visa password was very highly significant. 
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Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Design 19.129 1 19.129 30.247 0.000 
Design × Gender 0.933 1 0.933 1.475 0.226 
Design × Age 3.127 2 1.564 2.473 0.088 
Design × Order 0.587 1 0.587 0.928 0.337 
Error (Design) 96.763 153 0.632   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 0.005 1 0.005 0.004 0.947 
Age 14.085 2 7.043 5.887 0.003 
Order 1.027 1 1.027 0.858 0.356 
Gender × Age 0.027 2 0.013 0.011 0.989 
Gender × Order 0.047 1 0.047 0.040 0.843 
Age × Order 4.109 2 2.054 1.717 0.183 
Error 183.036 153 1.196   
Table 4.4: ANOVA Results for Usability: Online Shopping 
There was a very highly significant main effect due to age group, F(2,153)=5.887, 
p=0.003, but no significant main effects due to gender or order of experience, and 
also no significant between-subjects interactions. 
The online shopping experience based on the CodeSure card was scored significantly 
lower than the online shopping experience based on the Verified by Visa password 
for 18 of the 21 usability attributes, Table 4.5. However, the online shopping 
experience based on the CodeSure card was rated significantly higher for security, 
F(1,153)=5.836, p=0.017, than the online shopping experience based on the Verified 
by Visa password. 
There were 11 attributes where age group had a significant effect: those aged 18 to 
35 gave significantly higher usability scores overall than those aged 36 to 55, and 
this was the same for those aged 36 to 55 compared to those who were over 55. 
95 
Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Design (df=1; F=16.923; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Confusion 
Age (df=2; F=8.552; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=47.991; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Concentration 
Age (df=2; F=12.073; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=23.344; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Flustered 
Age (df=2; F=7.746; p=0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=22.739; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Stressed 
Age (df=2; F=7.149; p=0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=40.371; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Frustration 
Age (df=2; F=3.625; p=0.029) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=30.336; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Complication 
Age (df=2; F=6.731; p=0.002) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=12.897; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Age (df=2; F=6.354; p=0.002) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Knew what to do next 
Order (df=1; F=4.175; p=0.043) CodeSure first, both higher 
Design (df=1; F=8.218; p=0.005) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Instructions 
Age (df=2; F=8.953; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=8.927; p=0.003) CodeSure < Verified by Visa In control 
Age (df=2; F=4.402; p=0.014) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Quick Design (df=1; F=64.472; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Design (df=1; F=36.857; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Ease of use 
Age (df=2; F=5.915; p=0.003) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Design (df=1; F=17.312; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa Too many details 
Age (df=2; F=4.075; p=0.019) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Use again Design (df=1; F=5.273; p=0.023) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Efficiency Design (df=1; F=20.035; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Needs improvement Design (df=1; F=40.352; p<0.001) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Matched expectations Design (df=1; F=6.709; p=0.011) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Liked Design (df=1; F=7.585; p=0.007) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Enjoyment Design (df=1; F=6.133; p=0.014) CodeSure < Verified by Visa 
Trustworthy Gender (df=1; F=4.775; p=0.030) Males > Females 
Security Design (df=1; F=5.836; p=0.017) CodeSure > Verified by Visa 
Table 4.5: Significant Differences in Usability Attributes: Online Shopping 
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Internet Banking Task 
The Internet banking experience incorporating the CodeSure security challenge (on 
first time use) scored an acceptable 5.29 for overall usability. The more familiar 
experience, based on Internet banking password and memorable information scored 
higher for usability at 5.47, Table 4.6. A repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was carried out on the data for the Internet banking task, Table 4.7, with 
design (Memorable Information design vs. CodeSure card challenge) as the within-
subjects factor and gender (78 male; 87 female), age group (50 aged 18 to 35; 57 
aged 36 to 55; 58 aged 56 and over) and order of experience (83 experienced the 
scenario with memorable information challenge first; 82 experienced the scenario 
with CodeSure card first) as the between-subjects factors. Only main effects were 
explored. 
Design Mean Score Std. Dev. N 
CodeSure Card 5.2903 1.07619 165 
Memorable Information 5.4678 1.00716 165 
Table 4.6: Usability Questionnaire Means: Internet Banking 
There was a significant main effect for the design used, F(1,153)=4.193, p=0.042. 
The mean attitude score for usability for the overall experience of Internet banking 
with the CodeSure card challenge at 5.29, whilst acceptable high in its own right, 
was lower than the mean attitude score for usability for the overall experience of 
Internet banking using the memorable information challenge at 5.47. The difference 
was statistically significant, F(1,153)=4.193, p=0.042. 
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Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Design 2.529 1 2.529 4.193 0.042 
Design × Gender 0.181 1 0.181 0.300 0.585 
Design × Age 0.421 2 0.211 0.349 0.706 
Design × Order 0.008 1 0.008 0.014 0.907 
Error (Design) 92.264 153 0.603   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 1.848 1 1.848 1.339 0.249 
Age 31.313 2 15.657 11.348 0.000 
Order 0.001 1 0.001 0.000 0.983 
Gender × Age 0.369 2 0.184 0.134 0.875 
Gender × Order 0.802 1 0.802 0.581 0.447 
Age × Order 5.055 2 2.528 1.832 0.164 
Error 211.082 153 1.380   
Table 4.7: ANOVA Results for Usability: Internet Banking 
There was a very highly significant main effect due to age group, F(2,153)=11.348, 
p<0.001, but no significant main effects due to gender or order of experience, and 
also no significant between-subjects interactions. 
The overall Internet banking experience based on the CodeSure card was rated 
significantly lower for usability than the overall Internet banking experience using 
memorable information for 11 of the 21 usability attributes, Table 4.8. There were 12 
attributes where age group had a significant effect: those aged 18 to 35 gave 
significantly higher usability scores overall than those aged 36 to 55, and this was the 
same for those aged 36 to 55 compared to those who were aged 56 and over. 
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Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Confusion Age (df=2; F=16.179; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=6.397; p=0.012) CodeSure < Memorable Info Concentration 
Age (df=2; F=22.252; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=11.089; p=0.001) CodeSure < Memorable Info Flustered 
Age (df=2; F=13.082; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=10.123; p=0.002) CodeSure < Memorable Info Stressed 
Age (df=2; F=14.312; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=7.430; p=0.007) CodeSure < Memorable Info Frustration 
Age (df=2; F=7.674; p=0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Complication Age (df=2; F=8.535; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Knew what to do next Age (df=2; F=19.903; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=7.120; p=0.008) CodeSure < Memorable Info Instructions 
Age (df=2; F=18.933; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Design (df=1; F=5.943; p=0.016) CodeSure < Memorable Info In control 
Age (df=2; F=11.178; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Quick Design (df=1; F=3.985; p=0.048) CodeSure < Memorable Info 
Design (df=1; F=3.915; p=0.050) CodeSure < Memorable Info Ease of use 
Age (df=2; F=8.022; p<0.001) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Age (df=2; F=5.959; p=0.003) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ Too many details 
Order (df=1; F=4.389; p=0.038) CodeSure first, both lower 
Use again Design (df=1; F=5.727; p=0.018) CodeSure < Memorable Info 
Design (df=1; F=5.726; p=0.018) CodeSure < Memorable Info Matched expectations 
Age (df=2; F=4.421; p=0.014) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+ 
Trustworthy Design (df=1; F=4.194; p=0.042) CodeSure < Memorable Info 
Table 4.8: Significant Differences in Usability Attributes: Internet Banking 
Telephone Banking Task 
The Telephone banking experience using the CodeSure card (on first time use) 
scored an acceptable 5.01 for overall usability. The more familiar Telephone banking 
experience based on security number password scored higher for usability at 5.51, 
Table 4.9. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on 
the scores for the Telephone banking task, Table 4.10, with design (security number 
vs. CodeSure card) as the within-subjects factor and gender (78 male; 87 female), 
age group (50 aged 18 to 35; 57 aged 36 to 55; 58 aged 56 and over) and order of 
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experience (83 security number experience first; 82 CodeSure card experience first) 
as the between-subjects factors. Only main effects were explored. 
Design Mean Score Std. Dev. N 
CodeSure Card 5.0139 1.13579 165 
Security Number 5.5102 0.97030 165 
Table 4.9: Usability Questionnaire Means: Telephone Banking 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Design 20.615 1 20.615 29.093 0.000 
Design × Gender 1.012 1 1.012 1.428 0.234 
Design × Age 2.080 2 1.040 1.468 0.234 
Design × Order 3.849 1 3.849 5.431 0.021 
Error (Design) 108.413 153 0.709   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 0.256 1 0.256 0.169 0.682 
Age 1.978 2 0.989 0.652 0.523 
Order 0.770 1 0.770 0.508 0.477 
Gender × Age 1.385 2 0.692 0.456 0.635 
Gender × Order 2.407 1 2.407 1.586 0.210 
Age × Order 1.715 2 0.857 0.565 0.570 
Error 232.216 153 1.518   
Table 4.10: ANOVA Results for Usability: Telephone Banking 
There was a very highly significant main effect for the design used, 
F(1,153)=29.093, p<0.001. The mean attitude score for usability for the overall 
experience of Telephone banking with the CodeSure card challenge at 5.01, whilst 
acceptably high in its own right, was lower than the mean attitude score for usability 
for the overall experience of Telephone banking using the security number challenge 
at 5.51. 
There were no significant main effects due to gender, age group or order of 
experience. 
The usability of the Telephone banking experience using the CodeSure card was 
rated significantly lower than the usability of the Telephone banking experience 
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using security number for 18 of the 21 usability attributes, Table 4.11. The three 
attributes where this was not the case were ‘reliable’, ‘trustworthy’ and ‘security’. 
Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Confusion Design (df=1; F=17.479; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Concentration Design (df=1; F=25.066; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Flustered Design (df=1; F=31.578; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Stressed Design (df=1; F=31.360; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Frustration Design (df=1; F=20.034; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Complication Design (df=1; F=23.142; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Knew what to do next Design (df=1; F=19.443; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Instructions Design (df=1; F=25.735; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
In control Design (df=1; F=27.729; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Quick Design (df=1; F=19.381; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Ease of use Design (df=1; F=28.439; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Too many details Design (df=1; F=33.019; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Use again Design (df=1; F=6.740; p=0.010) CodeSure < Security No.
Efficiency Design (df=1; F=4.477; p=0.036) CodeSure < Security No.
Needs improvement Design (df=1; F=17.648; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Matched expectations Design (df=1; F=16.470; p<0.001) CodeSure < Security No.
Liked Design (df=1; F=8.460; p=0.004) CodeSure < Security No.
Enjoyment Design (df=1; F=8.313; p=0.005) CodeSure < Security No.
Table 4.11: Significant Differences in Usability Attributes: Telephone Banking 
In summary, usability scores with the experiences based on disparate, channel-
specific security procedures were higher than the experiences based on a common, 
multi-channel security procedure based on the CodeSure card. This was the case for 
all three tasks examined. The differences in usability scores overall were statistically 
significant. 
For the six usability questionnaires posed, reliability analysis on the scale of each 
(based on Cronbach’s α) reported a minimum of α=0.937, indicating once again that 
the questionnaire reliability was good. 
4.1.3.3. Quality Rating Results 
Participants were asked to rate use of the common security procedure based on the 
CodeSure card with use of the disparate channel-specific security procedures, 
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between best and worst on a scale of 0 to 30, both overall and for the three attributes, 
‘convenience’, ‘security’ and ‘ease of use’, Table 4.12. This was done after all tasks 





Ease of use 24.27 18.42
Table 4.12: Mean Quality Rating Results 
The CodeSure card was rated higher for ‘security’ but lower for ‘convenience’ and 
‘ease of use’. 
Participants gave several reasons for their overall ratings: “The CodeSure card was a 
bit confusing to use. I feel that I wasn’t as familiar with it”, “The debit card was 
easiest to use, but once you know what you’re doing with the CodeSure card you will 
have more security.” 
In terms of convenience, most participants recognised the benefits of the CodeSure 
card but were concerned with the usability of the buttons, and therefore confused 
convenience with ease of use: “The current system is so straightforward and the card 
is a bit harder with the buttons.” 
In terms of security, participants appreciated the one-time passcode generation 
feature of the CodeSure card: “The CodeSure card seems a lot stronger for security, 
randomly generated code more secure than password as it keeps changing”, 
“CodeSure card is better due to random numbers which keep changing.” 
For ease of use, the focus was again on the buttons of the CodeSure card: “The 
current systems were easier and quicker”, “The existing approaches were familiar. I 
know what I’m doing. The new card’s buttons are unresponsive.” 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on these data, 
Table 4.13, with design (disparate vs. CodeSure card) as the within-subjects factor 
and gender, age group and order of experience as the between-subjects factors. As 
before only main effects were explored. 
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Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Overall Age (df=2; F=4.847; p=0.009) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Convenience Design (df=1; F=29.021; p<0.001) Disparate > CodeSure 
Security Design (df=1; F=29.874; p<0.001) CodeSure > Disparate 
Design (df=1; F=60.018; p<0.001) Disparate > CodeSure Ease of Use 
Age (df=2; F=3.741; p=0.026) Age 18 to 35 > 36 to 55 > 56+
Table 4.13: Summary of Significant Differences in Quality Attributes 
The difference in scores between the overall experience with channel-specific 
security procedures and the overall experience with a common CodeSure security 
procedure was not statistically significant. The score for security was higher with the 
common CodeSure card procedure than with the disparate security procedures and 
the difference was statistically significant, F(1,153)=29.874, p<0.001. The scores for 
convenience and ease of use were lower with the common CodeSure procedure than 
with the disparate security procedures and the differences were statistically 
significant for convenience, F(1,153)=29.021, p<0.001, and for ease of use, 
F(1,153)=60.018, p<0.001. There was also a between-subjects effect of age group for 
ease of use, F(2,153)=3.741, p=0.026, and overall, F(2,153)=4.847, p=0.009. 
Creating a rank ordered list from the overall quality ratings gives participants’ 
overall preferences, Table 4.14. As relative score differences can vary greatly, this 
can give a better indication of what participants’ true preferences were, and can even 
differ from the mean quality ratings if there are clear leaders in the rankings. The 
disparate security procedures and the common CodeSure procedure were ranked 
similar overall, and the rankings matched those of the quality ratings for 
convenience, security and ease of use. 
 Disparate CodeSure No Preference 
Overall 48.48% 51.52% 0.00% 
Convenience 61.82% 28.48% 9.70% 
Security 15.76% 69.09% 14.55% 
Ease of Use 74.55% 15.15% 10.30% 
Table 4.14: Preferences between Disparate and Common CodeSure 
Procedures 
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A non-parametric statistical test (chi-square test) was performed on these categorical 
preference data in Table 4.14. Participants who ranked both devices equally were 
marked as no preference and these cases were removed from the subsequent chi-
square analysis. 
The difference in rankings between the disparate procedures and the common 
CodeSure procedure was not statistically significant for the overall rating, but the 
differences were significant for convenience, χ2(1)=20.302, p<0.001, security, 
χ2(1)=56.177, p<0.001, and ease of use, χ2(1)=64.892, p<0.001. 
4.1.3.4. Success Rates 
For both the online shopping task and the Internet banking task, the common 
CodeSure procedure had a higher success rate than with the disparate security 
procedures, Table 4.15. 
Online shopping Internet banking Telephone banking 
Disparate CodeSure Disparate CodeSure Disparate CodeSure 
57.8% 69.9% 69.3% 77.1% 82.5% 77.7% 
Table 4.15: Success Rates: Access First Attempt 
The higher success rate with the CodeSure card was statistically significant 
(p=0.010) for the online shopping task, but not for the Internet banking task 
(p=0.110) (McNemar’s test). 
In the Telephone banking task the CodeSure card had a lower success rate but the 
difference was not statistically significant (p=0.302). The extra failures here were 
typically due to users being unable to complete generation of the one-time passcode 
on the CodeSure card and keying in to the phone within the 30 second limit imposed 
by the IVR system; or users having problems pressing the buttons on the CodeSure 
card using only one hand. 
4.1.3.5. Interview Comments 
Asked what they liked about using the CodeSure card, participants responded: “The 
display was very clear and easy to see. It is also a lot more secure.” Their dislikes 
were mainly about the buttons: “Pressing the buttons can be difficult at the start.” 
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Asked about the benefits to them of using the CodeSure card, participants responded: 
“It’s fast and simple to use and it means I will not have to write down or memorise 
my numbers”, “It is very innovative and modern, security conscious, good impression 
on the company.” 
Some 66% of participants stated they preferred use of a common security procedure 
for all channels while 28% said they preferred the disparate security procedures 
currently used by the bank. 
Some 79% of participants would like to use the CodeSure card for online shopping, 
with 24% saying they would shop more often than at present; 65% of participants 
would like to use the CodeSure card to access their bank’s Internet banking service, 
with 36% saying they would use Internet banking more often than at present; 57% of 
participants would like to use the CodeSure card to access their bank’s telephone 
banking service, with 28% saying they would use telephone banking more often than 
at present. 
4.1.4. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“There will be no differences in metrics of attitude to usability and 
preference between the two scenarios.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since usability 
scores for the online shopping, Internet banking and telephone banking tasks with the 
existing disparate channel-specific security procedures were higher than those with 
the common CodeSure card security procedure; and statistical tests confirm the 
differences to be significant. The difference in quality ratings and preferences for 
convenience, security and ease of use were also statistically significant with the 
CodeSure card procedures scoring higher in terms of security but scored lower for 
convenience and ease of use. 
For online shopping, the mean usability score at 5.11 with the common CodeSure 
card procedure, whilst acceptably high in its own right, was significantly lower than 
with the existing Verified by Visa procedure at 5.61, and a similar finding was 
obtained for 18 of the 21 usability attributes examined. However, the CodeSure card 
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procedure was rated significantly higher than the Verified by Visa procedure for the 
security attribute and had a significantly higher success rate (70%) than did the 
Verified by Visa procedure (58%) during the task. Many of the usability attributes 
that were rated significantly lower for the CodeSure card procedure were related to 
the lack of familiarity with the CodeSure procedure compared to the existing 
Verified by Visa procedure, which could explain why users felt so confused and 
flustered when first confronted with the new CodeSure-based procedure. 
For Internet banking, the mean usability score at 5.29 with the CodeSure card for 
login was again acceptably high in its own right but was lower than with the existing 
memorable information security procedure at 5.47, and this difference was 
statistically significant. There were 11 out of 21 usability attributes where the 
CodeSure card procedure was rated significantly lower than the memorable 
information procedure, again many likely to be related to familiarity of the existing 
process. The CodeSure card had a higher success rate than the memorable 
information procedure but that difference was not statistically significant. 
For telephone banking, the mean usability score at 5.01 with the CodeSure card for 
login was acceptably high in its own right, but was significantly lower than with the 
security number procedure at 5.51. The CodeSure card procedure was rated 
significantly lower than the security number procedure for 18 of the 21 usability 
attributes. The CodeSure card procedure also had a lower success rate than the 
security number procedure although this difference was not statistically significant. 
The CodeSure card proved to be difficult to use whilst holding a telephone handset 
from an ergonomics point of view – it was difficult to operate the card and hold the 
phone to the ear at the same time. 
Although the disparate security procedures were scored significantly higher than the 
CodeSure card procedure for usability, the mean usability scores for the CodeSure 
card were still acceptably high, being scored over 5.0 for all 3 tasks. All of the 
participants were first time CodeSure card users and were therefore unfamiliar using 
the CodeSure card to perform the tasks they routinely do several times a month (66% 
of participants shopped online at least once a month, 60% logged in to Internet 
banking at least once a month and 36% phoned their automated telephone banking 
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service at least once a month). Usability scores for the CodeSure card have been 
shown in Chapter 3 to increase with usage which would perhaps improve scores with 
the CodeSure card. 
There appears to be some enthusiasm for the CodeSure card and the unified security 
procedure it offers: some 66% of participants would prefer a common CodeSure for 
all channels compared to the 28% who prefer disparate security procedures. Some 
79% would like to use the CodeSure card for online shopping, 24% would shop more 
often; 65% would like to use the card for Internet banking, 36% would use Internet 
banking more often; and 57% would like to use the card for telephone banking, 28% 
would use it more often. 
4.2. Summary 
The experiment results presented here indicate that users are aware of a trade-off 
between the security of a procedure and its convenience. This is reflected especially 
in the usability results for the security attribute between Verified by Visa and the 
CodeSure card during the online shopping task. 
Some 66% of participants would prefer a common security procedure across all 
banking and eCommerce channels, which is encouraging for the future of the 
CodeSure card. Only 28% would prefer the security to remain the same in the 
banking channels they use, but that is perhaps due to being familiar with existing 
procedures rather than thinking about the benefits a common security procedure 
would bring. Although the CodeSure card scored lower than today’s security 
processes in terms of usability, the CodeSure card was still usable with mean 
usability scores above 5.0, and the main challenge for the bank would be to break 
users out of their comfort zone in using security processes that they are familiar with 
and move them over to the common security processes of the CodeSure card. 
The results presented in this chapter confirm the role of the CodeSure card in a 
common security procedure across multiple channels, offering a usable solution in 
reducing fraud by means of improved customer authentication performance. The 
other element of fraud reduction, using the CodeSure card to combat identity theft, 
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phishing attacks, malware and reverse (sender) authentication is addressed in the 
next chapter. 
 
Chapter 5. Combating Identity Theft – the Role of 
the CodeSure Card in Sender Authentication 
The search for a common, usable security procedure involves improved customer 
authentication on the one hand and improved protection against identify theft on the 
other. The results presented thus far have illustrated the role of the CodeSure card in 
a common security procedure offering strong two-factor customer authentication 
across multiple channels. The other element of fraud reduction, using the CodeSure 
card to combat identity theft from phishing attacks and malware and by use of 
reverse (sender) authentication is addressed here. 
The increase in public awareness of online fraud has resulted in growing customer 
mistrust of online channels. As a result, banks have made a strategic decision to 
avoid use of the email channel with customers; instead using messages accessible 
only after the customer has logged in (securely) to access their accounts on the 
bank’s Internet banking site. Indeed banks have been instructing their customers to 
ignore any other emails purporting to be from the bank as they are likely to be 
fraudulent. Customers are also at risk from malware threats that can infect their 
computer (or phone) and engage in identity theft without their knowledge. In an ideal 
109 
situation, banks would like to ensure that all of their customers are sufficiently 
protected from such malware threats, and one solution is for the bank to provide 
malware detection software to their customers to protect against this threat. 
Four experiments are reported in this chapter, three of which investigated the 
awareness of customers about identity theft of their personal details via phishing 
attacks and via malware; and one experiment which investigated the role of the 
CodeSure card in fraud prevention by allowing the bank as sender to authenticate 
themself in communications with the customer (emails, SMS text messages and 
phone calls) using reverse (sender) authentication. 
The first experiment dealt with phishing emails, focusing on customers’ 
understanding and awareness of the issues with phishing emails and the consequent 
fraud, characterising levels of customer awareness and the impact of social 
engineering schemes: and examined customers’ abilities to actually notice when an 
email is a phishing email. A representative bundle of different types of phishing 
email attacks were explored in the experiment. 
The second experiment explored the effectiveness of Internet Security tutorials 
(which in practice would be accessible to customers on the bank’s web site) in 
educating customers on best practice in detecting and handling phishing emails. 
The third experiment dealt with malware, investigating customer reactions to a 
possible malware fraud prevention strategy that involves the bank recommending 
that the customer download malware detection software (which is provided and 
certified by the bank) to be run on their computer. The idea with this strategy is that 
every time the customer logs on to the bank’s Internet banking site, the malware 
detection software would send a report to the bank about any infection or malware 
presence on the customer’s computer by scanning the applications and processes that 
are running on the customer’s computer. This fraud prevention strategy would allow 
the bank to make a risk assessment for each transaction on each Internet banking 
session with the possibility of advising the customer of the existence of a malware 
threat, recommending that they disinfect their computer using anti-viral software, or 
requiring the customer to make an out-of-band contact with the bank to complete any 
specific (risky) transactions. 
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The fourth experiment investigated customer reactions to the reverse / sender 
authentication capabilities of the CodeSure card as used in a fraud prevention 
strategy by the bank to reassure customers that the communications (in all forms) 
that they receive from the bank are genuine. 
5.1. The Phishing Emails Experiment 
The key questions addressed by this experiment centre on the levels of customers’ 
understanding about the substance of phishing emails and the financial consequences 
for them as Internet banking users; and on user behaviour on receipt of phishing 
emails in terms of their ability to detect phishing emails and their propensity to 
divulge security details. The experiment was designed to explore if different types of 
phishing email attacks would affect user behaviour. 
5.1.1. Experiment Design 
For this experiment participants were selected as having used their bank’s Internet 
banking at some point during the 3 months prior to the experiment. In their 
experiment session, participants were asked to assume a persona and work through 
their email in-box list of 6 emails and to “deal with the emails as you would in real 
life”. The 6 emails were pre-defined in a batch of 3 benign email messages and 3 
phishing emails. The fraudulent, phishing emails presented to the participants were 
representative of the most sophisticated phishing email types reported to date, 
including addressing the participant by ‘their’ name and containing no spelling or 
grammatical mistakes. 
The 3 phishing emails exhibited different styles in terms of modes of responding – 
asking the reader to click on a text hyperlink; to click on a clickable button; or to 
complete an embedded HTML form, Figure 5.1. With the text hyperlink style of 
phishing link, the links to the fraudulent Internet banking site were plain text 
hyperlinks such that moving the mouse over the hyperlinked word ‘log on’ would 
display the target link, which was spoofed using the digit ‘1’ as replacement for one 
of the lowercase ‘l’s in the target URL. With the clickable button style of phishing 
link, the clickable buttons acted as hyperlinks and as such represented a more 
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determined phishing attack since moving the mouse over the button did not display 
the target link in this case. In all three cases, if the participant entered ‘their’ account 
details they were directed to a replica of their bank’s Internet banking site (at the 
fraudulent URL) which simulated a browser overlay frame spoof with fake padlock 
symbol. 
The 3 phishing emails also exhibited different levels of apparent content urgency and 
pressure for the reader to attend and respond, ranging from confirming account 
changes with subject “Internet Banking: Security Precaution”; increasing urgency in 
the need to arrange payment of a forthcoming utility bill with subject “Bill Payment 
Reminder Service”; and further increasing urgency to a warning of an imminent 
overdraft charge with subject “Important Notice: Overdraft Charge”, Figure 5.2. 
The 3 benign emails presented to the participant were a legitimate email from their 
bank suggesting that they might benefit from a new Internet Saver Account, using 
their (persona) name (with subject “New Internet Saver Account”); a ‘spam’ email 
which reports that a little-known company is worth investing in (with subject “Red 
Hot Stock Watch”); and a benign ‘newsletter’ style email from a supermarket store 
(with subject “Even More Inflation Busting Deals”), Figure 5.3. 
When participants dealt with each of their 3 phishing emails and the one legitimate 
email from their bank, a realistic (mirror) copy version of the bank’s Internet banking 
web site was accessed such that participants were able to complete the task in hand 
(with the exception of the bill payment task), even when responding to the fraudulent 
emails, so as not to alert them and influence their behaviour with subsequent emails. 
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(a) Text Hyperlink 
(b) Clickable Button 
(c) Embedded HTML Form 
Figure 5.1: Three Styles of Links in Phishing Emails 
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(a) Confirm Account Changes 
(b) Forthcoming Utility Bill 
(c) Imminent Overdraft Charge 
Figure 5.2: Three Different Levels of Content Urgency in Phishing Emails 
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(a) Legitimate Email from the Bank 
(b) ‘Spam’ Email 
(c) ‘Newsletter’ Style Email 
Figure 5.3: Three Benign Emails 
The email client used in the experiment was IE6 running a Webmail client 
application with a preview pane and a generic appearance and layout, modified to 
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prevent easy deletion of emails without first reading them in the experiment. The 
Webmail client was connected to an hMailServer IMAP server running on a 
Windows 2003 server. The ‘hosts’ file of computers used in the experiment was 
modified in order to redirect all clicks and web traffic to the same internal server. 
An inventory of 12 emails was created, consisting of 3 fraudulent emails of 
increasing urgency, each with 3 styles of user response; plus 3 benign emails. To 
avoid experiment bias, the order of presentation of the emails in the list was 
randomised across participants. The order of the 4 ‘bank’ emails (3 as phishing 
emails, 1 valid email) was randomised, a total of 4! = 24 orders. The two other 
(benign) emails were distributed amongst the other emails in a balanced, random 
ordering. Data from click logs were used to report when participants avoided links in 
phishing emails and to report when they were duped and responded to the different 
email types and different levels of message urgency. 
Before starting the experiment, each participant was given a brief overview of the 
Webmail client being used in the experiment. 
During their email reading sessions, all participants were monitored by Tobii 1750 
gaze-tracking cameras (with their prior consent) to deliver data on the content in each 
of the emails that participants viewed; and to detect which security features they 
actually checked in the spoof ‘bank’ web sites. 
After dealing with their batch of 6 emails, each participant was asked several 
questions to assess their knowledge of online security and phishing attacks and their 
consequences. 
5.1.2. Summary of Experiment Metrics 
The details of the experiment are summarised in Table 5.1. 
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The Phishing Emails Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of customer awareness of phishing attacks. 
Null hypothesis (H0) The content urgency and the response style of phishing emails 
have no effect on the participants’ propensity to click on phishing 
links within the email. 
Experiment design Participants were asked to ‘respond appropriately’ to 6 emails, 3 of 
which were phishing emails. 
Dependent variables Button click data. 
Gaze-tracking data. 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Exit interview data. 
Independent variables Experiment: email order (24 orders, balanced). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, in proportions women:men 60:40), 
age group (2 groups, balanced, split aged 18 to 44 / 45 and over). 
Cohort 96 (2 age groups × 2 genders × 24 email orders) = 96. 
All registered Internet bankers. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £30. 
Session time 30 minutes. 
Table 5.1: Experiment Design Details 
Unlike in the other experiments discussed earlier, the proportions of women to men 
was designed to be 60:40, Table 5.1, to reflect the fact that it has been reported that 
women are more likely to be duped by phishing email attacks than are men (Jagatic 
et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2010). The measurements collected in the experiment 
included demographic and technographic characteristics of participants (e.g. Internet 
banking usage); click data; gaze tracking data; debriefing interview responses. The 
null hypothesis was tested by means of analysis of participants’ button click data as 
gathered during their email sessions. 
5.1.3. Results 
5.1.3.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
A total of 96 participants were recruited. However, the data for 3 participants were 
found to be incomplete, resulting in a final total of 93, 35 males and 58 females, with 
45 participants being aged 18 to 44; and 48 being aged 45 and over. 
All of the participants were Internet banking users, with 77% having used Internet 
banking within the week prior to the experiment and 69% reporting that they used 
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Internet banking at least once per week. Overall, the cohort was considered valid as 
part of the target market sector to take part in the experiment and elicit views on 
Internet banking security issues. 
Participants were also asked where they most often logged in to Internet banking and 
a large majority (80%) reported that they used Internet banking primarily from home. 
Asked how many emails they received per week that appeared to be from their bank, 
some 63% said that they never received any emails from their bank, while 21% said 
that they seemed to receive an email from their bank once a week. 
5.1.3.2. Email Task Results 
The (phishing response) button click activity of participants was recorded during 
their email reading session. Participants’ propensity to be duped by, and respond to, 
the phishing emails is detailed in Table 5.2. Note that responding in this case relates 
to the participant clicking on the phishing link in the email but excludes any 








Clickable Hyperlink Style 42.4% 67.7% 72.4% 60.2% 
Clickable Button Style 53.3% 64.5% 53.1% 57.0% 
Embedded HTML Style 33.3% 51.6% 65.6% 50.5% 
Overall 43.0% 61.3% 63.4% 55.9% 
Table 5.2: Propensity to Respond to Phishing Emails, by Style and Urgency 
Younger participants showed a slightly higher propensity (57.6%) to respond to 
phishing emails than did older participants (53.2%). Women showed a slightly higher 
propensity (57.7%) to respond to phishing emails than did men (53.1%). 
The lower urgency of the ‘confirm account changes’ email is reflected in the lower 
overall number of participants (43.0%) who responded to it compared to those who 
responded to the ‘bill payment’ email (61.3%) and ‘pending overdraft charge’ email 
(63.4%). These results suggest that message urgency has an effect on (duping) 
response rates to phishing email attacks. 
The embedded HTML form style of response also resulted in lower uptake (50.5%) 
overall compared to the clickable hyperlink (60.2%) and clickable button (57.0%) 
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styles. This is possibly due to more people being aware of the security risks in 
completing Web forms in such emails. 
Statistical analysis (Cochran’s Q) of the propensity to respond results confirmed that 
the effect of content urgency in the phishing emails was statistically significant, 
χ2(2)=13.625, p=0.001. The result of Cochran’s Q test on the link style of phishing 
emails shows that there was no statistically significant effect of link style in the email 
message on the uptake of phishing emails. 
Pairwise comparisons using McNemar’s test showed that the differences between the 
uptake of the ‘confirm account changes’ email and each of the other two content 
urgencies were highly significant (p=0.005) where the less urgent ‘confirm account 
changes’ email had significantly less uptake than the other two phishing emails, but 
the difference between the ‘bill payment’ email and the ‘pending overdraft’ email 
was not statistically significant. 
Without exception, all of the participants who were duped by a phishing email and 
clicked on the hyperlink or completed the HTML form then proceeded to log on to 
Internet banking. No one attempted any alternative approaches such as typing the 
bank’s URL into the address bar of the Web browser and no one backed out during 
the log on sequence. Only 21.5% of participants did not respond to any of the 
phishing emails. 
Some 37% of participants clicked on the link in the genuine email from the bank that 
offered details on a new Internet Saver account. Of the 5 participants who sent a 
reply to one of the emails, 1 replied to the (benign) store email “As per your 
message”; 2 replied to the investment opportunity spam email with “Thanks for this 
information” and “Thanks for info”; 1 participant sent an email reply to the ‘bill 
payment reminder’ phishing email “Thank you for your email with reminder”; and 1 
participant sent an email reply to the ‘pending overdraft charge’ phishing email. 
There were 12 participants who attempted to delete emails without first reading 
them. Here 6 participants indicated that they would always try to delete emails 
according to sender and subject rather than looking at them first; 2 replied that they 
would normally move such emails to the deleted items folder after a quick scan and 
could always retrieve them if they were important; 2 replied that they “wouldn’t read 
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adverts” or would “delete when I see people offering loans and things”; 1 replied that 
they would rely on the spam filter and so wouldn’t normally click on emails that they 
didn’t recognise; and 1 replied that “in my experience I don’t get emails from the 
bank.” 
After working through their list of 6 emails, when participants were told “I’m not 
sure if you were aware in what you’ve just done, but not all of those emails were 
genuine”, 29.0% of participants showed no obvious reaction, 40.9% said they had 
worked that out, 16.1% said they had had not noticed but were concerned by the 
revelation and 14.0% said they had not noticed and were not concerned. 
Only 20 participants (7 males and 13 females) did not respond to any of the phishing 
emails in the experiment and only 7 (2 males and 5 females) of those participants 
who said they had worked out that some of the emails were not genuine did not 
respond to any of the phishing emails in the experiment. 
When asked, 49 of the 93 participants (52.7%) (22 were older males) claimed they 
already knew what phishing emails were before they arrived for the experiment, 
“Emails that look like they’re from a bank – looking for your details.”  However, 
only 12 of these did not respond to any of the phishing emails in the experiment. 
Interestingly, 11 of the 49 (9 were women) wrongly described spam emails as being 
typical phishing attacks. 
These data clearly indicate that participants’ self-reporting on their knowledge of 
phishing is at odds with their exhibited resistance to being duped by the types of 
phishing emails encountered in the experiment. 
5.1.3.3. Gaze Results 
During the experiment gaze data were logged, and the proportion of participants who 
gazed at particular regions of the emails is shown in Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 
5.5 for the three email types. 
120 






Sender’s email address 75.8% 78.6% 64.5%
Bank’s logo 39.4% 35.7% 48.4%
Message title 57.6% 71.4% 81.0%
Message text 84.9% 78.6% 90.3%
Sender’s signature 63.6% 50.0% 64.5%
Table 5.3: Gaze Records (% of Participants) – Text Hyperlink 






Sender’s email address 93.3% 84.4% 86.7%
Bank’s logo 46.7% 34.4% 20.0%
Message title 86.7% 75.0% 87.0%
Message text 96.7% 87.5% 93.3%
Sender’s signature 93.3% 84.4% 83.3%
Table 5.4: Gaze Records (% of Participants) – Button Hyperlink 






Sender’s email address 86.2% 93.8% 90.3%
Bank’s logo 41.4% 28.1% 25.8%
Message title 93.1% 87.5% 87.0%
Message text 72.4% 75.0% 71.0%
Sender’s signature 58.6% 31.3% 29.0%
Table 5.5: Gaze Records (% of Participants) – HTML Form 
These gaze data actually reveal no new insights into customers’ behaviour with the 
phishing emails, apart from confirming that the key regions of the emails were 
generally adequately studied in the experiment. 
5.1.3.4. Interview Comments 
When asked what practical steps the 49 ‘phishing aware’ participants had been 
taking to avoid problems from phishing emails, 25.8% reported that they used anti-
virus or Internet security software; others that they simply employ good practices 
such as filtering messages based on subject (25.8%) or sender (10.8%). Only 9.7% of 
participants had not taken any practical steps to avoid threats from phishing emails. 
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Only 1 participant had been the victim of a phishing email but 10 participants knew 
of someone who had been a victim. 
5.1.4. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“The content urgency and the response style of phishing emails have no 
effect on the participants’ propensity to click on phishing links within the 
email.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since higher 
levels of urgency in the phishing emails was shown to have a significant effect on the 
propensity of participants to click on clickable hyperlinks within phishing emails. 
However, the style of the clickable hyperlink (text hyperlink or button hyperlink or 
embedded HTML form) in phishing emails had no significant effect on response 
rates. 
Although 57% of participants were ‘phishing aware’, claiming that they knew what 
phishing emails were before the experiment, only 21.5% of participants did not 
respond to any of the phishing emails in their experiment session. 
The perceived urgency in the message of the phishing emails resulted in the expected 
relative increase in duping / uptake of participants: 43.0% responded to the ‘confirm 
account changes’ email, 61.3% responded to the ‘bill payment reminder’ email and 
63.4% responded to the ‘pending overdraft charge’ email. 
In the experiment, participants exhibited low resilience to email phishing attacks and 
these data clearly indicate that participants’ self-reporting on their knowledge of 
phishing is at odds with their exhibited resistance to being duped by the types of 
phishing emails encountered in the experiment. 
Users’ behaviour with phishing emails in the experiment confirms that although 
phishing is now an established form of eCrime, a large proportion of Internet users 
still know little or nothing about it and a better general awareness of online security, 
possibly developed by customer education about the need for Internet security would 
be of benefit. This tutorial approach is considered in the next experiment. 
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5.2. The Internet Security Tutorial Experiment 
To further the observations on the absence of user skills in combating phishing 
attacks catalogued above, this experiment was designed to explore the effectiveness 
of online tutorials covering Internet banking security in driving changes in customer 
behaviour. 
5.2.1. Experiment Design 
There were three parts to the experiment – test to establish a baseline measure, give 
an on-line tutorial, and then re-test to assess learning impact. The test was based on a 
popular online phishing IQ test1, and used security guidelines available on the bank’s 
Internet banking site. In all parts of the experiment, all participants were monitored 
by Tobii 1750 gaze-tracking cameras (with participants’ prior consent) to deliver 
data on the security features they actually checked for in the web pages they 
encountered in the experiment. 
In the first part of the experiment the participant undertook the test viewing a set of 
10 different web sites being asked to identify which ones they thought were 
fraudulent and which were genuine. 
In addition to the bank’s genuine Internet Banking web site, 9 other example web 
sites were used, taken from popular eCommerce sites. For each of the 10 web sites, 3 
versions, exhibiting a range of typical fraud features, were created for use as the 
fraudulent sites in the experiment. All three of each of the fraudulent versions 
included a bad URL in the address bar of the web browser; in addition 2 failed to 
show an ‘https’ secure connection with a corresponding absence of the padlock icon 
in the browser toolbar; and 1 also contained bad grammar in the content of the web 
page, Figure 5.4, (“you’re” instead of “your”, “I am new customer” with missing 
article.) For each participant, 4 of the 10 sites they saw were genuine and 6 were 
fraudulent (2 with bad URL only; 2 with bad URL but no ‘https’ or padlock; and 2 
with bad URL but with no ‘https’ or padlock and bad grammar). 
                                                 
1 The MailFrontier Phishing IQ Test at http://www.sonicwall.com/furl/phishing. 
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Figure 5.4: Web Site used in Test – with Bad URL, no ‘https’, Bad Grammar 
In the second part of the experiment, participants studied a tutorial based on 7 ‘top 
tips’ on Internet security, Figure 5.5, which focused on identifying fraudulent emails 
and web sites. Each of the tips was presented on a separate web page with either an 
example illustrating the concept or a further explanation. Participants were asked to 
choose whether they thought each tip was helpful or not by clicking on the 
appropriate button at the bottom of each page, which would then advance to the next 
page. However, this was done simply in order to encourage participants to read the 
tips, rather than for later analysis. 
In the third part of the experiment participants were shown a second set of different 
examples based on the same 10 web sites (again, 4 genuine and 6 fraudulent) and 
again asked to identify the fraudulent ones. The overall aim was to assess how 
effective their learning had been in the tutorial. In both the ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
quizzes, one of the Web sites was their bank’s Internet banking site. 
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6. Beware of pop-ups. 
7. Beware of bad English. 
1. Don’t click on links in emails that are unsolicited or seem suspicious in any way. 
2. Check that the website is using a secure connection. 
3. Check that the website has a genuine site certificate. 
4. Check the address of any website that asks for important personal details. 
5. When in doubt, type in the address of a website directly. 
Figure 5.5: Seven ‘Top Tips’ Used in Internet Security Tutorial 
5.2.2. Summary of Experiment Metrics 
The same participants as the previous (phishing) experiment were involved with this 
experiment, which was run immediately after their session in the previous phishing 
emails experiment. The details of the experiment are summarised in Table 5.6. 
The Internet Security Tutorial Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of customer awareness of Internet security. 
Null hypothesis (H0) The Internet Security tutorial based on 7 ‘top tips’ will have no 
effect on detection of fraudulent web site test scores. 
Experiment design Participants are asked to identify the fraudulent web sites from a 
set of 10 before being shown a tutorial on Internet security. They 
are then shown another set of 10 web sites and asked to identify 
the fraudulent sites. 
Dependent variables Web site quiz results. 
Gaze-tracking data. 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Independent variables Experiment: web site order (randomised). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, in proportions women:men 60:40), 
age group (2 groups, balanced, split aged 18 to 44 / 45 and over). 
Cohort 96 (2 age groups × 2 genders × over-sampling ratio 24:1) = 96. 
All registered Internet bankers involved in the previous experiment. 
Honorarium Included in previous experiment. 
Session time 30 minutes. 
Table 5.6: Experiment Design Details 
The measurements collected included demographic and technographic characteristics 
of participants (e.g. Internet banking usage); quiz data; gaze tracking data. 
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5.2.3. Results 
5.2.3.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
All of the 93 participants involved in the previous (phishing emails) experiment took 
part in this experiment (see Section 5.1.3.1). 
5.2.3.2. Fraudulent Web Site Test Results 
Every participant was given a score out of 10 after being tested on the first set of web 
sites, and then also given a score out of 10 after being tested again on the second set. 
The means of these first test and second test scores were calculated for each of the 
four age and gender groups and also across all participants, Table 5.7. 
 First test score Second test score Improvement
Males, 18 to 44 7.26 8.47 +1.21
Males, 45 and over 5.87 7.06 +1.19
Females, 18 to 44 5.19 8.12 +2.93
Females, 45 and over 5.16 7.55 +2.39
All participants 5.73 7.81 +2.08
Table 5.7: Mean Test Scores 
Each of the four age and gender groups improved their test scores after being given 
the tutorial on Internet security. Younger males tended to have a higher initial score 
than older males and females: and females, notably younger females, showed the 
largest improvement in their second score. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on these test scores with the first and 
second test scores as the within-subjects variable, and taking age and gender as 
between-subjects factors. The resulting ANOVA table is shown in Table 5.8. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Scores 159.849 1 159.849 72.735 0.000
Scores × Age 0.841 1 0.841 0.383 0.538
Scores × Gender 22.816 1 22.816 10.382 0.002
Scores × Age × Gender 0.708 1 0.708 0.322 0.572
Error 193.398 88 2.198  
Table 5.8: ANOVA Test Results for Mean Test Scores 
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Results of the ANOVA tests confirm that the difference in scores between first and 
second tests was highly significant, F(1,88)=72.735, p<0.001, Table 5.8. There was 
also a significant interaction with gender, F(1,88)=10.382, p=0.002, Table 5.8. 
Whilst males scored significantly higher than females in the first test, this difference 
was not significant in the second test. This suggests that the tutorial had a more 
beneficial impact on women than on men in the experiment. 
The percentages of genuine web sites that were correctly classified in the quiz are 
shown in Table 5.9, separated by age and gender. Only 58.9% of older female 
participants were able to correctly identify the genuine web sites before being given 
the tutorial, yet 81.5% were able to correctly identify the genuine web sites after the 
tutorial. 
Group First test Second test 
Males, 18 to 44 82.9% 86.8% 
Males, 45 and over 76.6% 82.8% 
Females, 18 to 44 78.8% 81.7% 
Females, 45 and over 58.9% 81.5% 
All participants 72.6% 82.9% 
Table 5.9: Percentage of Genuine Web Sites Correctly Classified 
Similarly, the percentages of fraudulent web sites that were correctly classified in the 
quiz are shown in Table 5.10, separated by age and gender. Only 47.8% of 
participants managed to correctly identify the fraudulent web sites before the tutorial, 
increasing to 73.7% after the tutorial. 
Group First test Second test 
Males, 18 to 44 65.8% 83.3% 
Males, 45 and over 46.9% 62.5% 
Females, 18 to 44 37.8% 71.2% 
Females, 45 and over 45.7% 75.8% 
All participants 47.8% 73.7% 
Table 5.10: Percentage of Fraudulent Web Sites Correctly Classified 
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There was a much larger improvement across all participants in identifying the 
fraudulent web sites (+25.9%) after the tutorial when compared to identifying the 
genuine web sites (+10.3%). 
Before being given the tutorial, only 4% of participants were able to correctly 
classify all 10 web sites. After the tutorial, 12% of participants correctly classified all 
10 web sites, an 8% improvement. 
These results are calculated for only 92 of the participants since 1 of the participants 
failed to experience the second test. There were 7 instances of a test terminating 
prematurely, mainly due to the gaze tracker software failing, but the participant was 
able to re-start the test from the same point. 
5.2.3.3. Gaze Results 
Behaviour of participants was assessed based on gazes to the important security 
features of the browser address bar (‘https’ presence) and padlock icon which were 
recorded as participants viewed the 10 web sites in both the first and second tests, as 
reported in Table 5.11 (for the 85 participants with complete gaze data). Although 2 
of the 4 versions of each web site did not have a padlock icon, gazes to where it 
would have been were recorded in an attempt to gauge if participants still checked 
for its presence. 
Group Address bar Padlock icon 
 First test Second test First test Second test 
Males, 18 to 44 74.2% 80.5% 11.6% 14.2% 
Males, 45 and over 56.2% 77.7% 8.5% 30.0% 
Females, 18 to 44 46.8% 71.6% 6.0% 22.0% 
Females, 45 and over 48.6% 85.4% 7.5% 26.8% 
Overall 54.1% 79.0% 7.9% 23.1% 
Table 5.11: Percentage of Participants Who Checked Web Site Security 
The results in Table 5.11 indicate the effectiveness of the Internet security tutorial in 
raising user awareness of the need to examine the details of the target URL and 
presence of the padlock icon in providing reassurance of the authenticity of a web 
site. 
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Repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out using the gaze data for address bar as 
the within-subjects variable in one case; and the gaze data for padlock icon in the 
other. Age group and gender were taken as between-subjects variables. The within-
subjects variable (test) was measured on an integer scale of 0 to 10 representing the 
number of web sites in which the participant gazed at least once at the relevant 
screen region (address bar or padlock). 
The number of participants who gazed at the address bar rose from 54.1% on the first 
test to 79.0% on the second test and the results of the ANOVA test, Table 5.12, 
confirm that the difference was statistically significant, F(1,81)=26.696, p<0.001. 
There was no effect due to age group but the results indicate that the effect for 
gender was near significance with women showing a greater increase between tests 
than did men. 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Test 1.949 1 1.949 26.696 0.000 
Test × Gender 0.277 1 0.277 3.797 0.055 
Test × Age 0.180 1 0.180 2.470 0.120 
Error (Test) 5.912 81 0.073   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 0.320 1 0.320 3.246 0.075 
Age 0.007 1 0.007 0.071 0.791 
Gender × Age 0.323 1 0.323 3.276 0.074 
Error 7.989 81 0.099   
Table 5.12: ANOVA Test Results for Gaze Data (Address Bar) 
The number of participants who gazed at the padlock icon rose from 7.9% on the 
first test to 23.1% on the second test and the results of the ANOVA test, Table 5.13, 
confirm that the difference was statistically significant, F(1,81)=22.239, p<0.001. In 
this case there were no effects due to age group or gender. 
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Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Test 0.861 1 0.861 22.239 0.000 
Test × Gender 0.030 1 0.030 0.777 0.381 
Test × Age 0.120 1 0.120 3.098 0.082 
Error (Test) 3.136 81 0.039   
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 0.001 1 0.001 0.026 0.871 
Age 0.088 1 0.088 2.457 0.121 
Gender × Age 0.010 1 0.010 0.279 0.599 
Error 2.886 81 0.036   
Table 5.13: ANOVA Test Results for Gaze Data (Padlock Icon) 
5.2.4. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“The Internet Security tutorial based on 7 ‘top tips’ will have no effect on 
detection of fraudulent web site test scores.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since there 
was an overall improvement in participant scores in identifying fraudulent web sites, 
rising from 47.8% in the first test to 73.7% in the second test (after the tutorial). 
Younger males tended to show a higher initial degree of knowledge about Internet 
security than the other gender and age groups. Females showed the largest 
improvement after being shown the top tips tutorial. The tutorial was clearly 
effective in educating users about web site security issues. 
The gaze data also backs up this finding, where the number of participants who 
gazed at the browser address bar rose from 54.1% on the first test to 79.0% on the 
second test. Similarly, the number of participants who gazed at the screen area where 
the padlock icon is located in the web browser rose from 7.9% on the first test to 
23.1% on the second test. In both cases the difference between first and second test 
results were statistically significant. 
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This experiment has demonstrated that online tutorials can be highly effective in 
educating users about the threat of phishing attacks and the nature of fraudulent web 
sites. 
5.3. The Malware Detection Software Usability 
Experiment 
Malware is the name given to malicious software that fraudsters embed in a target 
customer’s computer by duping the customer into opening an embedded link in an 
email, or by other means, which then covertly downloads a small program which is 
injected into the customer’s computer, usually in their system directory. The role of 
the malware program is to lurk in the system directory and only when a specific 
(banking) web site is being accessed, to ‘awake’ and monitor the security details that 
the customer is using to access their account; later sending these security details to 
the fraudster. 
The approach to dealing with such malware threats follows the same principles, only 
overtly. The bank advises the customer to download the bank’s approved malware 
detection software. This program sits in the system directory of the customer’s 
computer and when the customer starts to log in to the bank’s Internet banking site to 
access their accounts, the malware detection program awakes and checks the 
customer’s computer for the presence of malware, sending a report to the bank to 
take remedial action for that session. The challenge facing the banks is that 
customers are hesitant in allowing the bank to do exactly the thing they are trying to 
prevent the fraudster from doing. 
Loading malware detection software on the customer’s computer allows the bank to 
assess the risk from malware on a multi-level basis where benign infections such as 
worms might register as low risk; malware that does not impact the Internet banking 
session would be medium risk; and malware such as rootkit infections that would 
contaminate the session registered as high risk. Targeted solutions like this allow the 
bank to have greater control over the security of their Internet banking site and to 
better profile the customer and their computer when used to access accounts on the 
bank’s Internet banking site. 
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The key issues being addressed by this experiment were therefore concerned with the 
levels of customers’ understanding about malware and its potential consequences for 
them as Internet banking users; and customers’ propensity to accept the download 
and installation of software2 to test for the presence of malware on their computer on 
an on-going basis each time they access the bank’s Internet banking site. Another 
issue was how customers react to the branding / source of the software they were 
being asked to download – either coming from the bank or from a software vendor 
company. 
In addition, this experiment was designed to determine the extent to which customers 
want to be made aware of the malware scan in operation or the results of the malware 
detection software as it scans during log on to their Internet banking session: and to 
assess customers’ attitudes to the bank’s intervention with transactions when a 
malware threat is detected. 
5.3.1. Experiment Design 
A cohort of 192 Internet banking customers was recruited to take part in the 
experiment. Participants were selected as having used their bank’s Internet banking 
site at some point during the 3 months prior to the experiment. 
The participant sample was recruited with women and men in proportions 60:40, and 
in two age groups (ages 18 to 44 and ages 45 and over). Also, to model increasing 
customer awareness of phishing emails and malware infections by Internet users, half 
of the cohort were ‘phishing aware’, being invited back for this experiment having 
previously experienced the ‘top tips’ tutorial of the previous experiment dealing with 
the threat of phishing attacks. 
In their experiment session, participants were asked to adopt a fictitious persona with 
appropriate bank account and Internet banking log on details. 
In the first part of the experiment, participants were asked to log on to Internet 
banking and check ‘their’ account balance. After log on they encountered a web 
                                                 
2The product is only installed once; it is the scan that occurs every time the customer logs in. After 
installation, the scan can be covert or overt. 
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page, which recommended they download the bank’s approved security software to 
check the security of their computer, Figure 5.6. For realism in the experiment, the 
security software appeared to take 2 seconds to download and 15 seconds to 
complete the initial scan after the log on process. If the participant chose not to 
download the software, the researcher made a note of this, asked them why they 
chose not to install the software, and then asked them “in the interests of the 
experiment” to accept the installation of the security software, explaining that it was 
actually necessary in order for them to continue with the remainder of the 
experiment. Any participant who continued to decline the offer would be dismissed 
from the experiment – and paid their honorarium (none declined). 
 
Figure 5.6: Log on Screen Recommending Installation of Security Software 
Participants were then asked to again log on to Internet banking and make a payment 
of a large amount of money (e.g. £500) to a third party account which they have 
previously set up for their account. After log on, the malware scan process took 5 
seconds. By design, the third party funds transfer was not completed by the bank and 
the participant encountered an Internet banking page asking them to call the bank to 
authenticate the transaction. 
Participants repeated this funds transfer task a total of three times, on each occasion 
experiencing different levels of overtness of the malware scanning procedure. 
The branding of the security software varied between participants. Half experienced 
download and installation from the bank: the other half experienced download and 
installation from a leading security software vendor (Symantec). 
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5.3.1.1. Implementation Details 
The web browser used in the experiment was IE6, with the security software 
download and installation being simulated to avoid issues in the experiment with 
unsigned software and/or invalid security certificates in Windows. The hosts file was 
modified on each experiment machine so as to redirect the bank URL to the local 
web server. Data from click logs was used to report the proportions of participants 
who avoided the installation of the software, and also those that clicked on the 
security certificate information during the installation of the software. 
During the sessions, all participants were monitored by gaze tracking cameras (with 
their consent) to deliver data on what content in the Internet banking pages they 
actually concentrated on; and on what security features they actually checked during 
the installation and operation of the security software and reports. 
5.3.2. User Interface Designs 
Three user interface designs were assessed in the experiment, exhibiting different 
levels of overtness and user involvement in the malware scanning procedure. 
The Covert design was characterised by the absence of on-screen information on 
malware scanning or detections and no specific information about security threats 
was presented to the user during their Internet banking session. The recommendation 
to call the bank was presented as matter-of-fact “Your transaction was not 
completed. Please phone our Helpdesk on 0870 123 4567 in order to complete this 
transaction”, Figure 5.7. 
The Overt design was characterised by malware detection and threat information 
being presented as a persistent security status bar graphic with warning text in the 
left-hand menu panel of the Internet banking page. The recommendation to call the 
bank drew the customer’s attention to the risk that had been identified, Figure 5.8, 
“Your transaction was not completed. <The bank> have detected a security threat on 
this computer. Please refer to the panel on the left to see the extent of the threat. 
Please phone our Helpdesk on 0870 123 4567 in order to complete this transaction”. 
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Figure 5.7: Covert User Interface Design: ‘Transaction was not completed’ 
 
Figure 5.8: Overt User Interface Design: ‘Transaction was not completed’ 
The Intrusive design was characterised by malware detection and threat information 
which was being presented at log on as a dialogue box, Figure 5.9, that interrupted 
the flow of the user interaction, and needed to be read and closed by the user before 
proceeding to the Internet banking site. In addition, as with the Overt design, the 
threat information was presented as a persistent security status bar graphic with 
warning text in the left-hand menu panel of the Internet banking page. The 
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recommendation to call the bank reminded the customer of the existing risk they had 
seen when they logged on, Figure 5.10, “Your transaction was not completed. When 
you logged on to Internet Banking we advised you of a security threat to this 
computer. Please refer to the panel on the left to see the extent of the threat. Please 
phone our Helpdesk on 0870 123 4567 in order to complete this transaction”. 
 
Figure 5.9: Intrusive User Interface Design: ‘Detected a security threat’ 
 
Figure 5.10: Intrusive User Interface Design: ‘Transaction was not completed’ 
The ‘name’ and ‘publisher’ fields of the Internet Explorer download screen were set 
to be either the bank or a leading security software vendor, Figure 5.11, with 50% of 
participants experiencing each. 
136 
 
Figure 5.11: Malware Detection Software Branding During Installation 
Both the fields in the installation window were clickable to pop up a security 
certificate window detailing the authenticity of the software to be downloaded from 
either source. Both the download prompt and security certificate window were 
written to bypass the browser security limitations and so that button click data could 
be logged in the experiment. 
5.3.3. Summary of Experiment Metrics 
The measurements collected included: demographic and technographic 
characteristics of participants (e.g. Internet banking usage); attitude toward usability; 
quality rating and ratings for the different user interface designs on a 30-point linear 
scale (‘best’ to ‘worst’); preferences (rank order of the procedures) from the quality 
ratings; click data; gaze tracking data; interview responses with qualitative comments 
on specific issues. 
After each of their hands-on experiences with each of the three user interface designs 
participants were asked to complete a short usability questionnaire. The usability 
questionnaire was based on a modified version of those used in the previous 
experiments. The subject in each sentence was changed to ‘service’ and statements 
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on ‘ease of understanding’, ‘helpfulness’, ‘convenience’, ‘user friendliness’ and 
‘security information’ were added, Table 5.14. 
Question Statement (polarity) Abbreviated Form 
I had to concentrate hard to use this service (-) Concentration 
I got flustered when using this service (-) Flustered 
I felt under stress while using this service (-) Stressed 
I found this service frustrating to use (-) Frustration 
I thought this service was too complicated (-) Complication 
When using this service I always knew what to do next (+) Knew what to do next 
I felt in control while using this service (+) In control 
I thought this service was slow (-) Quick 
I would be happy to use this service again (+) Use again 
I felt this service was reliable (+) Reliable 
I felt that this service needed a lot of improvement (-) Needs improvement 
This service did not match my expectations (-) Matched expectations 
I found this service user-friendly (+) User friendly 
I liked using this service (+) Liked 
I did not enjoy using this service (-) Enjoyment 
I found this service trustworthy (+) Trustworthy 
I felt confident in the security of this service (+) Security 
I found this service confusing to use (-) Confusion 
The instructions for completing this service were clear (+) Instructions 
This service was easy to use (+) Ease of use 
This service was difficult to understand (-) Easy to understand 
I felt that this service was unhelpful (-) Helpful 
I found this service convenient to use (+) Convenient 
I felt informed about the security of this service (+) Informed about security
Table 5.14: Usability Questionnaire Statements 
Details of the experiment design are shown in Table 5.15. 
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The Malware Detection Software Usability Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of customer attitude to Internet security malware 
detection software. 
Null hypothesis (H0) The attitudes of the participants towards usability will be the same 
for all three of the user interface designs with malware detection 
software. 
Experiment design Participants experience three different user interface designs using 
malware detection software. 
Repeated measures (balanced order). 
Dependent variables Usability attribute scores. 
Button click data. 
Gaze-tracking data. 
Other data Demographic and technographic data. 
Exit interview data. 
Independent variables Experiment: exposure order (3 user interface designs, 6 possible 
orders, balanced), software branding (2 brands – bank and 
software vendor). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, in proportions women:men 60:40), 
age group (2 groups; ages 18 to 44 / ages 45 and over, balanced), 
phishing awareness (2 groups; top tips tutorial or not). 
Cohort 192 (2 age groups × 2 genders × 2 phishing awareness × 6 
treatment orders × 2 software branding × over-sampling ratio 2:1) 
= 192. 
All experienced Internet bankers. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £50. 
Session time 90 minutes. 
Table 5.15: Experiment Design Details 
5.3.4. Results 
5.3.4.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
A total of 168 participants were recruited, with 65 males and 103 females 
participating in the experiment: 86 were aged 18 to 44 and 82 were aged 45 and over. 
All of the participants were Internet banking customers who had used Internet 
banking within the 3 months prior to the experiment, with 93% having used it in the 
last month and 75% within the last week. The frequency of their usage of Internet 
Banking was also noted, with 74% using Internet banking at least once a week and 
20% using it every day. Overall, the cohort was considered valid as part of the target 
market sector to take part in the experiment and elicit views on Internet banking 
security issues. 
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Participants were also asked where they most often logged in to Internet banking. A 
large majority (77%) used Internet banking at home and 14% used it at work. 
Of the 97 participants that used either glasses or contact lenses, 71 (73%) were 
wearing them during the experiment. There were 3 (2%) participants who stated that 
they had colour-blindness issues, although this did not prove to be an issue during the 
experiment. 
By design, 77 of the participants (46%) had taken part in the previous (Internet 
security tutorial) experiment to highlight typical pitfalls in email and web security. 
This was treated as a between-subjects variable in the analysis to determine the 
effect, if any, of phishing awareness on customer attitude to malware detection 
software. 
5.3.4.2. Software Download Results 
Participants’ button click data were recorded at the security software download 
prompt. Of the 168 participants, only 50 participants (30%) chose to install the 
software first time. Another 103 participants did not click on anything and were 
asked to click “OK” in order to continue with the experiment. Here comments 
included “Didn’t see the install button”, “Normally I get stuff like this and just ignore 
it”, “I already have security software”. 
Of the remainder, 10 participants tried clicking on the “Save” button (presumably in 
an attempt to examine the file before installation) before being asked to click “OK” 
and complete the download and installation: and 2 participants tried clicking on the 
“Cancel” button at the download prompt, but were asked to click “OK” – they then 
proceeded as required. Of these, 1 participant stated that she would never normally 
perform such an installation, and the other said that she would probably install it the 
next time. 
There were 3 participants who chose not to install the software, 1 of whom attempted 
to cancel the download as well and who said that they would never download such 
software. The other 2 said that they would normally proceed and install it anyway, 
but for some reason chose not to during the experiment. All 3 completed the 
installation for the purposes of the experiment. 
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The button click data reveal that for the 50 participants who completed the download 
without intervention, 95.6% of those who had not been given the tutorial on Internet 
security performed the expected installation compared to 85.7% of those who had 
been given the tutorial: evidence of only a slightly higher awareness of Internet 
security issues for those who had been given the phishing training. 
None of the participants investigated the security certificate of the software 
download provider, either through clicking the appropriate fields in the download 
prompt or by clicking the padlock icon in the web browser. 
Although each participant had gaze data for at least one of the four tasks in the 
experiment (download software, 3 login uses), only 91 participants had a full set of 
gaze data for each of the four tasks. This was due mainly to the participant looking 
away from the screen to refer to their login details and then not resuming the correct 
seating position afterwards, with the result that the gaze tracking camera lost 
registration. The percentages of all participants who looked at the relevant screen 
regions at least once, and the corresponding percentages of the 91 participants with 
full gaze data, are shown in Table 5.16. 
Screen region % of all participants (168) % of those with full gaze data (91)
Browser toolbar 25.6% 33.0%
Browser address bar 26.2% 31.9%
Status bar 11.9% 15.4%
Padlock icon 0.6% 0.0%
Table 5.16: Gaze Reports during Security Software Installation 
Here 25.6% of all participants (33.0% of those with full gaze data) looked at the 
browser toolbar and 26.2% of all participants (31.9% of those with full gaze data) 
looked at the URL of the web page during the software installation download, 
perhaps looking for reassurance that the download prompt was genuine: and 11.9% 
of all participants (15.4% of those with full gaze data) also gazed at the web browser 
status bar at this time, perhaps looking for similar reassurance. Only one participant 
looked at the padlock icon during this time, although that could be due to lack of 
familiarity with IE6 (in IE7 it is located at the address bar) or the fact that the icon 
was so small that it could not be accurately gaze tracked. 
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5.3.4.3. Usability Results 
Table 5.17 shows the usability questionnaire means for each malware detection user 
interface design confirming that the usability scores were lowest for the Covert user 
interface design and highest for the Intrusive user interface design. 
Design Mean Score Std. Dev. N 
Covert 5.0751 1.06257 168
Overt 5.2989 1.06079 168
Intrusive 5.3105 1.04791 168
Table 5.17: Usability Questionnaire Means by User Interface Design 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out on these usability data, with user 
interface design (Covert vs. Overt vs. Intrusive) as the within-subjects factor and 
gender (65 male; 103 female), age group (86 aged 18 to 44; 82 aged 45 and over), 
phishing knowledge (77 had experienced the Internet security tutorial and 91 had 
not) and software branding (87 bank software download and 81 software vendor) as 
the between subjects factors. Several combinations of variables including treatment 
order were explored beforehand. No significant effects for order were noted; 
therefore order was eliminated from further analysis. 
Results of the ANOVA test, Table 5.18, confirm that there was a significant main 
effect for user interface design, F(2,304)=10.697, p<0.001. Pair-wise comparisons 
show that the difference in usability scores between the Covert user interface design 
(5.08) and the Overt user interface design (5.3) was statistically significant, p<0.001: 
and that the difference in usability scores between the Covert user interface design 
(5.08) and the Intrusive user interface design (5.31) was also statistically significant, 
p<0.001, with the Covert user interface design scoring significantly lower for 
usability in both cases. The difference between the Overt user interface design and 
the Intrusive user interface design was not statistically significant. 
Results of the ANOVA test, Table 5.18, indicate a between-subjects effect of age 
group with the older age group (ages 45 and over) scoring usability higher for all 
three user interface designs than did the younger age group (ages 18 to 44), 
F(1,152)=4.883, p=0.029, Table 5.18, and the difference was statistically significant. 
142 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Design 6.391 2 3.195 10.697 0.000
Design × Gender 0.192 2 0.096 0.322 0.725
Design × Age 0.073 2 0.037 0.123 0.885
Design × Phished 1.086 2 0.543 1.819 0.164
Design × Branding 0.428 2 0.214 0.717 0.489
Error (Design) 90.811 304 0.299  
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 5.594 1 5.594 2.166 0.143
Age 12.612 1 12.612 4.883 0.029
Phished 0.087 1 0.087 0.034 0.854
Branding 1.643 1 1.643 0.636 0.426
Gender × Age 0.864 1 0.864 0.334 0.564
Gender × Phished 0.680 1 0.680 0.263 0.609
Gender × Branding 0.051 1 0.051 0.020 0.889
Age × Phished 1.227 1 1.227 0.475 0.492
Age × Branding 9.422 1 9.422 3.648 0.058
Phished × Branding 23.541 1 23.541 9.115 0.003
Error 392.554 152 2.583  
Table 5.18: ANOVA Test Results for Usability Attributes 
The ANOVA test results, Table 5.18, also show an interaction between the effect of 
phishing knowledge and branding of the malware detection software, 
F(1,152)=9.115, p=0.003. The nature of this interaction is illustrated in Table 5.19. 
Those with phishing knowledge from the security tutorial gave higher scores to the 
download from the bank compared to the software vendor. Conversely, those without 
phishing knowledge from the tutorial gave higher scores to the download from the 
software vendor. 
Phishing Knowledge Branding Mean




Table 5.19: Usability Scores, by Phishing Awareness and Download Branding 
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Pairwise analyses (with Bonferroni correction) for each of the 24 individual usability 
attributes in the usability questionnaire (Table 5.14) were carried out and reported in 
Table 5.20. Only main effects were considered in the analysis. 
For each of the 11 usability attributes listed in Table 5.20 (as with the mean usability 
scores reported above) there were no significant pairwise differences between the 
Overt and the Intrusive user interface designs. There were 7 usability attributes 
where the Overt user interface design scored significantly higher than the Covert user 
interface design: and there were 9 usability attributes where the Intrusive user 
interface design scored significantly higher than the Covert user interface design. 
Attribute Significant Effects Details 
Mean df=2.000; F=10.697; p<0.001 
pCovert-Overt<0.001: pCovert-Intrusive=0.001
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
Frustration df=1.834; F=4.012; p=0.022 
pCovert-Intrusive=0.043 
Covert < Intrusive
Use again df=2.000; F=7.766; p=0.001 
pCovert-Overt=0.007: pCovert-Intrusive=0.002
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
Needs improvement df=1.906; F=4.933; p=0.009 
pCovert-Intrusive=0.018 
Covert < Intrusive
Matched expectations df=2.000; F=10.322; p<0.001 
pCovert-Overt=0.001: pCovert-Intrusive=0.001
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
User friendly df=1.884; F=4.106; p=0.019 
pCovert-Overt=0.039 
Covert < Overt 
Liked df=2.000; F=7.006; p=0.001 
pCovert-Overt=0.003: pCovert-Intrusive=0.010
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
Enjoyment df=2.000; F=4.623; p=0.011 
pCovert-Intrusive=0.024 
Covert < Intrusive
Helpful df=1.774; F=9.846; p<0.001 
pCovert-Overt<0.001: pCovert-Intrusive=0.009
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
Trustworthy df=2.000; F=6.765; p=0.001 
pCovert-Intrusive=0.001 
Covert < Intrusive
Informed about security df=1.881; F=34.612; p<0.001 
pCovert-Overt<0.001: pCovert-Intrusive<0.001
Covert < Overt 
Covert < Intrusive
Convenient df=1.863; F=4.283; p=0.017 
pCovert-Overt=0.031 
Covert < Overt 
Table 5.20: Summary of Significant Differences in Usability Attributes 
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Taken together these data suggest that the Covert user interface design is not the 
correct approach. 
For the three sets of usability questionnaire data, reliability analysis on the scale of 
each (based on Cronbach’s α) reported a minimum value of α=0.956 (for the 
usability questionnaire for the Covert user interface design), indicating that the 
questionnaire reliability was high. 
5.3.4.4. Quality and Preference Results 
The results for the quality scores (30-point linear scale) are shown in Table 5.21, 





Table 5.21: Mean Quality Scores by User Interface Design 
Results of preliminary repeated-measures ANOVA tests with the quality scores for 
each of the three user interface designs as the within-subjects variable and with order 
of experience, gender and phishing awareness as between-subjects variables 
indicated that gender and phishing awareness had no significant effects or 
interactions in the quality rating scores so these were omitted from subsequent 
analysis. 
The resulting ANOVA test used the quality scores for each of the three user interface 
designs as the within-subjects variable and with age group, order of experience and 
branding as the between-subjects variables. The results of the ANOVA test are 
shown in Table 5.22. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated; therefore the degrees of freedom were corrected using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, as reflected in the non-integer values for 
degrees of freedom in Table 5.22. 
145 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Interface 1916.048 1.784 1074.265 21.864 0.000
Interface × Order 884.001 8.918 99.126 2.017 0.038
Interface × Age 33.509 1.784 18.787 0.382 0.659
Interface × Brand 54.730 1.784 30.685 0.625 0.519
Error (Interface) 12619.511 256.837 49.134  
Between-Subjects Effects 
Order 487.049 5 97.410 1.149 0.337
Age 1060.223 1 1060.223 12.510 0.001
Brand 224.040 1 224.040 2.643 0.106
Error 12204.228 144 84.752  
Table 5.22: ANOVA Test Results for Quality Scores 
The results of the ANOVA test confirm that there was a main effect for quality 
scores of user interface design, F(1.784, 256.837)=21.864, p<0.001, Table 5.22. Pair-
wise comparisons show that there was a significant difference, p<0.001, between the 
Covert user interface design with a quality score of 14.94 and the Overt user 
interface design with a quality score of 18.13: and also there was a significant 
difference, p<0.001, between the Covert user interface design and the Intrusive user 
interface design with a quality score of 19.81, with the Covert user interface design 
scoring significantly lower overall in terms of the quality scores in both cases. There 
was also a moderately significant difference between the Overt user interface design 
at 18.13 and the Intrusive user interface design with a quality score of 19.81, 
p=0.034, favouring the Intrusive user interface design in the quality scores. 
The ANOVA results indicate a significant interaction with treatment order for the 
three user interface experiences, emphasising the importance of the care taken to 
carefully randomise and balance for treatment order across the cohort in execution of 
the experiment to minimise the impact of order effects on the data. 
There was a significant between-subjects effect due to age group, F(1,144)=12.510, 
p=0.001, Table 5.22, where the older age group (ages 45 and over) scored all three 
user interfaces significantly higher than did the younger group (ages 18 to 44). 
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The quality scores were also used to generate a rank order of preference, Table 5.23. 
These data indicate a significant bias toward the Intrusive user interface design (Chi-
square test for those participants with a preference: χ2(2)=29.918, p<0.001). 
User Interface Design Ranked Best % 
Covert 24 14.3% 
Overt 30 17.9% 
Intrusive 69 41.1% 
No Preference 45 26.7% 
Total 168 100.0% 
Table 5.23: Preferences for the Alternative User Interface Designs 
Participants explained their overall scores, comparing the three designs: “[Intrusive] 
gave me a warning at the start. Others – can’t remember a difference”, “To not 
successfully pay the bill was very frustrating – none of them worked”, “[Intrusive] 
felt flustered, [Covert] was more comfortable”, “I was more aware of what was going 
on during the [Covert] session.” 
5.3.4.5. Gaze Tracking Data from Different User Interface Designs 
As with the security software download and installation task in this experiment, 
gazes at the browser toolbar, browser address bar, browser status bar and padlock 
icon were recorded during Internet banking login (bill payment) tasks. In addition, 
any gazes at the left hand navigation menu in the Internet banking web pages were 
logged and, in the Overt and Intrusive user interface designs, any gazes at the 
security status bar located within the navigation menu were also recorded. The gaze 
results are shown in Table 5.24. 
Screen region % of participants 
 Covert Overt Intrusive 
Left hand menu 44.0% 50.0% 49.4% 
Security status bar n/a 13.1% 14.3% 
Browser toolbar 5.4% 16.7% 10.7% 
Browser address bar 8.3% 16.1% 10.7% 
Status bar 2.4% 1.8% 1.2% 
Padlock icon 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Table 5.24: Screen Region Gazes (All 168 Participants) 
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For the Overt design, participants looked at the browser toolbar and browser address 
bar more than with the other two designs, although only some 16% of participants 
gazed at these targets. There were surprisingly few participants who gazed at the 
security status bar in both Overt and Intrusive user interface designs (some 13%), 
typically gazing for just half a second, although some gazes at the security status bar 
lasted for 3 seconds. 
The gaze results for the subset of 91 participants who had a full set of gaze data 
across all of the four tasks are similar to those for the full cohort of 168 participants, 
Table 5.25. 
Screen region % of participants 
 Covert Overt Intrusive 
Left hand menu 62.6% 70.3% 63.7% 
Security status bar n/a 17.6% 15.4% 
Browser toolbar 6.6% 25.3% 16.5% 
Browser address bar 11.0% 25.3% 15.4% 
Status bar 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 
Padlock icon 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Table 5.25: Screen Region Gazes (91 Participants with Full Set of Gaze Data) 
It is a physiological fact that the pupils in the eye dilate, typically by up to 15%, 
during periods of increased cognitive load, such as heightened awareness, interest or 
anxiety (Klingner et al., 2008). To investigate this pupillary response in participants 
with the malware detection software in operation, the pupil size (mm) at each gaze 
event was recorded, averaged for each user interface design, Table 5.26. Each room 
was set to similar lighting levels to minimise the effects of differing light intensity on 
pupil size. Pupil dilation was calculated across the whole cohort in the one case, and 
also just for those 91 participants with a full set of gaze data. The mean pupil 
diameter should be interpreted relatively across designs and reflects trends. 
Cohort Pupil diameter (mm) 
 Installation Covert Overt Intrusive 
168 participants 3.20 3.11 3.15 3.14 
91 participants 3.32 3.20 3.24 3.24 
Table 5.26: Mean Pupil Diameter across Designs 
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The installation task appears to have resulted in larger average pupil dilation when 
compared to the bill payment tasks, possibly reflecting the additional anxiety caused 
by the software installation. The Covert design also resulted in smaller pupil dilation 
when compared to the other user interface designs. 
5.3.4.6. Interview Comments 
When asked about the differences between the three Internet banking sessions, a total 
of 39 (23%) participants did not notice any differences in their three bill payment 
tasks. The remaining 76% noticed some or all of the differences between the designs: 
25% of participants remarked only on the security warnings at the end; 20% of 
participants remarked only on the security status bar; 11% of participants remarked 
only on the security warning at login; 10% of participants mentioned all of the 
differences between designs; 5% of participants mentioned all of the differences 
except they thought that the security status bar was only in one design; 4% of 
participants remarked only on the security warnings at login and at the end (and 
failed to mention the security status bar). 
When asked what they liked in the Internet banking sessions, a total of 42 (25%) 
participants said that they specifically liked the security threat slider bar, “Like the 
threat level indicator, very visible”, “Being told about security threat. More security 
is always good”. 
When asked about the factors they consider when deciding on a download, the main 
considerations for participants were “Who is the download from?”, “How big is the 
file?”, “How will it interact with my existing software?” 
When asked about who they thought provided their download in the experiment, the 
vast majority (89%) had failed to notice. Of the 13 participants who thought that the 
bank had provided the download, 5 gave the wrong answer – their software had been 
branded as Symantec. 
When asked how they felt about the downloaded software scanning their computer 
and sending the results to the bank, just over half of the participants (54%) either 
thought it was good thing, or had no problem with the scan; 32% of the participants 
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were either not happy about it, or felt uncomfortable about it. The remainder either 
did not know, or wanted more information about the scan. 
5.3.5. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“The attitudes of the participants towards usability will be the same for 
all three of the user interface designs with malware detection software.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis since the 
differences in mean usability scores between the Covert user interface design and the 
Overt user interface design; and between the Covert user interface design and the 
Intrusive user interface design were statistically significant. 
Only 30% of participants performed the security software download and installation 
as instructed by the login sequence without any prompting from the researcher: 9% 
of participants examined the details of the download or aborted the installation 
process, being generally very wary of what they would install on the computer. None 
of the participants examined the security certificate information that was available to 
them at the download prompt. Some 53% of participants would normally refuse to 
download or install such software. 
The button click data reveal that for the 50 participants who completed the download 
without intervention, 95.6% of those who had not been given the tutorial on Internet 
security performed the expected installation compared to 85.7% of those who had 
been given the tutorial: evidence of a only a slightly higher awareness of Internet 
security issues for those who had been given the phishing training. 
Usability attitudes were highest for the Intrusive user interface design (5.31) and the 
Overt user interface design at 5.30. These two designs, offering user information 
about the malware detection operation, scored significantly higher than the Covert 
design at 5.08. An age group effect revealed that older participants were much more 
positive in their attitudes than were younger participants towards all three designs, 
possibly suggesting stronger awareness of the impact of theft in the older age group. 
There was also evidence to suggest that those with higher awareness of Internet 
security and phishing threats gave higher usability scores with bank-branded 
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software than those who had not taken part in a previous tutorial training session on 
Internet security. Conversely, those who had not taken part in the previous tutorial 
training session gave higher usability scores with the download from the software 
vendor. 
In terms of individual usability attributes, the Overt user interface design and the 
Intrusive user interface design for the malware detection software scored higher than 
did the Covert user interact design where they were considered to be more likely to 
be used again, more helpful and liked. They also better matched expectations and 
were considered to be more informative about security issues. 
Additional benefits of the Intrusive user interface design when compared to the 
Covert user interface design included enjoyment, trustworthiness, less frustration and 
considering it to need less improvement. Similarly, for the Overt user interface 
design when compared to the Covert user interface design, additional benefits 
included convenience and user-friendliness. 
Although the difference in usability scores between the Overt user interface design 
and the Intrusive user interface design was not statistically significant, the overall 
quality scores strongly favoured the Intrusive user interface design, scoring 19.8 on 
the 30-point scale, significantly higher than either of the alternative user interface 
designs. 
The rank ordering of the three user interface designs, again clearly favoured the 
Intrusive user interface design, with 41% of participants ranking it best of the three. 
Obtaining consistent eye tracking results from all participants was only partially 
successful (full data for 91 out of a cohort of 168), probably due to some participants 
looking away from the screen to refer to their login details and then not resuming the 
correct seating position afterwards. However, relative comparisons of gaze data 
between designs could still be performed. 
The browser toolbar, address bar and status bar were all gazed at far more during the 
installation task than during the bill payment tasks, perhaps reflecting the increased 
interaction with the browser and heightened awareness of the surrounding operating 
system during the installation. 
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Interestingly, with the Overt user interface design, participants looked at the browser 
toolbar and address bar more than with the other two user interface designs, possibly 
due to the lack of information given about the security status bar after login and 
resulting in participants checking that the URL was still correct. 
The pupil dilation data extracted from the gaze data suggest higher levels of 
cognitive load for participants during the software download and installation task, 
possibly reflecting higher levels of awareness or anxiety; and relatively lower levels 
of cognitive load in the bill payment task, notably with the Covert user interface 
design. 
Some 23% of participants did not notice the difference between the three user 
interface designs (Covert, Overt and Intrusive). After being reminded of the three 
different user interface designs, the majority of participants were positive about their 
bank providing extra online security and 25% liked the security status bar, although a 
few suggested that it provided more detail. Some 20% of participants commented 
that they disliked the way the Covert design gave no reason for the bill payment 
failure. 
Approximately half of the participants would have either ignored or purposely not 
installed the security software download. Their main worries appeared to be over 
who was providing the download, how big it was and how it would interact with 
their existing software. Only 25% would have installed it without asking any further 
questions. 
5.4. The CodeSure Sender Authentication Experiment 
Use by the banks of modern communication channels such as email, Facebook, text 
messaging, Twitter and automated voice messaging are currently limited by the 
prevalence of fraudulent messages from criminals which purport to come from the 
bank. Research shows that some 42% of UK Internet banking users have been the 
target of fraudulent emails (Ensor, 2005). In an attempt to reassure customers, many 
banks currently include part of the customer’s postcode in email message, but this 
has limited effect, and most banks are now telling customers that they will no longer 
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receive any emails from their bank – and if they do then they are likely to be 
fraudulent. 
Given results of the phishing experiment and the Internet security tutorial experiment 
considered earlier in this chapter it is clear that Internet banking users remain at risk 
from these types of security threats and that any usable security solution considered 
by the banks will need to address the issue of customers needing to validate 
communications from their bank. The usable security solution based around use of 
the CodeSure card offers a way forward since the CodeSure card supports sender 
authentication thereby allowing the bank to supply a unique identification code 
within an email, SMS message or outbound telephone call, which can be decoded by 
that customer’s CodeSure card, and only that card. Each code can only be used once. 
The CodeSure card’s Verify mode of operation allows the customer to take an 8-digit 
security code in a message from their bank and key this into their CodeSure card. 
The 8-digit code will have been constructed by the bank with knowledge of the 
secret security key (although not the PIN) for that customer’s CodeSure card such 
that the card will analyse the input code and display a VERIFIED or FAILED 
response to authenticate the sender. 
5.4.1. Experiment Design 
An experiment was undertaken to investigate usage of the CodeSure card in sender 
authentication tasks with emails, text messages and automated telephone calls being 
received by participants. Participants were presented with a bundle of emails, SMS 
messages and phone calls by an automated voice service and were then asked to 
evaluate the authenticity of each, initially without the CodeSure card and then with 
the CodeSure card. 
A cohort of 96 Internet banking and telephone banking customers were recruited to 
take part in the experiment sessions. The cohort was balanced for age group and for 
gender. Participants were selected as having used Internet banking and telephone 
banking at some point during the 3 months prior to the experiment. In their 
experiment session, participants were asked to adopt a persona and told to deal with 
batches of incoming messages via email, SMS text messaging and via telephone. 
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To establish a baseline of behaviour for each participant, they first received a batch 
of 3 emails, 3 text messages and 3 phone calls from their bank without reference to 
any authentication considerations. The order of the 3 message channels was 
randomised across participants. Each participant received their 3 emails in sequence, 
one after the other: similarly for their text messages and phone calls from the bank. 
The messages included ‘their’ surname or last 3 characters of ‘their’ postal code for 
re-assurance. After each message the participant was asked to rate the message for 
authenticity. 
Three different message content types were used in the experiment, exhibiting 
different message urgency (new product announcement, payment due alert and 
suspicious card use alert) and the order of message type was randomised across 
channels for each participant. 
The participant was then given a letter “from their bank” detailing the use of the 
CodeSure card in sender authentication for each of the communications channels to 
help combat phishing and identity fraud. They were also given a tutorial sheet on 
how to use the Verify mode of the CodeSure card, Figure B.7 in Appendix B. 
They were then asked to use their CodeSure card for sender authentication with a 
second batch of 6 emails, 6 text messages and 6 phone calls from their bank. Half of 
these messages included valid CodeSure sender codes; the other half included bogus 
sender codes as if from a fraudster. Again the order of the 3 message channels and 
the urgency of each message were randomised across the sample. 
Participants gave a confidence score for each message: “On a scale from 0 to 10 
where 10 means absolutely confident, how confident are you that that message is 
genuine and comes from the bank?” 
5.4.2. Implementation Details 
As with the phishing emails experiment presented in Section 5.1, the email client 
used was IE6 running a Webmail client, modified to prevent easy deletion of emails 
without first reading them. The Webmail client was connected to an hMailServer 
IMAP server running on a Windows 2003 server, and a dummy Sendmail agent was 
used to prevent any participants sending out real email replies (participants were not 
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asked to respond to the emails so any emails they sent were ignored). Participants 
were forced to read the emails in the correct order. 
The batch of emails that the participants received consisted of a low urgency 
message (discount on a loan), medium urgency message (card payment due) and high 
urgency message (unusual transactions on the account), Figure 5.12. 
 
[With sender code]: “You can confirm that this message is genuine by 
entering <sender code> using the keypad on the reverse of your bank 
card [Verify mode]. You should then see VERIFIED displayed on the 
card.” 
Greeting: “Dear Mr/Mrs <name> [Postcode ending 5ND]” 
Low urgency: “As a long-standing customer of <bank> we can offer you a 
significant discount on our range of personal loans. For information 
contact us online at http://www.<bank>.com or on the telephone on 
08457 3000000.” 
Medium urgency: “The minimum payment to your credit card is due. To 
avoid being charged interest, please make this payment as soon as 
possible. You can make your payment online at 
http://www.<bank>.com or on the telephone on 08457 3000000.” 
High urgency: “We have noticed several unusual foreign transactions using 
your debit card recently. If this might be a concern for you, please 
check online at http://www.<bank>.com or on the telephone on 08457 
3000000.” 
Figure 5.12: Emails used in Sender Authentication Experiment 
The CodeSure sender authentication message was appended to the end of each of the 
three emails when the CodeSure card was being used. The (valid) 8 digit sender 
authentication codes were generated by the CodeSure card server. 
An IVR telephone banking service similar to the one used in the CodeSure multi-
channel experiment considered in Chapter 4 was used, written in C using Nuance 
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speech recognition technology and the Nuance Dialog Builder API. When the 
participant was ready to accept a telephone call, the ‘bank’ dialled the customer and 
took the participant through the steps required for the task – depending on whether or 
not a CodeSure card was being used, Figure 5.13. 
 
[With sender code]: “You can confirm that this message is genuine by using 
the Verify mode on the reverse of your bank card. Using the keypad, 
enter the code <sender code>. Here’s that code again <sender code>. 
You should then see VERIFIED displayed on the card. To hear this 
message again press ‘1’; or to transfer to our telephone banking 
service, press ‘2’…” 
High urgency: “We have noticed several unusual foreign transactions using 
your debit card recently. If this might be a concern for you, please 
check online at www.<bank>.com or through telephone banking 
now…” 
Medium urgency: “The minimum payment to your credit card is due. To 
avoid being charged interest, please make this payment as soon as 
possible. You can make your payment online at www.<bank>.com or 
through telephone banking now…” 
Low urgency: “As a long-standing customer of <bank> we can offer you a 
significant discount on our range of personal loans. For information 
contact us online at www.<bank>.com or through telephone banking 
now…” 
Greeting: “Hello, this is an automated call from <bank> for Mr/Mrs 
<name> with account number ending <account>. If you are Mr/Mrs 
<name> please press ‘1’ to continue…” 
Figure 5.13: Telephone Messages used in Sender Authentication Experiment 
The CodeSure sender authentication message was played after each of the three 
telephone messages when the CodeSure card was being used. As before, the (valid) 8 
digit sender authentication codes were generated by the CodeSure card server. 
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The SMS service was written in Visual Basic and was run on a computer running 
Windows Server 2003 connected to a Sony Ericsson K700i mobile phone. The SMS 
service treated the mobile phone as a modem over which it could communicate and 
automate the sending of text messages to the three experiment mobile phones. The 
three types of SMS messages sent were as shown in Figure 5.14. As with the other 2 
channels, the SMS service contacted the CodeSure card server to generate (valid) 8 
digit sender authentication codes when the CodeSure card was being used. 
 
[With sender code]: “Confirm this message is genuine by entering <sender 
code> using the keypad on the reverse of your bank card (Verify 
Mode). You should then see VERIFIED displayed.” 
High urgency: “We have noticed some unusual foreign transactions for your 
account ending <account>. Please check online at www.<bank>.com 
or call us on 084573000000.” 
Medium urgency: “The minimum payment for your account ending 
<account> is due. To avoid interest charges, make a payment online at 
www.<bank>.com or call us on 084573000000.” 
Low urgency: “As a customer we can offer you discounts on our personal 
loans. More info at www.<bank>.com or call us on 084573000000.” 
Figure 5.14: Text Messages used in Sender Authentication Experiment 
The details of the experiment are summarised in Table 5.27. 
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The CodeSure Sender Authentication Experiment 
Experiment purpose Exploration of using sender authentication with the CodeSure card 
to verify emails, SMS messages and phone calls from the bank. 
Null hypothesis (H0) The use of sender authentication to verify the sender of a message 
has no effect on participants’ trust in the message. 
Experiment design Participants were asked to assess the authenticity of 3 emails, 3 
SMS messages and 3 telephone calls without sender 
authentication: and 6 other emails, 6 SMS messages and 6 
telephone calls with the CodeSure card used for sender 
authentication. 
Repeated measures (randomised order of messages), within-
subjects. 
Dependent variables Button click data. 
Perceived authenticity scores for each message. 
Other data Exit interview data. 
Independent variables Experiment: task order (randomised, balanced). 
Participant: gender (2 genders, balanced), age group (2 groups, 
ages 18 to 44 / ages 45 and over). 
Cohort 96 (2 age groups × 2 genders × over-sampling ratio 24:1) = 96. 
Selected from banking customers who have used Internet banking 
and telephone banking at least once in the preceding 3 months. 
Honorarium Personal cheque for £30. 
Session time 60 minutes. 
Table 5.27: Experiment Design Details 
5.4.3. Results 
5.4.3.1. Demographic and Technographic Results 
The customer sample consisted of 109 participants, balanced for gender (50% male 
and 50% female) and for age groups (51% aged 18 to 44 and 49% aged 45 and over). 
All had used their bank’s Internet banking and telephone banking services in the 3 
months prior to the experiment. 
5.4.3.2. Message Confidence Results 
Participants gave a confidence score for each message: “On a scale from 0 to 10 
where 10 means absolutely confident, how confident are you that that message is 
genuine and comes from the bank?” 
158 
The confidence scores for each type of message (no sender code, valid sender code, 
bogus sender code) were averaged for each participant and rounded to the closest 
integer score, Table 5.28. 
Confidence Score No Code Valid Code Bogus Code 
0 0.0% 0.0% 38.5% 
1 0.0% 0.0% 17.4% 
2 0.9% 0.9% 10.1% 
3 0.9% 0.0% 9.2% 
4 2.8% 0.0% 3.7% 
5 9.2% 0.9% 7.3% 
6 12.8% 1.8% 2.8% 
7 26.6% 12.8% 4.6% 
8 21.1% 22.0% 4.6% 
9 12.8% 28.4% 1.8% 
10 12.8% 33.0% 0.0% 
Table 5.28: Message Confidence Results 
The most common message confidence score without sender code was 7 (26.6% of 
participants). With a valid CodeSure sender code the most common message 
confidence score was 10 (33% of participants). With a bogus code the most common 
confidence score was 0 (38.5% of participants). 
The mean and modal message confidence scores by channel are given in Table 5.29 
(mean) and Table 5.30 (mode). Table 5.31 shows the frequencies of participants 
scoring messages with a confidence of 9 or 10. 
 SMS Email Phone Overall 
No sender code 7.291 7.221 7.547 7.353 
Valid CodeSure sender code 8.661 8.698 8.723 8.694 
Bogus CodeSure sender code 2.242 2.228 2.248 2.239 
Table 5.29: Mean Message Confidence Scores 
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 SMS Email Phone Overall 
No sender code 8 8 10 8 
Valid CodeSure sender code 10 10 10 10 
Bogus CodeSure sender code 0 0 0 0 
Table 5.30: Most Frequent (Modal) Message Confidence Scores 
 SMS Email Phone Overall 
No sender code 29.1% 34.3% 41.0% 34.8% 
Valid CodeSure sender code 67.3% 69.4% 68.8% 68.5% 
Bogus CodeSure sender code 3.1% 2.8% 3.4% 3.1% 
Table 5.31: Frequency of Message Confidence Scores of 9 or 10 
To investigate the statistical significance of the mean message confidence scores of 
Table 5.29 by channel, a repeated measures ANOVA was run with message type (no 
sender code, valid CodeSure sender code or bogus CodeSure sender code) and 
channel (SMS, email or phone) as within-subjects factors and age group and gender 
as between-subjects independent variables, Table 5.32. Mauchly’s test for sphericity 
was significant for message type (p<0.001), channel (p<0.001) and for the interaction 
between message type and channel (p<0.001), therefore because the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated the degrees of freedom were corrected using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. 
Results of the ANOVA test reveal, Table 5.32, that there was a highly significant 
overall effect, F(1.421,149.230)=326.011, p<0.001, for message type with all pair-
wise differences between the messages types being statistically significant, p<0.001. 
There were no significant interactions between message type and channel and there 
were no significant between-subjects interactions or effects. 
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Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Within-Subjects Effects 
Message 7580.817 1.421 5333.969 326.011 0.000
Message × Gender 0.850 1.421 0.598 0.037 0.919
Message × Age 73.521 1.421 51.730 3.162 0.062
Error (Message) 2441.595 149.230 16.361  
Channel 2.963 1.697 1.746 0.923 0.386
Channel × Gender 8.508 1.697 5.013 2.649 0.082
Channel × Age 0.389 1.697 0.229 0.121 0.854
Error (Channel) 337.201 178.210 1.892  
Between-Subjects Effects 
Gender 11.936 1 11.936 1.124 0.292
Age 3.666 1 3.666 0.345 0.558
Gender × Age 2.214 1 2.214 0.208 0.649
Error 1115.171 105 10.621  
Table 5.32: ANOVA Results for Mean Message Confidence Scores by Channel 
These results confirm that the use of the CodeSure card with sender codes is highly 
effective. Message confidence scores rose from 7.35 without sender codes to 8.69 
with valid sender codes checked by means of the CodeSure card and also fell to 2.24 
with bogus codes identified by use of the CodeSure card. 
5.4.3.3. Interview Comments 
When asked to identify the benefits to them of using the CodeSure card to verify 
messages, participants responded: “It made me feel more confident in the messages I 
received.”, “It could stop fraud. I would know if messages were fraudulent or 
genuine.” 
Some 75% of participants felt that banks should include a sender code in all 
messages: exclusions suggested were messages about sales and those that were not 
related to a bank account: 40% of participants expressed a preference for a 4-digit 
sender code, 43% for a 6-digit code and 16% for an 8-digit code. 
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5.4.4. Discussion on Experiment Results 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this experiment was: 
“The use of sender authentication to verify the sender of a message has 
no effect on participants’ trust in the message.” 
The evidence presented here is sufficient to refute this null hypothesis: a valid 
CodeSure sender code was given a mean message confidence score of 8.7; a bogus 
CodeSure sender code was given a mean message confidence score of 2.2; and a 
message with no sender code was given a mean message confidence score of 7.4. 
The (pair-wise differences) were each statistically significant. Sender authentication 
using embedded CodeSure card codes in emails, SMS and phone calls from the Bank 
therefore boosts customer confidence in the validity of messages: the modal score 
without sender codes of 7 (26.6% of participants) rose to a modal score of 10 (33.0% 
of participants) with a valid CodeSure sender code and fell to 0 (38.5% of 
participants) with a bogus sender code. 
5.5. Summary 
These results of these experiments reveal several important findings in the field of 
online security, showing that whilst users claim to be aware of the general threats of 
phishing and malware, their claims are possibly misplaced since their behaviour in 
the experiments failed to indicate any resilience in avoiding phishing. 
For the phishing threat, changes to the style of link employed in the ‘lure’ between 
text hyperlinks, button hyperlinks and embedded HTML forms had no effect on 
users’ propensity to click on the link. However, heightening the apparent urgency in 
the message content of the email did have an effect. Educating users in phishing and 
online security significantly reduces their likelihood of being duped by a phishing 
email, and such education offers possibly the sole route available to banks to reduce 
identity theft and its associated costs, although care must also be taken in selecting 
the correct approach to educating customers (Desman, 2003). 
The malware detection software experiment highlighted that users dislike having 
security information hidden from them, especially when it prevents them completing 
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the task they are attempting to perform. If their bank were to offer them security 
software to detect malware on their machine, users would therefore prefer that it kept 
them informed about threats rather than hiding it from them and secretly 
communicating the scan results back to the bank. Although users would be more 
likely to be anxious during the installation of such software, that is an indicator of 
increased awareness, and a little education on the use of security certificates used in 
the installation of downloaded software could help to alleviate concerns. 
For the (50) participants who completed the download without intervention, 95.6% 
of those who had not been given the tutorial on Internet security performed the 
expected installation compared to 85.7% of those who had been given the tutorial: 
evidence of a only a slightly higher awareness of Internet security issues for those 
who had been given the phishing training. 
The CodeSure card is again shown to be a potential solution for banks to reduce the 
threat of phishing (and vishing) through the use of sender authentication procedures. 
Users have been shown here to be much more likely to be confident in the validity of 
communications from their bank, resulting in a lower success rate for phishing and 
could help bring back customer confidence in the bank using such channels to 
communicate with their customers. 
 
Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions 
The research reported here has centred on a series of 8 large-scale usability 
experiments investigating the role of two-factor authentication with the CodeSure 
card as the basis for a usable security solution for banking and eCommerce. The 
premise behind the concept of usable security is that by furnishing customers with a 
familiar device, a familiar form factor, to be used in a familiar, common modality for 
all purchases, financial transactions and account access in the physical world as well 
as in the digital world, this familiarity will demolish the existing barriers where 
channel security procedures are seen by customers as being an imposition, thereby 
achieving improved levels of actual security because security procedures with usable 
security will become a natural part of everyday financial activity. The results 
presented here have shown that the CodeSure card and procedures based on the card 
offer the basis of such a usable security option. 
6.1. Discussion 
Usability scores for the CodeSure card at 4.49 (on a 7-point scale) for first use were 
shown to rise to 4.66 on tenth use, confirming the device usability as suited for use in 
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a usable security procedure. An enhanced card design, featuring improved mode 
selection and navigation cues and importantly, a keypad buffer to allow key-ahead, 
served to further boost usability scores for the CodeSure card to 5.01 with improved 
usage times and improved task times and success rates. 
Participants recognised that the CodeSure card was convenient to use as reflected in 
the quality ratings and comments; and appreciated the role of the card as a multi- 
channel, usable security solution where 82% expected to be able to use it to access 
their bank’s Internet banking service, 73% to use it for telephone banking and 88% to 
use it for online shopping. Some participants would even expect to use direct 
channels more often when using the CodeSure card. 
The experiment results suggest that users are aware of a trade-off between the 
security of a procedure and its convenience. Some 66% of participants would prefer 
a common security procedure across all banking and eCommerce channels, which is 
encouraging for the future of the CodeSure card. Only 28% would prefer the security 
to remain the same in the banking channels they use, but that is perhaps due to being 
familiar with existing procedures rather than thinking about the benefits a common 
security procedure would bring. Although the CodeSure card scored lower than 
today’s disparate security processes in terms of usability, the CodeSure card was still 
usable with mean usability scores above 5.0, and the main challenge for the bank 
would be to break users out of their comfort zone in using security processes that 
they are familiar with and move them over to the common security processes of the 
CodeSure card. 
Experiment results also reveal several important findings in the field of online 
security, showing that whilst users claim to be aware of the general threats of 
phishing and malware, their claims are possibly misplaced since their behaviour in 
the experiments failed to indicate any resilience in avoiding phishing. 
In terms of the phishing threat, changes to the style of link employed in the ‘lure’ 
between text hyperlinks, button hyperlinks and embedded HTML forms had no 
effect on users’ propensity to click on the link. However, heightening the apparent 
urgency in the message content of the email did have an effect. Educating users in 
phishing and online security can reduce their likelihood of being duped by a phishing 
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email, and such education offers possibly the sole route available to banks to reduce 
identity theft and its associated costs, although care must also be taken in selecting 
the correct approach to educating customers. However, experiment data actually 
confirm the limitations of reliance on user education since only 12% of participants 
who studied an on-line security tutorial on email and web site security were actually 
able to detect all of the fraudulent web sites presented to them in the experiment. 
The experiment results also highlighted that users dislike having security information 
hidden from them, especially when it prevents them completing the task they are 
attempting to perform. If their bank were to offer them security software to detect 
malware on their machine, users would therefore prefer that it kept them informed 
about threats. 
The CodeSure card is also shown to be a potential solution for banks to reduce the 
threat of phishing (and vishing) through the use of sender authentication procedures 
and users are much more likely to be confident in the validity of communications 
from their bank, resulting in a lower success rate for phishing and could help bring 
back customer confidence in the bank using such channels to communicate with their 
customers. The sender authentication mode of the CodeSure card proved to be a 
successful device in boosting customer trust in messages sent by the bank. This 
offers hope to banks in being able to re-establish trust in such channels and 
effectively use them as a means of communicating to their customers again. It also 
reduces the threat posed by phishing (and vishing) to the bank and offers customers a 
straightforward way to check the authenticity of messages without necessarily having 
been educated in Internet security. 
6.2. Limitations and Practical Issues 
Creating true-to-life prototypes of banking systems for these experiments was key to 
making the experience seem as real as possible for participants, thus making it 
possible to extrapolate experimental results into real world usage. Although still 
located in a usability laboratory setting, participants were immersed in the tasks and 
even when gaze tracking was being used it was unobtrusive and did not impede 
participants in their assigned tasks. 
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Several limitations on the use of gaze tracking cameras in such large-scale usability 
work were encountered leaving their use as such in question. For example, in the 
CodeSure Keypad and Display Synchrony experiment (Section 3.3) the gaze tracking 
cameras may sometimes have been blocked from tracking a participant’s gaze if they 
inadvertently moved their arm to obscure the line of sight between the camera and 
their eyes. The experiment design aimed to minimise this by suitably adjusting the 
position of the CodeSure card on the screen depending on if it was being used by a 
left or right-handed person, but the limitation was still an issue. Also, calibration of 
the gaze tracker camera was only performed for a participant at the start of each 
batch of tasks and participants may have been seated differently between tasks, 
resulting in the gaze tracker camera finding it difficult to locate their eyes and 
therefore generate accurate gaze data, mandating the need for periodic re-calibration 
of the camera, which is at odds with attempts to portray the experiment scenarios as 
being ‘normal’. 
The CodeSure multi-channel usability experiment (Chapter 4) attempted to compare 
the usage of the CodeSure card with today’s disparate authentication methods, 
resulting in a bias towards today’s methods most likely due to familiarity. To counter 
this, the experiment could perhaps have been combined with a longitudinal study that 
measured attitudes towards usability over a prolonged period of time, perhaps asking 
participants to repeat the experiment a week later in a similar way to the CodeSure 
card baseline usability experiment (Section 3.1). 
A limitation of the Phishing Emails experiment (Section 5.1) was that participants 
were constrained to using the supplied Webmail client to read and process the emails 
they were given. However, although participants were primed on the use of the 
Webmail client before the experiment, many would have been more familiar using 
other email clients or devices. As part of experiment procedure, participants were 
also restricted to reading the emails in the order they were given and had to open 
them before being allowed to delete them, a constraint that many participants would 
not have followed in real life. This highlights a general point to be made about all of 
the experiments presented in this research: whilst much effort was made to make 
experiment scenarios as realistic as possible, the experiments were still run within a 
laboratory setting with personas assigned to participants. 
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6.3. Ideas for Further Work 
Whilst the experiments presented here investigated the use of the CodeSure card in a 
wide selection of banking channels, use of the card in any of the physical channels 
such as ATM or counter, where the CodeSure card can be used as a normal debit or 
credit card, was not examined. Although there is no difference in usage between 
using a CodeSure card and a normal bank card at an ATM, it was never entirely clear 
that participants in this research were mindful, or perhaps even aware of, the fact that 
the CodeSure card could still be used as a normal bank card at an ATM or at a POS 
terminal in a shop. This would serve as an interesting new thread of research 
investigation. 
The aspect of the CodeSure card which drew the most negative criticism was the 
sensitivity of the keypad buttons. It would be interesting to investigate in a further 
usability experiment participants’ attitude to the usability of the CodeSure card with 
different button technologies, such as capacitive touch sensitivity as used in most 
touch screen phones. Whilst the CodeSure card might have a better response to 
button presses with capacitive technology, there could also be a negative reaction to 
over-sensitivity of the buttons. An experiment such as this would provide insight into 
the extent to which negative reaction to the sensitivity of the buttons dominated the 
overall usability ratings for the CodeSure card. 
With the growing use of mobile phones to access Internet banking, many banks offer 
an alternative mobile phone banking service which provides a more limited feature 
set compared to Internet banking yet is more suited for use with the smaller form 
factor of a mobile phone. Whilst not investigated in the experiments presented here, 
the reduced authentication that is typical for this banking channel would be 
interesting to investigate with the CodeSure card as an alternative to a predefined 
passcode. 
Finally, further work to investigate how best to generate and analyse pupil dilation 
data (as derived in the Malware Detection Software usability experiment reported 
here) as measured whilst participants were busy completing practical tasks would be 
of value.  Whilst the results shown for that experiment showed slight differences, any 
future research might benefit from using timestamps for key events during the tasks 
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so that a more detailed representation of pupil dilation could be obtained for such key 
points. This might lead to a better understanding of where users become more 
anxious and might help to influence the design of a better security procedure. 
6.4. Conclusions 
In all of the experiments presented here the CodeSure card was rated acceptably high 
in terms of mean usability. The usability and convenience of the CodeSure card were 
rated at odds with security, reflecting the belief that more complicated procedures are 
more secure, yet also not fully appreciating the need for more secure procedures to 
protect themselves from eCrime. Perhaps this need will become more apparent in 
years to come as more users become aware of security issues and usable security 
solutions are deployed. 
Overall, the research reported here is offered in support of the thesis that a usable 
security solution predicated on code-based multi-factor authentication will result in 
tangible improvements to actual security levels in banking and eCommerce services, 
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Appendix A. Description of Statistical Tests used 
in this Research 
A.1. Statistical Significance 
Probability, p, is defined as the likelihood (between 0 and 1) of a given event 
happening. The statistical significance of an experimental result is defined as the 
probability that the experiment would produce a result as strong as this by chance 
alone. 
Results can be referred to as being ‘significant’ (p<0.05, or 1 in 20 chance of 
happening by chance alone), ‘highly significant’ (p<0.01, or 1 in 100 chance of 
happening by chance alone) or ‘very highly significant’ (p<0.001, or 1 in 1000 
chance of happening by chance alone). 
Test statistics each have an idealised distribution which allows the calculation of the 
probability of obtaining the resulting value in the general population. If a result is 
found to be statistically significant, there are two possibilities. The first is that it was 
caused by a Type I error (false positive) where the populations are actually identical 
and there really is no difference and, purely by chance, larger values were obtained 
in one group and smaller values in the other. If statistically significant is defined to 
mean p<0.05, then there will likely be a significant finding in 5% of analyses where 
there really is no difference. Alternatively, a statistically significant result could be 
because the populations really are different, so the conclusion is correct. 
If a result is not found to be statistically significant, there is still a possibility that 
there is still an effect. This is termed a Type II error (false negative). There is a trade-
off in that making the chance of getting a Type I error smaller, the chance of getting 
a Type II error increases. 
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A.2. Statistical Tests 
The choice of test to use to analyse data depends on the type of data that was 
measured and the assumptions that each test makes about the data it is given. For 
example, parametric tests assume that the data is normally distributed and is interval 
data. After performing a particular test, the output can include the test statistic itself, 
a probability value (p) and the degrees of freedom used. The degrees of freedom (df) 
of a test statistic refers to the number of independent values that are free to vary in its 
calculation. Typically, the degrees of freedom will be the number of input parameters 
minus any that depend on other input parameters. 
The t-test is a parametric test used to compare the means of a single dependent 
variable between two different sample groups to determine if the difference is not 
just due to chance alone. The groups are determined by the independent variable and 
if there is a significant difference between the means then there is a high probability 
that the difference was caused by the effect of the independent variable. This 
assumes that the sample groups came from the sample population, that the data is 
normally distributed and that it is measured at the interval level. If the sample groups 
came from a repeated measures experiment (i.e. participants experienced both 
designs) then the paired samples t-test is used, otherwise the independent measures t-
test is used. 
When comparing more than two sample groups or more than one independent 
variable, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is used to investigate how the 
variables interact and which effects are important. Like the t-test, it is a parametric 
test, but it is also able to compare the means of three or more sample groups of 
between-subject and within-subject factors. The t-test is unsuitable for use on more 
than two groups because the repeated tests would inflate the cumulative Type I error. 
The ANOVA test manages to minimise such errors but can only test for an overall 
effect and does not provide information about which sample groups were affected. 
After performing an ANOVA test, post-hoc procedures using t-tests can be used to 
perform pairwise comparisons between selected combinations of the sample groups, 
thus determining where effects lie. The cumulative Type I error resulting from 
performing these tests is typically managed by applying Bonferroni adjustment 
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(Field, 2009) which adjusts the criterion for significance, and there are other 
adjustments that are more appropriate to use when very many tests are being 
performed. In repeated measures experiments with three or more sample groups, the 
ANOVA test has the additional assumption of sphericity, where variances across 
groups are assumed to be equal. Mauchly’s test is used to determine if the 
assumption of sphericity has been violated, and if so Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
can be applied to the output of the ANOVA. 
For two between-subjects variables measured on a category scale, a non-parametric 
test for associations between them can be performed with the chi-square test. The 
frequencies for each category are compared with those expected by chance and a 
probability score is calculated for the likelihood of an effect between the variables. 
The chi-square test requires that each of the frequencies in each category be greater 
than five and assumes that a participant will have contributed only once to just one 
variable. Analysis of success rates (pass or fail, encoded as 1 and 0) between two 
treatments in the same population can be performed with McNemar’s test, or with 
Cochran’s Q test for three or more treatments. 
The measure of scale reliability of a questionnaire can be ascertained by calculating 
Cronbach’s α. This compares all possible combinations of the split-half reliability 
(Field, 2009) of questionnaire responses for each participant to determine if all 
questions contribute equally well to the overall questionnaire. Values of α above 0.7 
are typical acceptable values for questionnaire reliability. 
All of the statistical analysis for the experiments presented in this work was carried 
out using SPSS1. 
                                                 
1 SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). 
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Appendix B. User Guides for the CodeSure Card 
 
Figure B.1: The CodeSure Card Baseline Usability Experiment 
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Figure B.2: The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment (Front Page) 
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Figure B.3: The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment (Baseline) 
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Figure B.4: The Enhanced CodeSure Card Usability Experiment (Enhanced) 
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Figure B.5: The CodeSure Keypad and Display Synchrony Experiment 
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Figure B.7: The CodeSure Sender Authentication Experiment 
